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I.

THE BIBLE AND THE WORD OF GOD.

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What is the Bible? The reply to this inquiry has been as divergent as the Bible is comprehensive and the needs of humanity are manifold and progressive. Every age has furnished its own answer. For this reason we will consider briefly, first of all, the historical aspect of the question.

In the development of the Jewish people certain Hebrew writings came to be regarded as Sacred Scripture, because of the subjects to which they related, and because it was believed that the truths which they contained were made known to their authors by the divine Spirit. But that the copyists did not believe in the sanctity of the letter is evident from the history of the variations, between the Septuagint and the Hebrew, which indicate a very free handling of the text. The Apostles and the other New Testament writers, in quoting from the Old Testament, also pay but little attention to verbal accuracy. They evidently looked upon the Law and the Prophets as containing divine truth and important predictions, but their attention was mainly fixed upon the substance of the writings, and not upon the words in which the thoughts were expressed.

The Jewish rabbis, in the time of, and subsequent to, the be-

ginning of the Christian era, entertained far more mechanical views. They believed that God either wrote all the Law with His own hand, or else dictated it word for word to Moses as His amanuensis. The prophetic writings were distinguished from the Law as inferior to it, and the poetical books were regarded as occupying a still lower plane.

When we turn our attention to the early Church Fathers, we find that they are, to a great extent, free from the crudities and extravagance of the rabbis, but living, as all men necessarily must, amid the conditions and environment of their own age, they could not escape from the influence of the mechanical theory of inspiration which was taught both in the Talmud and in the Platonic philosophy, a marked development of which we have in Philo's view.

They speak of the Scriptures as "divine," "God-inspired" and "heavenly," and regard them as infallible, although from the earliest times two tendencies manifested themselves, the one legal and traditional, and the other critical and speculative. But the representatives of both tendencies made free use of the allegorical method and thus had ample opportunity to escape from the tyranny of their theory, by reading any fanciful esoteric meaning desired, into the text, every jot and tittle of which, according to Origen, for instance, was inspired in the highest degree, while, at the same time, he could speak of the "scandals," "offences" and "impossibilities" which cleave to the letter.

For a time the allegorical method had free scope, but by and by the Church found it necessary to limit this arbitrary mode of dealing with the Bible. Hence there gradually arose the churchly and dogmatic control of Scripture. Discussions, polemical writings and the decisions of general councils followed, and continued into the Middle Ages. Then came the period of scholasticism, with its powerful thinkers, endless questions and hair-splitting trivialities, in connection with the dogmas of the Church. The revival of learning, and the rise of the *Renaissance*, which touched all departments of human life, led also to a more careful study of Sacred Scripture, and thus opened the way for the Ref-

ormation, which rediscovered the Bible, and found it to be practically a new book. It was now studied and handled without rules or theories. It appealed to the Reformers not primarily through dogmas, confessions and creeds, but as the word of God, and therefore as an all-sufficient guide in faith and morals. The Bible, as the word of God, was primary and fundamental. Everything else was secondary. With the Reformers the first question always was, What saith the Lord?

But while they continually appealed to the word of God, which they found in the Bible, they also saw and felt that the Bible and the word of God were not in all respects identical. This was particularly the case with Luther, who vehemently affirms that a single letter of Scripture is of more consequence than heaven and earth, while at the same time he rejects as faulty not only certain passages, but even entire books. He can find no place for the Apocalypse, makes light of Jude and speaks of James as an epistle of straw. Zwingli admitted the existence of historical errors in the Bible, and Calvin saw the inferior and temporary character of the Old Testament. And yet they all stoutly maintained that in the Bible believers possess the unerring word of God, which the Pope has no right to contradict or oppose, which will overcome all opposition, and is the unfailing source of new life and power to the Church, being authoritative and sufficient concerning things necessary to salvation, both as respects faith and as respects morals.

But the Reformers had neither time nor inclination to form a dogmatic theory of inspiration. During the 17th century, however, as the Roman Catholic Church continued to emphasize her infallibility, the Protestant Church began to feel the need of a counter instrument, which could be appealed to as wholly divine and unquestionably infallible, and as, therefore, more than a match for the infallibility of the Church of Rome, which it was claimed was only a pretense. It was accordingly maintained that to hold fast to the absolute infallibility and equal verbal inspiration of all parts of the Bible was a *necessary assumption of faith*. This arbitrary theory of an infallible letter continued

until about the middle of the 18th century, when the historical conditions under which the biblical writings originated, and by which they were shaped, commenced to be taken into account.

Since that time two tendencies have been at work, the one traditional and conservative, the other critical and progressive. The struggle has passed through various phases of mysticism, rationalism and critical historical inquiry, freely modified by the marvelous discoveries of science, until so prominent a public journal as the *New York Tribune* boldly asserts that "the doctrine of evolution has overthrown the popular anthropomorphic conception of God, and the popular belief in the literal truthfulness of the Bible." Whether the doctrine of evolution has done this, or not, something certainly has happened.

The Bible, in the form in which it used to be accepted, is slipping away from us. It no longer has the kind of power in reference to scientific questions that it once had. Formerly it was regarded as an oracle, containing an account of the creation scientifically correct. The first question, therefore, with relation to the advances of science always was whether its claims were in agreement with revelation. The Church, drawing its proofs from Scripture, compelled Galileo to retract his contention that the earth revolves around the sun. When the discoveries of geology first began to make known the antiquity of the earth and the manner of its formation, its conclusions were set aside as impossible because in conflict with the infallible statements of the Mosaic record. In our time all this has been reversed. The Bible no longer coerces science, but science coerces the Bible. Instead of squaring the facts of geology with the Bible, the modern defense of Scripture admits without question that geology is right and then endeavors to show how the biblical account of the creation may be reconciled with the established facts of physical science.

The Bible, interpreted according to the old methods, no longer leads, but follows timidly in the wake of science, like a once mighty giant shorn of its strength. Nature is eagerly studied, and when its processes are made known, they can neither be set



aside nor ignored. The reconcilers seemed to be able to manage astronomy and geology, but when it came to the doctrine of evolution it was soon evident that no reconciliation along the old lines of thinking was any longer possible.

The question, What is the Bible? thus returns upon us with redoubled force.

The true answer to this inquiry can be found only by a free but reverent examination of the Bible itself, subjecting the books of which it is composed to the same searching scrutiny to which other important literary works are subjected, inquiring into their authorship and manner of composition, and the literary methods of the age and people which produced them; in fact, by remembering and realizing that *the Bible is literature* and can be properly understood only according to the methods by which other literature is understood. Its divinity does not make it any the less human, but more so. The holy men of God, who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, still spoke according to human conditions and in all respects in an intensely human manner. To understand them we must take into consideration the time, place, environment and way of thinking of the people among whom they lived, as well as each writer's personality, training, temperament and immediate purpose.

Such a course of procedure will not hinder us from coming to a knowledge of the divine revelation which is contained in the productions of the biblical writers. On the contrary, it will help us to appreciate all the more the great truths which are enshrined in the Bible. To admit frankly the limitations and imperfections which honest scholarship has found in the Scriptures is not to question the presence of the supernatural in them, or to discredit either revelation or inspiration. Man, created in the image of God who is Spirit, has a divinely derived constitution, and as such is a spiritual being. God dwells with him in the spirit and thus can make Himself known. In revelation He inwardly discloses His thoughts and will, and in connection with this disclosure the recipient's soul is divinely quickened and elevated, that is, inspired. Revelation and inspiration have, however, not been

confined to a few individuals in one particular nation. On the contrary, they have been and are now as broad as the race. Every man has something of the Spirit of God in him, and therefore all men are potentially inspired. But this possibility becomes actual only in those who are challenged with divine truth and open their hearts to its reception. *The Hebrew and Christian Scriptures are the most highly inspired of all books because their authors give an adequate account of the closest approach which God has made to man on earth.* The power and efficacy of the Bible do not lie in the fact that it was given to the world in a manner different from other sacred writings. The primary question to be settled is not that of its inspiration. The conviction that it is inspired came in the first place as an inference and must always come in the same way. The Apostles believed that the Old Testament was inspired, but they did not so regard their own writings. The Christian Church has, however, discovered in the Gospels and Epistles the highest degree of divine power and therefore of inspiration. So to-day, the best way to approach the Bible is not under the influence of a theory of inspiration, but with an honest desire to become fully acquainted with a book which must be allowed to speak for itself in its own manner, without any reference to the question as to whether it is inspired or not inspired. Every other valuable book that we know of had to make its way into recognition and influence without any previous claims in its favor. The question is never raised whether Homer, Shakespeare and Bunyan are inspired, but the excellence of their literary productions is more fully appreciated by each succeeding generation. Now, whatever men may say about inspiration, the real truth of the matter is that the Bible can survive and maintain its supremacy, only by submitting to every form of criticism that can be brought against it. If it is a better and a truer book than any other, as we emphatically believe it is, it will rise to, and remain at the top; otherwise it will go down. The time is rapidly approaching when we will no longer ask, whether the Bible has come from God to men in a manner different from other good books, but

whether it has more of God in it than other literature. And, if the external prop of mechanical inspiration is taken away, the power of the Bible will not wane, but, on the contrary, it will increase. *Truth can always be depended upon to make its way without the help of any pretended authority lying back of it.* The Bible without any theories to hold it up and give it recognition is great enough to secure its own supremacy. No other book has ever taken such a hold on the world.\*

The revelation of which the Hebrew people were the bearers, through their theocratic institutions, worship, customs, rites and individual prophets, is recorded by the Old Testament writers as they were able to receive and transmit what was made known. In the New Testament we find the same law; making room both for

\*"What is the Bible to the Christian man? *His authority as to Christ and the Christian experience*; or, more tersely, his authority on Redemption. This involves the question, How does the Bible become to him such an authority? The standard answer has been: 'Because the Bible is inspired.' Another answer (Principal Fairbairn) has been: 'Because the Bible is a revelation of God.' Another answer (Robertson Smith) has been: 'Because the Holy Spirit authenticates the Bible in the believer's soul.' The key, though, to the complete answer lies in the fact that the Bible is implicated in the process by which the Christian experience is obtained. Beginning with the sense of sin, this is gained whenever the Holy Ghost can relate a man's ethical unrest to the demands of God. These demands are often forced upon the conscience by Christian testimony and preaching; but when the man yields to these demands he recognizes that the final authority for them is the Bible. So with the man's initial belief in our Lord, there is the Holy Spirit and a varying complex of influences; but the complex is made effective by the Scripture record of the birth, work, claims and personality of Jesus. Precisely so, whatever the preparation, it is the Bible, read or heard, which masters a sinner under the stress placed upon the Saviour's death. \* \* \* \* \*

"If the Bible is authority as to Redemption, still there is need of understanding this authority. How, then, can a Christian man understand the Bible? I answer: 'By means of his Christian consciousness.' Without noting the shades in usage, since the days of Lessing, and then of Schleiermacher, economically I can say that by Christian consciousness is here meant, the *insight* resulting from the domination of the mind by Christian experience," modified by environment and historical conditions. "In this insight are two elements, one intellectual, the other intuitional. \* \* \* In the profoundest sense the Bible is a progressive revelation to the Christian man. \* \* \* As Professor Bowne has said: 'Truth is revealed only when it is understood, and in this sense the revelation of God is still going on.'"—Professor Curtis in *The Independent*, Nov. 18, 1897.

Paul's and for James's conception of Christianity. In Christ the truth comes out centrally and fully, but is imperfectly recorded, being transmitted through varying traditions. How easily Jesus could have put His revelation into the form of a carefully prepared infallible book! But He wrote nothing. He simply intrusted the truth, which He desired to impart, to living men. He made no provision whatever to have His words and His works recorded in a book, but He took the greatest possible care to secure no less than twelve men, who should be constantly with Him, and thus become his disciples and apostles, each with a somewhat different conception of His person, and each sure to give his own account of Christ, in his own way. Instead of exerting Himself to produce an exact infallible document to speak for Him, He selected men of different types and temperaments and endeavored to secure their apprehension of himself, each in his own manner.

This enabled Him to give to the world a better and fuller revelation of Himself, although less inerrant. When the New Testament literature came to be written and collected, the Church, in addition to the Acts of the Apostles and the Apocalypse, found itself in possession of four brief memoirs of the Saviour, composed from four different standpoints, containing discrepancies and difficulties that cannot be honestly explained away, and yet withal such a full, varied and many-sided portraiture of Christ as no single biographer could possibly ever have produced; and of epistles which were written mainly to supplement the living voice of the preacher, whose presence it was not always possible to secure at all the places where it was desired.

What was the purpose of all this on the part of our Lord but to emphasize the mighty fact of biogenesis—that life can only come from life? A living stalk of wheat cannot be produced by writing a book on wheat. The living seed alone can bring forth the living stalk and the golden harvest. Christianity cannot be propagated by a book. "Ye search the Scriptures," says Jesus, "because ye think that in them ye have eternal life, and these are they which bear witness of me." The Bible is the greatest historical witness to the truth of the Gospel, embodying the ex-

periences of God's children, and telling of Him who is the way, the truth and the life, but the Scriptures are not the life. Their office is to bear witness of the life, which is in Christ and in His people.

The value of the Bible cannot be overestimated as such a witness-bearer to the truth. The experiences of Abraham, David and Isaiah, of Peter, Paul and John, and especially of the Lord Jesus Christ, constitute a many-sided mirror, in which the children of God can see reflected all the needs of their lives, in virtue of which the Bible becomes a lamp unto their feet and a light unto their path. Its varied lines, so complex and numerous, all converge and gather themselves up in the universal Man, who is the solution of all riddles, and the only source of spiritual life and light, for in Him alone dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. He is God manifest in the flesh, the personal utterance of the Divine, the Logos incarnate. He illuminates, interprets, corrects and fulfills the written word. His words, His acts, His life, His person are of central and fundamental importance. In Him revelation and inspiration reach their perfection. His person, words and deeds are, in a unique sense, creative and epoch-making. We can understand the Scriptures only as we understand Him. In the Bible we find God not only adapting Himself to human capacity, but also submitting to its limitations. Man's reception of the divine, however real, true and vital, goes forward within the confines of progressive apprehension. Some parts of the Bible express divine truth very imperfectly, as, for instance, the Book of Ecclesiastes, the Book of Esther and the 109th Psalm. Jesus Christ is the touch-stone by which all Scripture must be judged.

The relation of the Bible to the word of God now begins to appear. The Bible contains and is the word of God, but its various parts differ greatly in their degree of inspiration, and the divine word is not confined to the Bible. What then is the word of God. A very simple definition, and probably the best that can be given is this: *The word of God is what God says to His people*, whether in or outside of the Bible. It is a great mistake

to identify the word of God with the Bible. Just as the imperfections and discrepancies of Scripture are not words of God, so, on the other hand, God says much to His children, in addition to that which is set forth in Scripture. The Bible is finished, but the word of God is still in process of delivery. *The Bible gives us an account of God's dealings with certain individuals, families and nations in past ages, and, because God is unchangeable and self-consistent, it is the accredited standard by which are tested all utterances, whether past or present, which claim to have divine authority.* But the word of God is broader and deeper than what is written, because its kingdom embraces Him who is the author of all truth and the deepest reality of the whole creation. Jesus Christ has a message for every age and for every man on every worthy subject. His words are still spirit and life. As such they enter into the life of the community and of the individual. The living God speaks living words to living men. The Bible enshrines His mind and heart, His will and purposes, His life and love, His very self, to as great an extent as a series of writings, which are the product of personal communion with God, can do so. And the Bible has been used as a powerful factor in making Him known, particularly when it has been interpreted, as it always should be, in the light of its central truths, which are that the Son of God is come in the flesh, and that the believer is freely justified by faith in Him. But revelation cannot be confined within circumscribed limits, even though these limits be the Bible. It comes through history, which is as broad as humanity. It simmers and glows in human hearts and minds until it comes to the birth in one, or in many servants of Jehovah. It means the breaking in of divine truth into the mind, and is conditioned by the degree of receptivity at hand in communities and individuals. It is not wholly absent from Pagan nations, and among Christians is not entirely restricted to the religious sphere. Every pure poetic vision, every genuine philosophic intuition, as well as every great generalization and every seizure of a salient law of the universe, must be regarded as a revelation of the divine, and thus as a new word of God.



A similar movement, but of a higher order, goes forward within the distinctively Christian sphere. This is evident from the fact that the Bible means more to every succeeding Christian era than it did to previous ones. The truth of which it speaks is not only better understood, but is also more fully revealed through its many-sided adaptation to varying historical conditions. Christ's all-pervading life, which is the deepest power at work among Christian nations, embodies itself in and through His people, who must learn to give expression to the truth which He imparts to them as they are able to bear and use it. According to their degree of receptivity He makes His word known to chosen men, and thus fits them to give direction to Christian thought in the midst of crises and exigencies. This opens the way for new applications of the fundamental principles of Christianity, as was the case, for instance, when the American conscience demanded the abolition of slavery within our borders. Such is the case now with certain sociological and other well-known scientific and religious problems.

The word of God is making itself heard and felt with regard to all of these issues; even with relation to the Bible itself. It does this by bringing home to the consciousness of the Church of Christ what Sacred Scripture really is, and therefore we need have no fears as to the outcome. Already there is a very general consensus of opinion that the Bible is not a scientific treatise, that it has no ready made answers on any subjects, that it is not a thesaurus of proof-texts, that it does not anticipate the discoveries of astronomy, geology, biology and evolution, and that it need not be reconciled with science, because it looks at the subjects, in which both are interested, from a different standpoint and for another purpose, being concerned only with the religious aspect of the problem.

The study of the Bible as literature has shattered many beautiful theories, has exploded numerous pet traditions, has produced endless confusion in the camp of the bibliolaters, and has alarmed those who pin their faith to the letter of the record, but it is also liberating the book, which neither friend nor foe has been able to



destroy, by subjecting it to the scientific scrutiny, which in this age of inquiry nothing can escape. We are beginning to see that a literature which is the outflow of personal communion with God is safe, and that searching investigation and merciless criticism are only burning away the dross and bringing to light the truth. The Lord Jesus Himself is the real author of the rallying cry, "Back to Christ." The substance of His teaching is: Come to me, and through me go to the Bible, and through my words come back to me; for in me only will you find rest, by finding life and light.

READING, PA.

## II.

### PRESENT STATUS OF THEOLOGY IN THIS COUNTRY.

REV. A. E. TRUXAL, D.D.

That Theology is a progressive science will not be questioned by many of the readers of this REVIEW. Its course, like that of other sciences, is ever onward and forward. As the world advances in intelligence, knowledge and culture, theology advances too. Investigation, study and experience always enlarge and correct man's understanding of any subject. Theology forms no exception to this rule.

The Bible furnishes the material for the science of Theology. And the Bible never changes. It is a finished book. As the original manuscripts of the various books of the Bible have long since perished and as we possess only copies of them more or less distantly removed, there is of course a possibility, if not, indeed, a strong probability, that some words and passages in our Bible are not authentic. And the copyists may have omitted words and sentences here and there, and changed or modified others. Nevertheless there is a vast abundance in the Bible well authenticated upon which to rest the Christian faith, worship and life. So that it still remains true that the Bible never changes; that it is a finished book.

But the apprehension of the Bible does change from age to age. The Church learns by experience. Light comes to the Christian theologian from the history of the Church as this has been unfolded in the centuries that have passed away. Man's general conceptions are modified, changed and enlarged by the advancement made in natural knowledge. The theologian's knowledge of man and the world will influence his theological conceptions. As progress is made in the sciences of cosmogony, astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, psychology, ethics,

archæology, language and history, the study of Theology is stimulated and necessitated to conform itself to the new conditions created. The Bible is re-studied and its teaching apprehended from the standpoint gained by the advancement made in the natural sciences. New conditions demand a new application of the truth revealed through the word of God, and Theology is ever ready to bring the truth of God to bear upon every condition, relationship and need of the world's life.

Again, the Holy Spirit is given to the disciples to guide them into all truth. That promise is still in force. The Holy Spirit remains in the Church and with Christians. It seems to us, consequently, that we must believe, and that it is our privilege and pleasure to believe, that Christians are led by the spirit of the Lord from age to age into clearer, fuller and more correct conceptions of revealed truth. Hence it follows that there is progress in Theology. Old ideas wear out and pass away and new ones are called forth to take their place. The religious consciousness of the Church changes. Theologians modify and amend their views. Former conceptions are dismissed and new ones formed. This makes Theology a living science. If it were a fixed science it would be a dead science, and a dead Theology would soon be followed by a dormant church.

The progress in Theology, however, is neither rapid, constant nor regular. The theology of a given period may be better in many respects than that immediately following. The history of the Church furnishes a number of examples establishing this fact. Yet taking in view the entire course Christianity has run, it is still apparent that Theology is a progressive science. Sometimes, it is true, it remains very much the same through a number of centuries. Then again, in the course of a single generation many changes take place in theological thought. These changes, however, are never either violent or great. The bulk of Theology of any age is always conserved in the subsequent period. Ideas grow slowly and die slowly. This fact is illustrated by the views held in regard to the atonement. During a period of nine hundred years the theory was generally maintained that the death of

Christ was a ransom paid to the devil, who, it was supposed, had obtained some right in man. For another nine hundred years now the Anselmic theory, in one form or another, has held sway in nearly all theological systems. This view is in the present day being very seriously questioned by many theologians. We mention these things in this connection to show that ideas and general conceptions are of exceedingly slow growth. Yet it still remains true that Theology is evermore modifying and changing itself, and hence assumes new forms from time to time. Protestant Theology has run through different periods or stages which may be designated as Reformation Theology, Confessional Theology, Rationalistic Theology and Evangelistic Theology. And from present indications it would seem that a new phase is about to challenge the world, which may, perhaps, properly be called Ethical Theology. This brings us to note more particularly the present status of Theology as it prevails amongst us.

We can, of course, speak on this subject only in a very general way. The field of Theology in the present day is a very large one. Very many subjects are being investigated and studied, and they are viewed under a variety of aspects. And in regard to most of these subjects many different views are expressed, so that it is a difficult matter to obtain a full view of the whole field and to discern clearly the real status of Theology at the present time. One thing, however, is very clear, and that is that many of the most recent productions do not hold close by the confessional standards of the Church. The standards of the sixteenth and seventh centuries no longer control the thinking of theologians as was the case fifty and a hundred years ago. So that the confessions of the churches are not the key to the prevailing theology.

*First.* The Bible as a book or as The Book, is not viewed in the same light in which it was formerly considered. Biblical criticism as this has been carried on during the last half of the century has caused theologians to form new conceptions with reference to the Book of Books. That this is the case is evident from the fact that the question has been raised, What is the

Bible? And the various answers given to this question constitute still further evidence that the thought of the Church is undergoing a change in regard to this subject. The human side of the Book has been brought forward for consideration. Its production and formation have been investigated. The Book has been taken apart and the different parts have been analyzed. All portions of it have been scrutinized and are not regarded as of like value or equally inspired. It is held that it contains a divine revelation and that it is a divine revelation. But it has largely been robbed of its charm as being wholly and purely a divine Book. This fact has shocked some pious thinkers and filled them with fear and trembling. But it need not be an evil: just so the Book has not lost its value and interest for any one as revealing to man the truth, the will and the purpose of God. We do not in this connection take upon ourself the difficult task of describing the prevailing views of the Bible held by the Church at the present time. Our present purpose is simply to note the fact that as a general rule the Bible is not regarded in the same light by theologians of the day in which it was held in former periods of the Protestant Church; and, further, to state that this change has been brought about by the Higher Criticism.

*Second.* It must be observed also that the doctrine of the inspiration of the Bible has been undergoing a change in the minds of many theological thinkers. The plenary inspiration of the Scriptures is no longer held as formerly. Some writers do indeed yet use the term to set forth their position on the subject; but when they explain their idea of plenary inspiration they at once show their conception to be something different from the thought attached to the term in former times. In fact, the tendency of theological thought of the present day is to attach much less importance and value to the idea of inspiration than was formerly the case. Dr. Behrends, in his book, "The Old Testament Under Fire," which is a work on the conservative or traditional side of Theology, makes the following statement: "The doctrine of inspiration, as so conservative a theologian as the late Dr. Chalmers frankly admitted, has never been definitely formu-

lated ; and it may be doubted whether it ever can be. It really belongs to speculative divinity. The only practical question is whether the statement of fact and doctrine, given in the Scriptures, are trustworthy and authoritative in the realm of faith and conduct." In other words, do the sacred Scriptures reveal the truth of God ? Do they make known, as nothing else does or can, the will and purpose of God in regard to man ? If so, the form and degree of inspiration, the nature and character of it, are questions of minor importance. The doctrine in regard to the divine inspiration of the Scriptures has for many minds lost its significance. Yet it must be admitted, on the other hand, that some defenders of the faith hold that the maintenance of the Church and the existence of our holy Christianity depend on the inspiration of the Scriptures ; that when inspiration is lost, all is lost.

*Third.* Another special feature of Theology in the present day is the prominence given to Biblical Theology. This department has developed a more specific meaning than formerly. Biblical Theology, is, of course, nothing new. But in former periods it was studied largely in the light of preconceived theories or systems. Whether avowedly or not, the teachings of the Bible and of the books of the Bible were studied with the view of making them support some system of dogmatic Theology. Biblical Theology of the present day is pursued, as much as possible, independently of Systematic Theology. The efforts put forth have in view the discovery of the real meaning of the sacred writings. The question is, what subjects does this or that writer treat in his book or books, and what views does he express in regard to them ? The aim of Biblical Theology is to bring out the facts as they appear in the various books of the Bible. The primary duty of the bibliologist is not to harmonize and systematize the various teachings of the authors of the scriptural books, but to discover and set forth these teachings truthfully and correctly. He must forget everything else excepting the subject before him and pursue it faithfully to the end, regardless of consequences. Biblical Theology, as thus studied, becomes exceedingly interesting,

and very important too. It is claimed, and we believe justly, that the importance of this branch is fully equal to that of Systematic Theology. Dogmatists, on the other hand, insist that Systematic Theology must ever remain the leading and controlling department of theological science.

*Fourth.* Many writers of the present day make the love of God central for their thinking rather than His power. The controlling idea in their treatises is divine goodness instead of divine sovereignty. And when love is made the governing idea nearly all the various subjects belonging to the sphere of Theology appear in a different light from that in which they are presented when divine power is made the controlling thought. When the power of God is focal in a system of Theology, the various topics relate themselves to the focus and to each other in a certain order and with a certain meaning and force. When the love of God is made focal these topics assume a different arrangement towards each other and to the focus, and severally take on a new or at least modified meaning and carry with them either greater or less significance than formerly. That the idea of love is affecting much of the theological thinking of the day is quite evident. What influence it will have in modifying and changing existing systems of Theology we would not undertake to predict. But from the present outlook it would seem to us that some old ideas for a long time tenaciously held, will, in the near future, be driven from the field.

*Fifth.* Closely connected with the conception that God is primarily a God of love are the ideas expressed by the terms, the Fatherhood of God, and the Brotherhood of Man. These are very popular sentiments at the present time. They have taken a firm hold on the minds and hearts of the Christian masses and have found acceptance with many teachers and preachers of the Gospel. They are most positively and rejoicingly proclaimed from the religious rostrum. Religious assemblies are inspired with these ideas and their halls are made to resound with their repeated utterance. A large portion of the pulpit delights in proclaiming the thoughts that God is the Father of all men, and that all men are brethren one of another.



These two propositions, however, stand in opposition to theological views previously entertained. It had been held for many years in certain portions of the Church that God is the Father of the elect only; that the non-elect can in no proper sense be regarded as the children of God. Again in other systems of thought the proposition had been laid down, that God is the Father only of the Lord Jesus Christ and of those who have become united to Him by regeneration. All those who are out of Christ, who, according to the first conception mentioned, are the non-elect, are the children of wrath or the children of the devil. The general position on which these views rest is that all men through the fall have lost their sonship. None are the children of God. And, hence, those only whom God, according to His own good will and pleasure, has elected to faith and glory, or those who have been redeemed through the Lord Jesus Christ by faith in Him, do and can have God for their Father. All others remain under the bondage of sin and are of their father, the devil. But the pulpit of the present day, the religious platform and most of the popular theological writings have discarded these views and they emphasize the fact that God, in a very important sense, is the Father of all men, has a fatherly interest in all, and desires the salvation and eternal blessedness of all. These two general conceptions which seem not to agree with each other are after all closely related and perhaps they may be reconciled with one another; but it is nevertheless true that religious thought and feeling in regard to this phase of theology are flowing in new channels in these latter days.

*Sixth.* Another doctrine, once very generally held and taught, that is now being modified by the views of the present day, is the doctrine of man's total depravity. It has been held that man, through the dire effects of sin, has become religiously and morally dead, spiritually helpless and hopeless; that of himself he cannot think a good thought or perform a good act; that he cannot believe unless power be first given him from on high—for faith is the gift of God; that no man can come to the Lord Jesus Christ to follow Him unless the Father draw him; that man is not able

even to respond to the overtures of grace unless power be given him to do so.

That man is a sinner and needs the help and grace of God is admitted by all; but that he is so utterly depraved and helpless as the above view represents him is seriously questioned by many theological thinkers. There are those now who reject the doctrine of total depravity as it had been generally held from the time of Augustine onward. These believe that some moral worth and ability remain in man; that redemption and salvation involve an ethical process; that man can respond to the overtures of mercy and assert his will in favor of the good by which he is confronted through the gospel; and that the key to the situation as it really exists is to be found in the words of Scripture which say: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do for His good pleasure," in which the two factors in the process are recognized—man's work and God's work. They do not believe that mankind is a mass of moral corruption. On the other hand, they hold that some good is to be found in individuals that may be impregnated and quickened by the Holy Spirit through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ. These cannot understand that it is necessary to make men utterly worthless morally in order that God and His grace may be glorified by man's salvation. To their minds more glory would accrue to God and the grace of God by the salvation of a being with moral powers in active exercise than of one whose moral faculties are dead.

*Seventh.* Another subject in regard to which present theology, at least a large portion of it, is not in agreement with the old, is the reconciliation between God and man. The prevalent views of the past have been that God needs to be reconciled to man, or that mercy and justice in the God-head need to be reconciled to each other; that God has been alienated from man, that He is angry with man on account of his sins, that His wrath rests upon man; that something must now be done in order to reconcile God to man again, that His anger must be appeased and His wrath removed in order to the possibility of man's salvation and glorifi-

cation. But man cannot make the necessary satisfaction ; God, therefore, gives His only begotten Son to become man, suffer and die, and by his sacrificial death satisfy the justice of God and thus make room for the exercise of divine mercy towards man, and change the anger and wrath of God into pleasure and good will.

Much of the theology of the day sets these views aside and brings to the fore-front the idea that man needs to be reconciled to God. The obstruction is in man, not in God ; man needs to be brought into proper relation to God, not God to man ; while *we* were enemies, *we* were reconciled to God ; God has reconciled *us* to Himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation. The emphasis is placed on the necessity of man's reconciliation to God from whom he had become alienated through sin.

There may be a sense in which both propositions are true. Man and God may need to be reconciled to each other. There can be no question as to man's alienation from God ; and the attitude of God's feelings can not be the same towards a sinner as it is towards a saint. But it does make a difference in theology as to which side of the reconciliation is mainly emphasized ; and theological thinking of the present day to a very considerable extent lays the greatest stress on the necessity of man's reconciliation to God, and in so far forth the old theology is being modified.

*Eighth.* In regard to the atonement, Theology is in an unsettled state. Many theologians can no longer endorse the penal suffering or substitutionary theory that has in one form or another prevailed in the Church for many years. There never was at any time in the history of the Church an exact unanimity of thought and belief in reference to the atonement ; yet every age has had a prevailing view. Previous to Anselm for a period of nine hundred years the doctrine generally held was, that the death of Christ was a ransom paid to Satan in order to satisfy his right in man obtained through the fall. This view was maintained by such able men as Origen, Irenæus and Augustine. By Anselm then was formulated the conception that the sacrifice of Christ was neces-

sary to bring about a reconciliation between justice and mercy in the Godhead and thus make man's salvation possible. The ransom was paid to God. To this conception were added afterwards more definitely the ideas of substitution and vicarious suffering. This enlarged Anselmic view has for a long time prevailed very generally in the Church. It is found in various theological systems; it has entered into the confessions, the prayers and the hymnology of the Church to a large extent.

But in the meantime other theories have been advocated, too. The *moral influence* theory was taught by Abelard, Maurice, Bushnell and others; the *governmental* theory by Hugo Grotius; the *mystical* theory by modern German theologians and Mercersburg theology; and at present, views are being promulgated which may properly be called, we think, the *obedience* theory.

The substitutionary and penal suffering theory is being assailed on all sides as having too many unmoral features connected with it and being weighted down with consequences that cannot be maintained. The critics hold that the ideas of justice, righteousness and others, lodged in the moral nature of man must have their source in the Divine Being; that if God Himself acted on the basis of moral ideas different from those which He has given to man and according to which man must act, then there could be no communion and fellowship of man with God, and religion would be only a vain show without any real meaning. The penal suffering theory tested by the laws of ethics is found wanting. Our idea of righteousness will not permit one moral agent to suffer for the sins of another. Our conception of morality will not allow the idea of transferring the moral character, good or bad, from one person to another. We have not the space left to mention and describe all the objections that have been raised to the substitution theory of the atonement. We simply note their existence. What is wanting at present is a definitely stated and fully elaborated theory of the atonement that will meet all the objections that have been raised against the theories heretofore promulgated. Perhaps some genius will be moved in the near future to produce a work on the subject that will satisfy the relig-

ious consciousness of the day, though some German theologians, of the Ritschl school, question whether the human mind is capable of formulating a theory of the atonement that will be consistently logical throughout and true to all the facts in the case.

The theology of the day falls into two schools: the traditional and conservative, and the radical and progressive; or the old and the new. It may be said that the old rests on the Word of God and therefore must be true. That is begging the question. The question is, What do the Scriptures teach on these various subjects? The advocates of the New Theology hold that the Scriptures do not teach many of the views that have been held. All parties must appeal to the Word of God for justification of their position. A proper and correct understanding of the teaching of the Scriptures is involved in the true Theology.

How far will the new ideas in the various departments of Theology enter into the general religious thought of the country? Different predictions have been made in answer to this question. The New Theology may be only a passing hurricane; then let us stand aside, and let it pass. It may be the beginning of a steady rain that will refresh the dry and thirsty ground of the theological plain; then let us not fear it.

### III.

## SOCIAL EVOLUTION, BY BENJAMIN KIDD.

### A DIGEST

BY REV. CHARLES E. CORWIN.

We stand at a crisis in the world's history. Through all previous ages there has been an evolution of society, but it has never been more rapid than in the immediate past. Within a century there has been a wonderful advance in all departments of human knowledge, yet we only stand at the doorstep of the temple of social science. Sociology has hardly assumed the dignity of a science, for, while chemistry and astronomy have attained unity and stability, a proper foundation for further advanced sociology is yet in a chaotic state, the stones of the future edifice are indeed hewn in the quarry, but the structure itself is still unbuilt. The last century taught mankind the political commandment, "Thou shalt cease to be a slave of the nobles and despots who oppress thee, thou art free and sovereign." Mankind has in general learned this lesson, but the problem now before us, as yet unsolved, is expressed thus: "It is a grand thing to be free and sovereign, but how is it that the sovereign often starves?" For the solution of this problem all departments of knowledge must contribute. Too long has man in society been considered in a partial and therefore false manner. "To the politician he has been the mere opportunist; to the historian he has been the sport of forces apparently subject to no law; to the exponent of religion he has been the creature of another world, and to the political economist he has been the covetous machine." The time has come for social science to proceed on the method of the other sciences and, sending her roots down wherever she may find nourishment, to bear on her boughs the fruits of an investigation, not partial and lawless, but com-

plete and according to the great law of evolution which holds throughout the universe.

II. There is no phenomenon so wonderful as the evolution of human society. We trace the progress of mankind from the day when, as a brute-like creature, he lurked amid the rocks and woods, to the present, when he is only a little lower than the angels, and has authority over the birds of the air and the beasts of the field, when he stands lord of creation, having conquered the earth and subdued it. Yet man is a part of nature and subject to the same laws of progress which are the same now as they ever were. What is the law of progress? It is the law of selection and rejection. "Progress has been due to the opportunity of those individuals who are a little superior in some respects to their fellows of asserting their superiority and of continuing to live, and of promulgating as an inheritance that superiority." It is the law which Christ formulated thus: "To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." With man this law can be traced throughout his history. The first feature which we note in primitive society is its military character. The secret of success of all savage society is the secret of success of the fighting organization. We watch the growth of the great world powers of antiquity from Babylon to the culmination of military society in Rome, and we find the same law of progress through conflict. We behold Rome overcome by the force of the barbarians and we watch with wonder the operation of the same law during the middle ages, that seed time of the modern world. While the law still acts its method changes, for no longer is the conflict so much one of clans as it is of individuals. Development and progress is still by fiery competition. Wars in future will probably cease, but the condition of human progress will remain the same, that condition which appears so stern, but is in reality a law of mercy, if not to the present at least to the future, the law of the survival of the fittest.

III. While evolution proceeds in the whole universe according to this law, yet in the case of man its action is modified by two



factors, his reason and his capacity for action in society. Man can only reach his highest development in society, and therefore whenever individual interests conflict with social interests it is all important that the interests of the individual be subordinated to the interests of society. The great law which we have considered requires for the evolution of any form of life that the few individuals succeed at the expense of the many. If, however, we may suppose that any species of creature could at any time remove the onerous conditions of the progress of their race they would gladly do so. True, the removal of this law would mean the progressive degeneration of the race, but what creature would weigh the advantage of his descendants born ages hence against his own personal comfort which he would increase by the removal of this law. It is obvious that none of the lower forms of life have the power to even modify the law of progress by which the descendants profit at their expense. The new factor apparent in the evolution of man, however, is reason, which renders him capable of suspending in great measure the operation of this law. The development of his interests, all-important to him, and the development of the interests of the social organization, all-important to the race, are not identical. Why then does he subordinate his personal interests to the interests of future generations in whose prosperity he can have no share?

IV. The most characteristic phenomena of human society are the phenomena of religion. All civilization, customs, habits were grounded in religion. All mankind, whether conscious of it or not, are subject to its influence, not least those who profess to have escaped from its authority. In all this vast series of phenomena man is discovered to be in some way in conflict with his own reason. While in all other matters he exalts his reason and glories in its possession, in religious matters, despising it, he sets up sanctions for his conduct which are supernatural against those which are natural, ultrarational against those which are rational.

V. We have seen that the distinguishing feature of social history is the development which the race is undergoing, but for the majority of individuals at any given time this development is not

of personal interest, but is in antagonism to their personal interest. Man's reason which gives him the power to arrest this process is held in abeyance while the development continues. By what force, therefore, is this accomplished? The force by which mankind is advanced at the expense of individual interest is the superrational sanction imposed upon his action by religious belief. From time to time efforts are made to develop a religious system which lacks the supernatural, but they have always ended in failure and always must, for "no form of belief is capable of functioning as a religion in the evolution of society which does not provide a superrational sanction for social conduct in the individual, or, in other words, a rational religion is an impossibility, representing from the nature of the case an inherent contradiction of terms." The definition of religion, therefore, from the standpoint of social evolution may be formulated as follows:

"A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultrarational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing."

Considering the various systems of religious belief from the standpoint of this definition, we discover that however diverse in form and ceremony they may be, however great may be the distance from the totem worship of the degraded savage to the spiritual conception of the intelligent Christian, they all have this one characteristic, they bind the actions of men by the force of a supernatural sanction. Religion is, therefore, seen to be the complement of reason, for it produces the proper relation between the individual and society, necessary for the development of the latter on the advance of which the improved condition of future society depends.

VI. It is hard for us to realize, living in the midst of our present civilization, that the condition of society around us is the rare exception. Although the conditions are rare and modern, their roots reach down into the first century of our era, for at that

time was the seed of our social organization planted. Slowly had the society of the past reached its highest stage in a complete military organization, but since the religions of the past were failing, society, unsupported by religious sanctions, was rapidly falling into decay. Then burst upon the world the Christian system with the mighty force of young and immature life. Christianity forced upon the world with an energy unknown before, the superrational sanction necessary for social development. Self seemed to be annihilated, and the wave of asceticism, which is so disgusting to us, is the logical result upon certain minds of the tremendous force of the supernatural. And so for fourteen centuries the history of our civilization was the history of the growth of otherworldliness. "This period was barren only in the sense that any period of vigorous, but immature growth is barren." Now that the superrational sanction has obtained its full force, it becomes necessary that the individualism which is proper and useful for the present should not be swallowed up. Since Christianity would be perfect she must not only develop society as other religions can do, but she must also develop the individual as other religions do not, and this she does by her ethetical system, especially by her expression of the brotherhood of man. The great movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were born of the conflict between these forces in the progress of adjustment of one to the other in the evolution of society. We have seen that in the States of old the military idea predominated. Based upon a foundation of slaves and unqualified freedom stood the military class holding all beneath them in contempt. The political history of these last centuries is the story of the enfranchisement of these masses.

VII. It is to this spirit of altruism by which men are freed that the proper development is due, the spirit which finds its origin in the charity of the New Testament. This spirit, altho' developing in the ages of faith, has come to its fruition later than its correlative. The growth of the humanitarian feeling is the expression of this idea. Slavery has fallen before it and the sympathies of men in an ever widening circle have included even the lower animals

in their embrace. The relation of the stronger races to the weaker has undergone a radical change and the relations of the different classes in society are modified to a degree unparalleled. Indeed, the higher classes are so imbued with the altruism of Christianity that they hardly resist, nay often help, the tremendous upward movement of the masses whose advance in power means their own decrease relatively at least. The results, as yet incomplete, but coming with irresistible force, are not the results of the intellect, but of the Christian religion by which the world is at last solving the problem how the antagonistic forces, the force by which society advances and the force by which the individual advances may be harmonized without injury to either party.

VIII. Slowly through untold ages all life has been evolved, and the social organism has proved no exception to the general rule. The cosmic process has everywhere been triumphant in human history, and mankind, at least within the limits of western civilization, has about reached the goal toward which, as toward a guiding star, the eyes of statesmen and reformers have been directed—the attainment of the political heaven of *Laissez-faire*. The great political parties of reform have at last attained their end, for substantially is it true that before the law all men are free and equal. One reform has followed another with hardly a pause and the object of these measures has been to secure equal political rights for all. Every man politically may work out his own salvation or damnation unhampered by the restrictions of government. But as we have approached the object of our endeavor the goal has receded before us, and we find that we are carried forward past the limits of our former desires. Whither are we tending? We find that public opinion, the foundation of all progress, is tending more and more to side with the inherently weaker cause and, under the stimulus of the altruistic feeling, coming to propose measures which leave the doctrine of *Laissez-faire* far behind, a tendency to strengthen and equip, at the general expense, the lower and weaker against the higher and wealthier classes of the community. And effort for the solution of this

problem is expressed in the various socialistic systems that have appeared in every part of our civilization, and which among certain classes have almost attained the dignity of a religion. Socialism always has one definite end in view to which all its proposals directly or indirectly lead. This is the final extinction of that struggle for personal existence which has been waged. But the attainment of its object is probably impossible, for the law of all life is progress through conflict. Perfect peace, at least as the world is now constituted, means degeneration, and therefore a truly socialistic state, in which the struggle for existence was unknown, would be in a condition of progressive degeneration. Perhaps the culmination of the present tendency may be somewhat as follows: The ethical system which has supplied the motive force in the past will continue to operate. The sanctions of religion will continue to develop the organism of society, while the altruism characteristic of Christianity will continue that process by which the conditions of men individually have already been immensely ameliorated, by which political freedom has already become a fact, until social equality is attained. This will not be accomplished by the methods of socialism which are contrary to the absolute law of progress, but it will be accomplished by the raising of all to the condition of a fair opportunity, and equipping each individual equally for the struggle of life.

IX. If we have followed the line of thought thus far we have learned that our civilization is an organic growth, which is tending to raise the rivalry of life to the highest degree of efficiency by bringing all the individuals to a footing of equality. We have seen that this advance derives its force from the altruistic feeling which finds its origin in the religion of Christ. Many persons at the present, however, claim that there is a weakening in the religious sentiment among men. The rationalism which is antagonistic to religion, and which has been so highly exalted throughout the century, will be found on investigation to be unequal to the task of advancing in union the race and the individual. On examination, we find that, contrary to general opinion, the evolution of society is not primarily intellectual.

There can be little doubt that the ancient Greeks were, on the average, superior to the men of modern times in mental power, and yet their civilization failed to maintain itself, and is now dead. The feeble races which are destroyed by the stronger, as much by the arts of peace as by the spoils of war, are fully equal to their conquerors in brain power. The highly cultured intellect bears its own doom within itself for society is continually dying at the top and growing from the bottom. But five out of more than 500 aristocratic families of England can trace their history as far back as the fifteenth century. And so is it true that the intellectual portion dies out and its place is taken by those of a lower condition who in turn fail and leave their place to others. By the operation of this law, the average of mental power is prevented from rising. The intellectual development is not, therefore, a necessary factor in social evolution, but there are certain factors with which the progress of society is constant, but without which decay and degeneration are always apparent. These qualities are discovered to be the result of the superrational sanctions of religion combined with the high ethical system of Christianity, and therefore we are enabled to formulate the proposition that the evolution which is slowly proceeding in society is not primarily intellectual, but religious in character. Since the evolution of society by the analogy of the whole universe, material and spiritual, must continue, it follows that the race must become increasingly religious as the centuries go by.

X. The past is the prophecy of the future, and yesterday is the parent of to-morrow. History, so long considered as an exception in the great cosmic process, is discovered to be a beautiful part of a great whole, and by its study each one of us may possess himself of the prophet's mantle.

The two contending forces of individualism and socialism in the wider meaning of the term, are the combatants by whom man's progress is secured. The power of religion in the past has secured the success of the socialistic force injurious to the individual, but useful to the race and to posterity. Christianity indeed has produced like results with other systems, but she is different from

all others in that she has, like them, proved herself the foundation of the state, but the protector and liberator of the individual man. Under her influence the evolution of society proceeds through three stages: in the first the good of the few is obtained at the expense of the many, that the unborn generations may reap the benefit; in the second the greatest good of the greatest number at the present time is sought. This is a stage fraught with danger to mankind, for to stop at this would mean the degeneration of the race. Already we seem to be about to enter upon a third or final stage, the stage in which the problem of the individual and of the whole is solved not, by the destruction of either, but by the salvation of both. The stage in which the greatest good of the greatest number, not only at the present time, but of all generations to come is obtained. To bring this glorious result to pass has been the task assigned to the religion of Christ, and the accomplishment of it is the kingdom of God among men for the coming of which the founder of the system taught His disciples to pray.



#### IV.

#### FUNERAL REFORMS.

BY REV. STANLEY L. KREBS, A.M.

Together with many other clergymen, experience in the practical work of the gospel ministry has convinced me of two things in reference to modern funeral customs: 1. Of the necessity of funeral reform; 2. Of the desirability of its immediate discussion, and adoption, if possible.

It has come to be generally admitted that several of the customs obtaining at modern funerals should be modified and others dropped altogether. The points here presented are those which I have jotted down in my private notebook from time to time as events have suggested them. I find, however, that many other ministers have been struck with exactly the same points. This fact but confirms me in my opinions thus far formed, and encourages me to submit them to others for individual consideration and judgment. Every man must settle this question for himself. For, the fact that your neighbor or friend conducts a funeral in a given way, is no more a reason for you, when the sad necessity arises in your own family, doing exactly as he did, than that we Americans are in duty bound to follow the funeral customs of the ancient Greeks and Romans.

#### CUSTOMS OF THE PAST.

Indeed, how unreasonable some of the customs of the most enlightened and highly civilized nations of the past seem to us now! For example, among the cultured nations just mentioned, "when a man of note died, a wax mask was immediately taken off his features, and colored in exact resemblance to his look in life and health. This mask was affixed to a bust of wood or marble, inclosed in a marble or alabaster shrine, and set up in

the atrium of the deceased. On the occasion of a public funeral, these wax masks were removed or fac similes of them were made and worn by professional actors hired for the occasion, who might resemble the distinguished dead in stature, and strive further to impersonate them in dress and action. The dead man seemed thus to be accompanied and ushered to his rest by a guard of honor composed of all his famous forbears. Nor was family pride always content with the image of historic personages merely, but mythical ancestors were also introduced, and Tacitus tells us that Æneas and all the kings of Alba Longa walked in the funeral train of Drusus, and that sixty-four years after the battle of Philippi, at the funeral of the aged Junia, niece of Cato, wife of Cassius, and sister of Marcus Brutus, the images of twenty most illustrious families were carried before her. Equally absurd and ostentatious will some of our familiar customs of to-day appear to historians 30 or 50 years hence.

Such were the obsequies for the rich and famous. The very poor were simply hauled to vast common pits, into which the bodies were flung uncoffined, while the remains of malefactors, even in Horace's time, were exposed unburied, to the action of the elements and to birds and beasts of prey. We think this custom was as reprehensible as the ostentation of the rich.

There must be and there are, unquestionably, certain principles of Christian etiquette, propriety and æsthetics, and certain natural dictates of common sense, which should constitute the norm and guide for every intelligent person.

I wish to present at present not so much the positive side of this question, but rather the negative, namely what should be avoided and abolished.

The first on the list is the reprehensible and notorious custom of

#### EXTRAVAGANCE.

Entirely too much money is spent on funerals. Millionaires can afford highly expensive and ornamented caskets, cavalcades of carriages and edens of flowers. Some people argue that even the rich should not do this because of the bad example or pre-

cedent they thus set to those who cannot afford it. But it seems to me it is better for the world if the rich spend their money than if they hoard it. I must here, however, make the startling (?) statement that all people are not millionaires, though many feel and act as though they were. Many are not heirs even to thousands; only a few will fall heirs to hundreds, while the large majority will fall heir to nothing, except debts. And for the great masses of the people who live from hand to mouth, and even for the "well-to-do" classes, to spend from 100 to 200 dollars and often as much as 300 and 400 on a funeral casket, is an act which I can characterize as nothing less than a sin, a sin against the survivors who need that money sorely and sadly for the very primal necessities of life, for food, rent and clothing. Such expenditures often, very often, plunge those who are guilty of it into debt for months and years, and even forever. We cannot blame the undertakers, who cater to the public demand. Aye, the undertakers must often suffer too, by reason of non-payment of dues justly owing them. I fully agree with the man of common sense when he says, "It is not only false reverence and mistaken affection, but downright dishonesty, for a man's family or friends to indulge expenditures that cannot be met."

Another item of extravagance connected with modern funerals is the

#### PROFUSION OF FLOWERS.

I have seen the corpse buried beneath a veritable avalanche of expensive flowers, often arranged in the form of anchors, crosses, harps, "gates-ajar," names, etc., when I knew the donors could ill afford the outlay. Floral offerings are tender and beautiful expressions of affection and esteem, but it is easy to carry this custom to extremes and turn it into an intolerable burden. A single, simple lily or rose is more beautiful and chaste than the artificial forms above enumerated. I am most decidedly of the opinion, moreover, that it would be infinitely better to give these tokens to the deceased before he lies a corpse. If my friends, *e. g.*, love and esteem me, let them show it while I can

appreciate it. But when the eyes are sightless orbs, when floral fragrance can no longer stir a pleasurable emotion in the brain, and when the heart can no longer beat a responsive thrill of recognition and gratitude, then you are *too late* with your flowers. No, no, give them to the living. Or, send them to the sorrowing survivors, a week, a month, a year after the death of the loved one, for that is the time that loved one will be most keenly and bitterly missed, and not on the day or amidst the excitement of the burial services.

Another item of extravagance is the

#### CAVALCADE OF CARRIAGES,

which, in these degenerate days, are used to carry the family, and the pall-bearers, and the relatives, and the neighbors, and the friends, and the acquaintances, and even neighborhood loafers to the cemetery. These carriages are often multiplied, too, by the ostentatious simply to make more of a show on the streets.

Surely this is a needless expense, for it seems far more impressive and appropriate if only the immediate family, pall-bearers and officiating clergyman go to the cemetery, and if the cemetery service be made as brief as possible. But hundreds of curiosity-drinkers love to go there just to gratify a heathenish pruriency to see the last struggle and agony of the mourners, hear their crying, count their tears, and measure the depth of their grief. It is all decidedly wrong, and should be abolished instantaneously.

And now it certainly must be true that if all the money spent on these three items, on costly caskets, cavalcades of carriages and feasts of flowers—if all the money thus wasted was lavished upon the deceased while living, it would be far wiser and more justifiable; but the best of all would be, that it be given to the needy family and survivors, be given to them *by their not thus uselessly spending it*. Funeral extravagance should certainly be abolished. "And devout men carried Stephen to his burial." There are but few burial services recorded in Scripture. Among them stands this record of the burial of the first martyr. How

beautiful in its simplicity! It stands out in rugged contrast with the foolish and extravagant burial services of modern times. "Let all things be done decently and in order," or, as the Greek may otherwise and perhaps better be translated, "let all things be done *becomingly* and in order."

#### SECOND, PUBLICITY AND OSTENTATION

should be scrupulously avoided. We think this is a matter of good taste, and will at once appeal to persons of any delicacy of sentiment, refinement and culture.

It shocks one to see in the columns of the newspapers a report that the remains of one's beloved, of him or her who was near and dear to you, "were attired in patent leather slippers and button-hole bouquet, covered with an eiderdown blanket, trimmed with ribbons and lace," and that the whole "reposed in a solid oak casket, with heavy silver mountings, silver extension bar handles and plate;" and that other remains were attired in "a black satin robe, covered with quilted satin eiderdown blanket, trimmed with ribbons and lace, and reposed in a rosewood O. G. casket with heavy silver trimmings and plate."

Well and sensibly says the editor of the *Morning Herald*, of Reading, Pa., in commenting editorially upon this custom: "The real pathos is in gowning all that is left of the loved ones as if they were en route to a fancy dress ball, and in further permitting such publicity as these journalistic details necessitate. Even if the patent leather slippers and the button-hole bouquet and the plush casket and the heavy silver trimmings appeal to the mourners as the truest and noblest means of expressing their grief, yet does it seem to us pitiful that these funeral facts should be blazoned forth to the world."

The remedy is: Insist that newspaper reporters shall say nothing about the casket, flowers or corpse, except, if necessary, in a very general way. Good taste requires it, and I should think the delicacy of true affection would demand it. Many people seem to think that by the amount of money and the publicity they give to the funeral of a friend or relative, they can make

amends for ill-treatment or neglect while the deceased was living. Giving the dead a "good" funeral, as it is called, is resorted to as a salve for conscience. Of course, it is all hypocrisy, aye, ostentatious hypocrisy, and contributes no little to the perpetuation and spread of that sin in society. Were it the custom to have private funerals, it would in a large measure uproot this evil weed, and, perhaps, also, make people treat each other better.

#### THIRD, FUNERALS SHOULD BE PRIVATE.

Let it be heralded far and wide, from the very house-tops so that all shall hear, that making an exhibition of the dead is not showing respect for them. Much is done for mere effect. It is in bad taste and barbarous. It attracts to funerals those vampires of curiosity who go just to see how the people "take on" over the death of their departed. "Mourners thus make an exhibition of their grief to a curious crowd. Better by far if they were shut up alone with their dead and with God, and by simple prayer asked for sustaining grace." The exposure of the remains of some loved one to the gaze of a curious crowd is, to a sensitive person, a cruel infliction, prolonged and intensified as the curious throng, many of them utter strangers, pass in solemn file by the casket or coffin.

Accordingly, the more cultured and progressive people are having private funerals, services at the house only, and very brief at the cemetery. Thus the curious public, sight-seekers and scene-lovers, are excluded.

We think, however, there are two exceptions to this rule, for public or church services should be held (1) when the deceased was a public character, such as a clergyman, a civil officer, an author, artist, public benefactor, etc., (2) where the circle of relatives and friends is large and the house too small to accommodate them all.

#### FOURTH, ABANDONING THE CORPSE TO STRANGERS.

When one comes to reflect, this seems the most inexplicable of all the unreasonable customs prevailing. Think of it! relatives, even the very nearest and dearest, assemble way off in some re-

mote room of the house upstairs, and during the last hour or moments when the body of their loved one reposes in the familiar and endearing spot of home, abandon it to strangers down in the front room, who sit around it close and compact. Strangers, near, dear ones, far off!! What can possibly be the justification of this custom? Is it an effort on the part of the bereaved family to show courtesy to their friends? If this be true, then it ought to be reversed, for then of all times is the time when friends should show courtesy to the bereaved. I should want to be with my loved one or his body, sacred, because of the beloved soul which but lately tenanted it, during its last hour in the sacred precincts of home. This custom is certainly not doing things in the natural order. It is contrary to I. Cor. 14: 40. It is not "in order." It is both meaningless and unnatural.

Another custom which we would be pleased to see abandoned is

#### THE WEARING OF CRAPE.

It may not be objectionable to hang a piece of black cloth or ribbon on the front door as the recognized and conventional sign to the public that death is within, though some think even this should be done away with and flowers used instead. The Society of Friends has taken strong ground on this general question and has refused to sanction the practice of putting on mourning for the dead, first, because it is not always a truthful expression of feeling; secondly, because it often entails on survivors cost and expense which cannot suitably be incurred, and which sometimes leads into debt; third, because at a time when God would speak to the soul, through the solemn visitation of death, it is very undesirable to have the mind diverted by attention to outward attire; fourth, because injury to health and sight is frequently the result consequent upon the pressure of work at such times; and lastly, because, when we know that our dear ones are taken to eternal bliss above, the sable garment of woe seems at variance with the "Voice from Heaven, blessed are the dead that die in the Lord."

Backhouse and Taylor, in their history of the "Early Chris-



tian Church" say, "It was consonant with the new and glorious hope brought in through the Gospel, that the early Christians should despise and cast aside the whole paraphernalia of mourning which they saw around them—the sackcloth and ashes and rent garments of the Jews, the black apparel of the Romans, and the mourners hired to wail in both eastern and western nations."

Cyprian expresses himself in very strong terms on the same subject; writing concerning those who died in the pestilence during the reigns of Gallus and Valerian, he says: "How often and how manifestly has it been revealed to me by the condescension of God that I should publically declare that our brethren who are escaped from this world by the Lord's summons are not to be lamented, since we know that they are not lost, but gone before. Though they are to be longed for, they are not to be bewailed; and it is not becoming to us to put on *black* garments *here*, when they are already clothed in *white* raiment *there*."

Surely, indeed, funerals are sad and sombre enough. Why make them more so by figures clothed in black, which represents night, death, hopelessness and heathenism? Black crape is a relic of barbarism. Augustine very forcibly queries, "Why should we disfigure ourselves with black, unless we would imitate the *unbelieving* nations, not only in their wailing for the dead, but also in their mourning apparel? Be assured these are foreign and unlawful usages, but if lawful, they are not becoming." Along with these words of Augustine let us place those of St. Paul: "Let us do all things *becomingly* and in order."

Of course, those who at present wear crape or mourning apparel cannot be blamed, for they accepted custom as it is, without asking any questions. But those who are instructed and able to think for themselves should have the courage to break away from the unchristian tyranny of this century-long habit.

"During recent years," says W. M. Butler, "there has been a decided stand against wearing crape. The tendency in funeral goods is toward brighter hues." The Princess of Wales dispensed with crape during her mourning for the late Duke of Clarence. "Black is not the color of heaven. The Gospel of

Jesus Christ is full of hope. Why, then, should Christians clothe themselves with the emblems of darkness and despair? The burial rites of the early Christians were characterized by emblems of trust, peace and victory. They sang songs of triumph." We do not hear of those early Christians wearing crape for St. Stephen, or St. James, or John the Baptist. Every Christian that does it is perpetuating a distinctly heathen custom that speaks of the diametrical opposite to the Christian's hope and assurance.

SIXTH, MAKE THE SERVICES AT THE CEMETERY AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE,

especially in bad or winter weather, for the sake of the health of those who attend. How many cases of cold, catarrh, pneumonia, rheumatism, neuralgia, etc., have been contracted at cemetery services! We agree with the recommendation that the funeral director should inform the gentlemen that it will not be considered a mark of disrespect if they remain standing with their heads covered. Many a man, by removing his hat at the grave in cold or stormy weather, has taken a cold which has resulted in his death.

SEVENTH, ABOLISH SUNDAY FUNERALS.

This proposition has everything in its favor. The men engaged in the stables or in the undertaking business need the Sunday rest, and the poor minister is nearly worn to death by a Sunday funeral. For, besides the funeral, he has his many other duties to perform on that day, so that one Sunday funeral nearly makes two—nearly kills the officiating clergyman. Besides, on Sundays large crowds gather in the cemeteries, and the curious are glutted whenever a funeral comes along. With wise planning all Sunday funerals can be avoided.

EIGHTH, BRASS BANDS

are out of place, particularly as at present used, by reason of the outrageously bad taste they exhibit in the selections they play when returning from the interment. Says "George Gordon:" "A funeral may be solemn enough at the outset. The 'Dead March in Saul' does not last out the four hours of the band's

engagement. It is useful enough for consigning a corpse to the earth. But the 'Washington Post,' 'Three Cheers for the Red, White and Blue,' and the effervescent 'Yankee Doodle' are the tunes that conduct the cortégé home. Indeed, the whole affair, after the impressive prologue, wears such an air of genial gayety that it dwindles into a perfect picnic ere the day is done."

This thing is only too common, and his description, alas! only too true. It turns so solemn a thing as a funeral into a farce. It should be incontinently abolished.

#### NINTH, KISSING THE CORPSE.

The practice of kissing the dead is attended with so much danger to health and life that wise people ought certainly to hesitate before they engage in it. Bacilli or germs of various diseases are thus directly imparted to the living. Remember, too, that the corpse you kiss is not the person you loved, and will soon be earth, ashes, dust.

In conclusion permit me to say, Don't make too much of burials. The greatest and best on the roll of Christian saints and heroes are buried in

#### UNKNOWN GRAVES—

Moses, St. Paul, St. John, St. James, St. Matthew, etc. Where are their graves? How were they buried? Where are the costly marble monuments to mark their resting places and keep green their memory. Their funerals must have been simple and unpretentious indeed, so much so that no record has been kept and not even a hint dropped.

Call to mind, too, how severely simple were the obsequies of our Lord Himself. So simple and quiet were they that any disinterested observer would never have imagined Him to be any great or famous personage. He was buried without a costly casket, without flowers, without a stream of humanity passing by and staring at those matchless features fixed in death, without a brass band, without a calvacade of carriages—in fact, with only a few true friends to mourn Him, so few, indeed, that you could have counted them on the fingers of one hand. And in connec-

tion, remember the simplicity of the funeral of His servants, John the Baptist and St. Stephen. "And His disciples came, and took up the body, and buried it, and went and told Jesus." "And devout men carried Stephen to his burial." Indeed, it seems that the simpler the service the more solemn and impressive.

Again, *don't make too much of death and dying.* That is not half as important for character as living.

LIVING CHANGES AND SHAPES CHARACTER ; DEATH DOES NOT, either in the case of the wicked or of the good. Don't magnify either the terror or the pomp of death. For, first, when a wicked man dies, you cannot drag him into the place and condition of soul called "heaven," by a hearse drawn with six span of Arabian steeds or a whole cavalcade of carriages ; you cannot sing him into the celestial temple by even a Handel and Haydn chorus of trained musicians ; you cannot preach him into the mansions above even by Talmagian eloquence. Earth to earth, dust to dust, ashes to ashes with the body—to the judgment bar of God with the soul.

And, secondly, when a good man dies, don't make too much even of that death. His works will live in a long chain of blessings after him, even though a silver-lined hearse and a cavalcade of carriages do not follow him to the grave ; his indestructible good deeds will sing his praises better than a Bostonian chorus, and people will continue to bless his name and talk kindly of him even if there should happen to be no minister to pronounce his eulogy. Do not make too much of death.

Let us see to it that we live aright. Take care of your character *before* death, and afterwards, both here and yonder, it will take care of itself. Our song and rule should be the words of one of the most beautiful hymns that has ever been written, from the pen and heart of the now sainted Dr. Henry Harbaugh, the Reformed classic,

"Jesus ! I live to Thee,  
The loveliest and best ;  
My life in Thee, Thy life in me,  
In Thy blest love I rest."

If this be our experience, then at the end of life and all through we can also sing,

"Living or dying, Lord,  
I ask but to be Thine ;  
My life in Thee, Thy life in me,  
Makes heaven forever mine."

When this is true, what will it matter to our free and triumphant spirits what men do with our bodies that will soon turn to corruption and a feast for worms—whether they sink them into ocean's mysterious depths, or burn them with fire, or bury them in the ground?

Let us live honest, consistent, helpful lives, and then when we are dead, the instinct of humanity and the intelligent sympathy and culture of our friends will dictate a becoming disposal of our mortal remains, whilst the immortal part, the soul, will return in native freedom and glory to God Who gave it.

## V.

### CRITICISM OF SOCIALISM.

BY REV. A. G. GEKELER.

The socialist theory of value is, briefly, that the value of commodities is determined by the amount of labor socially necessary to produce them. "Use-values are combinations of two elements—matter and labor. If we take away the useful labor expended upon them, a material substratum is always left, which is furnished by Nature without the help of man. The latter can work only as Nature does, that is by changing the form of matter. Nay, more, in this work of changing the form he is constantly helped by natural forces. We see, then, that labor is not the only source of material wealth, of use-values produced by labor. As William Petty puts it, labor is its father and the earth its mother." And this earth cannot be made absolute private property. The earth is the Lord's, and for His creatures, and neither the divine law, as found in the books of Moses, nor our modern law admits the right of absolute ownership in land. If the title to all the land of a state were vested in one person, that person would have neither the moral nor legal right to push the people off his property. The right of ownership in land is simply a convention, a thing that has developed in the course of time and has proven generally useful in our present social system. It is the amount of labor usefully expended upon things, land included, that is the measure of their value. And if labor is the sole human factor in the production of commodities, it is a just inference that they of right belong to the producers, in proportion as they have been active in the production. If this inference were not drawn, probably no objection to this theory of value had ever been made.

With this proposition on value Socialism stands or falls. Hence we should expect strong objection to be made to this

fundamental position. But all I find against the theory comes to this, that labor, in order to be productive of value, must be *intelligent*, and what is already included in this, it must be expended upon an object of *demand*. Matter, irrespective of its character, has weight. But the blind exertion of human power is not wealth producing, more likely it is destructive. But it is the essence of labor to be human, *i. e.*, intelligent. Idiots are never hired.

Of course, pyramids have no exchange value at present; although great skill and much labor were expended upon them, they now meet no want. Yet when Brassey was asked what it would cost to-day to build a pyramid, he could make no estimate except on the basis of the cost of labor.

One critic brings forward, that the effort of a man in picking up a diamond, found by chance, is surely no measure of the diamond's value. Another refers to a masterpiece of art, a painting by Meissonier, and asks, What proportion does the value of the canvas and the pigments bear to the fabulous prices paid for the painting? The fair reply is, that diamonds and the precious metals have their values determined by the labor *commonly* necessary to find them, the average amount of labor necessary at any stage of society to find the precious metals and stones is what constitutes their standard of value and this standard already existing of course determines the value of chance finds also. As to works of genius, they form a separate class. They bring scarcity prices, and are personal monopolies, and, furthermore, among the quantities of commodities continually thrown upon the market, what an insignificant portion are the product of chance or genius! These two exceptions are of so small moment that they do not invalidate the labor theory of value.

More formidable seems the objection that the values of agricultural products cannot be measured or determined by the labor embodied in them. The time needed to dig a ton of coal or make a pair of shoes is constant and quite accurately determinable. But the labor needed to produce a ton of wheat or a cask of wine varies with the seasons and can never be foreknown. The



bounty of the seasons is a more important factor than the labor of man. But even here it is the labor embodied that determines the value of provisions. The difference between good and bad years is like the difference between more and less efficient machinery. In one year the labor of the farming community is spread over  $x$  commodities, in another over  $1\frac{1}{2}x$ , and the values will vary in some such proportion.

The only modification of the labor-value formula is, that it holds good only of those commodities which can be produced in practically unlimited quantities, and this is a modification of little importance, since, with rare exceptions, commodities can be produced to that extent. And now, when it comes to the division of these values, into necessary and surplus values, into the share of labor and the share of capital, what is the objection to the socialist inference, that, as labor is the father of values, to labor the valuable things made belong? Strangely enough, the opposition sets itself squarely upon the platform of socialism and uses the labor theory of value in the favor of the entrepreneur!

Thus Professor Kirkup says in the *Britannica*: "Marx's conception of labour is the same as that of Ricardo, and as a logical exposition of the historic contradiction between the two principles on the basis of Ricardo, the work of Marx is quite unanswerable. It is obvious, however, that the definition of labor assumed both in Ricardo and Marx is too narrow. The labor they broadly posit as the source of wealth is manual labor. In the early stages of industry, when the market was small and limited and the technique was of the simplest and rudest description, labor in that sense might correctly be described as the source of value. But in modern industry, when the market is world-wide, the technique most complex, and the competition most severe, when *inventiveness, sagacity, courage and decision in initiative, and skill in management*, are factors so important, no such exclusive place as has been claimed can be assigned to labor. The Ricardian principle therefore falls to the ground. And it is not historically true to maintain, as Marx does, that the profits of the capitalist are obtained simply by appropriating

the products of unpaid labor. In *initiating* and *managing* the capitalist is charged with the most *difficult* and *important* part of the work of production."

But here capital's claim to its customary share of the product is not based upon the right of the capital employed, nor upon the productiveness of capital, but upon the efficiency of intelligence and prudence in management. Since the enterprise, sagacity and courage of the capitalist contribute as much to the product as the labor of many operatives, it is but fair that his reward should be many times greater than that of the operative. But this is not a reward of capital, it is the reward of brains and industry! Let it be observed that this justification of the capitalist's share is socialistic to the core; this is not a refutation, but an adoption of Marx's theory of value. It is to every man according to his product! However, the socialist disputes the superlative efficiency of the capitalist. This lauded audacity and foresight—in short, this speculation—is possible and profitable only in our irrational system of competition. One man speculates successfully, but how many, equally intelligent, fail! Speculation, courage and decision, are called for only in the dark. When the real state of affairs in an industry is known or easily accessible to all, the audacity and foresight of the entrepreneur are in vain; then success is not a matter of brains, but of the heavy battalions of capital. How high an estimate must we put upon the brain and, forsooth, the courage of the sugar-trust, in buying up all the raw sugar it could lay hands on, when it was cock sure of the impending imposition of a protective tariff? How much brains was necessary to foresee a rise in the price of wool after McKinley's election? Not brains were needed, but cash on hand. Not brains, vast capital is needed to run down the price of stocks in order to buy low, and raise the price to sell. Not the abundance of brains, but the lack of honor and fair play were the factors in building up the vastest trust of the century.

Henry Demarest Llyod in "*Wealth vs. Commonwealth*" gives some examples of the value of brains, and other things, in fortune making.

A trustee of the Standard Oil Company was questioned in a State investigation :

"Had you ever been interested in the refining of oil in any manner when you first became connected with the oil business?"

"Never."

"Or the production of oil?" "Never."

He was a railroad man and had been taken into the combination for his value as such; but when he was asked if he could tell any of the rates of freight his company had paid, he said: "I cannot."

"What is your business and where do you reside?" another of the trustees was asked by the State of New York. "I decline to answer any question until I can consult counsel."

"What is the capital stock?" was asked of another. "I do not know."

"How much has the capital been increased since?" "I don't know."

"Where are the meetings of the Standard Oil Company held?" "I don't know."

"How many directors are there?" "I don't know."

"Do they own any pipe lines?" "I don't know." "I don't know anything about the rates of transportation."

"Did not the concern with which you were so connected purchase over 8,000,000 barrels of crude petroleum in 1881?" "I am unable to state."

He was asked to give the name of one refinery in this country running at the time, 1883, not owned or substantially controlled by his concern? "I decline to answer."

He was asked if he would say the total profits of his trust's companies for the last year, 1887, were not as much as \$20,000,000? "I haven't the least knowledge on that subject."

Asked on the witness stand in the Buffalo explosion case when it was he formed the trust with \$70,000,000 of capital, the president replied: "I am unable to state," and he could not say where its articles of agreement were, nor who has control of it. When questioned before the Interstate Commerce Commission, he

could not tell within \$25,000,000 how much business they were doing a year. The head of the New York Central Railroad could not tell when a stock dividend of something like \$46,000,000 had been declared on one of his roads. \* \* \*

The gravest objection made against socialism is, that it would be the end of freedom. Herbert Spencer says: "Even did their plans succeed, it could only be by substituting one kind of evil for another. A little deliberate thought would show that under their proposed arrangements, their *liberties* must be surrendered in proportion as their material welfare were cared for."

If this were true, it ought to persuade all men rather to abide by the present society with all its evils, than to fly to a despotism, no matter what temporal conveniences it promised. But this grave indictment against socialism is really a judgment on the men who make it. What, to them, is liberty, beyond the opportunity of making money? This is the sacred liberty that would perish.

Does socialism involve fettered speech and the censorship of the press? Does it involve less liberty in choosing congenial labor?

Does it stand for restriction or extension of education? What is liberty without leisure? And what is liberty without bread?

On the contrary, socialism means the largest liberty possible to all, secured by shorter hours of labor, and security of employment. That freedom, which those who are in the possession of a competence enjoy, will be the rule and no more the exception.

The one criticism of socialists, which is sound, is that they generally oppose religion. Marx rejoiced that the starting point of the German socialism is the "positive abolition of religion." Many are avowed atheists, and it would be an easy matter to collect many quotations from the writings of men high in their party which reveal a passionate enmity to the Church. Pastors often hear said: "So and so never goes to church; he is a socialist."

But irreligion may not be essential to socialism, possibly it is entirely accidental. Schaeffle, Ely and others have so judged, and their conclusion is easily reached by examining the principles

of the theory. Socialism is a theory of society and is as indifferent to religion as our party platforms. The simple truth is that the leaders of socialism in Europe have been free thinkers first, and socialists afterward. But their opposition to religion has a practical reason. The Gospel inculcates patience in the endurance of wrongs. A Christian will scruple to use violence against the powers that be. Christianity makes good martyrs, but poor fighters. Hence the Church is the strongest prop of the present order. The Church is the greatest hindrance to the realization of the socialist program. Perhaps this is no compliment to the Church, but it is a fact that European socialists must reckon with and which explains their extreme hatred of the Church.

The attitude of both parties must change. Religion is secure in the lap of Nature. The stability and order and beneficence displayed in creation are the ever present manifestation of Him to whom homage is due. A movement ignoring God and the deepest hunger of the human heart cannot conquer. The brotherhood of man cannot be realized while the existence and Fatherhood of God are denied.

On the other hand, the evils under which society groans can not be healed if Christians are content to have their souls saved in the world to come. If we can be sure that evils exist in our system that are condemned of God, we may be sure that it is our duty to labor with might for their extinction. The Church ought to be the alma mater of Christian reform, of reforms called for by the spirit of Christ. A social system embodying the mind of Christ, let it be called by whatever name, it is now the duty of Christians to prepare and establish.

## VI.

### ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF SALVATION, IN THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

BY THE EDITOR.

In the July number of this REVIEW, for 1897, we discussed St. Paul's doctrine of redemption, or of the objective side of the work of divine grace in the reconciliation and transformation of sinners, as this doctrine seems to be formulated in the greatest and most perfect of the apostle's writings. In the present article we propose now to take up the subjective side of the same work, or what may appropriately be called the doctrine of *salvation*. Salvation from the Latin *salus*, *health*, German *Heil*, may be defined as moral soundness or health, or as the subjective result of the objective work of grace in the soul. In treating this subject we shall, as before, make the Epistle to the Romans the main basis of our study, giving due consideration, however, also to such passages of other Pauline writings as may seem to bear upon our theme.

The essential moments in Paul's doctrine of salvation, we think, will generally be admitted to be the conceptions of *justification* and *sanctification*. These conceptions may be separated in thought, but in reality they belong together, forming one concrete process of life; and, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of many theologians in the past, we believe that they were so held together in the mind of St. Paul. Justification may, doubtless, be regarded as a forensic act whereby a sinner is declared righteous on the ground of faith in Christ; but faith in Christ involves the principle of a new spiritual life in the believer, whose unfolding is sanctification, and the end a Christ-like character. We may say, then, that justification and sanctification are related as the beginning and continuation, and also as the negative and positive side, of the same spiritual process. The word of justifi-

cation is pronounced in the divine judgment on the promise and prospect of sanctification which are in the sinner; and sanctification results as a consequence of justification, while faith is the subjective condition of both. These conceptions, we believe, will be verified by a closer study of St. Paul.

The verb *δικαιῶν* is used in the Bible in three distinct senses, of which the first is primary and fundamental: These are *factitive*, *demonstrative* and *declarative*. In the first sense it means *to make one righteous*. This is in agreement with the rule that verbs ending in *ω* usually signify the making of a person or thing into what is implied in the root. It is contended, even by so high an authority as Professor Thayer (*Lexicon, ad verbum*), that this sense is exceedingly rare, if not altogether wanting, in the New Testament. We believe, on the contrary, that this sense underlies the whole range of meaning in which the word is used by St. Paul. When Paul speaks of God as being "just and justifying him that is of faith in Jesus" (Rom. 3: 26), we believe that the action of the verb must be understood to produce the same quality in its object as that from which it proceeds in God. In the second sense *δικαιῶν* means to demonstrate or show one to be righteous who is such in reality. If a person has been falsely accused, and is by a legal investigation shown to be innocent, this is *justification*. In this sense the word is used in the Old Testament; as, for instance, in Deut. 25: 1 where judges are enjoined to "justify the righteous and condemn the wicked." In the third sense, finally, the word means to declare one righteous who is not such in fact—to absolve from guilt, *to pardon*, with the implied idea that the pardon granted shall work a moral transformation in the person pardoned. In this sense the word is, doubtless, most commonly used in the New Testament, especially in those writings of St. Paul in which he contends against the Pharisaic doctrine of salvation by works. This declarative sense of the word seems to be predominant, for instance, in Acts 13: 38, 39, where justification is clearly equivalent to remission of sins; also in Rom. 3: 24, where justification is declared to be an act of free grace on the part of God; and in Rom. 3: 25, where,



after having spoken of redemption and propitiation in the blood of Christ through faith, the apostle sums up by saying: "We reckon therefore that a man is justified by faith apart from the works of the law."

This idea of justification, in the sense of forgiveness of sins through faith in Jesus Christ as the principle of an actual divine righteousness in men, is the key-note of Paul's Gospel. The Gospel, as Paul apprehended it, "is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; for therein is revealed a righteousness of God from faith unto faith." The Gospel as divine power first works in the soul of the sinner the sense and assurance of forgiveness, and then induces in him that quality of righteousness which belongs to God Himself. This idea of a divine righteousness, in distinction from the righteousness supposed to be acquired by the observance of the law, is the leading peculiarity of St. Paul's teaching. In the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, however, he shows that this is not an entirely new idea. It was already fore-shadowed in the Old Testament. For of Abraham it is said (Gen. 15: 6), that "he believed God, and He counted it to him for righteousness." What did God count to him for righteousness? Not his works—not circumcision, not sacrifices and offerings—nor either the righteousness of another, but his faith. When he was old and as yet childless, Jehovah promised him that his seed should be as the stars of heaven for multitude. This promise Abraham believed; and this heroic act of faith was imputed to him for righteousness. Such is the record in Genesis. And so now, the apostle continues, "to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned for righteousness." This idea of the imputation of faith for righteousness, or simply of righteousness, without works, is then further illustrated and confirmed by a quotation from Ps. 32: 1: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not sin." And this blessedness has nothing to do with the observance of the law. Abraham was not yet circumcised when his faith was accounted unto him for right-

eousness. He simply felt sure that God was able to keep His promises, and trusted in His words without any hesitation or doubt; and *this* was reckoned unto him for righteousness. So now, in like manner, the faith of the Christian, who believes on Him that raised up Jesus, our Lord, from the dead, is reckoned unto him for righteousness.

Here, and nowhere else, the apostle twice uses the expression *imputation of righteousness*. What does he mean by this expression? The answer to this question may be gathered from the above representation of the blessed man. The blessedness of the man to whom righteousness is imputed, is just the blessedness of him whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered, or, in other words, the blessedness of the man to whom the Lord imputes not sin. The imputation of righteousness, then, consists not in setting to one's account a foreign merit, but simply in the non-imputation of sins, or *in the forgiveness of sins*. Justification is the imputation of righteousness or of faith for righteousness; and the imputation of righteousness is the non-imputation of sin; and the non-imputation of sin is merely the gratuitous forgiveness of sins. A person is justified in the specific sense in which Paul uses the word in relation to the Christian believer, when his sins are forgiven, or when his conscience is absolved from the sense of guilt and condemnation; but in the radical sense of *being made righteous*, which must be supposed to be the ultimate aim of divine forgiveness, one is completely justified only when he has developed a right Christian character. Justification, then, does not consist primarily in making a sinner righteous, either by the imputation or impartation of another's righteousness, or by a magical transformation of his moral nature. Righteousness is a personal quality that can only be acquired by personal action and conduct. To conceive of it as something ready-made and transferable from one person to another, is to make it unmoral. Those who adopt the vicarious punishment doctrine of the atonement usually define justification as the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Christ by His active and passive obedience has acquired an infinite quantity of merit; and

of this God sets to the account of the believing sinner a sufficient amount to cover up his sins and make him pass for righteous. Here we have the essence of the doctrine of supererogation and of indulgence. The idea of righteousness has ceased to be an ethical conception, and has been transformed into the notion of a physical commodity, that can be bought and sold, and arbitrarily transferred from one person to another. And this view is not materially improved by saying that the righteousness of Christ is not *imputed* but *imparted* to the believer in justification. A moral quality can not be imparted from one person to another. A father cannot impart his character to his son, as he has imparted to him his blood, or as he may impart to him his money. The son can, indeed, make the father's character his own, and the father can help him to do it, but only by a process of moral action. So the believer can make the character of Christ his own by a moral life, which has its principle in faith, through which Christ Himself exercises in him the power of a moral dynamic. But this is something very different from the notion of a direct legal imputation or physical impartation of Christ's righteousness. This notion is not a Pauline idea. Paul never says that the righteousness of Christ is imparted to the believer, or that the believer is accounted righteous because of the righteousness of Christ. He says that *faith* is imputed for righteousness (Rom. 4: 5); and when immediately afterwards he speaks of *righteousness* being imputed (verses 6 and 11), it is plain that this is intended to mean no more than is asserted in the foregoing proposition, namely, that faith is the condition of the sinner's being accounted righteous.

Faith is imputed for righteousness. The apostle's fundamental conception of faith may be inferred from his account of the justification of Abraham, in connection with his statement (Rom. 4: 23, 24), that "it was written not only for his sake, that righteousness was reckoned unto him, but for our sake also unto whom it shall be reckoned, *who believe on Him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead, who was delivered for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification.*" Faith is *trust*, it is *confidence*,

that falters not at any difficulties, and is sure even when it cannot see. So Abraham believed. He accepted God's promise that he should be made the father of a numerous posterity. He was sure that God could and would fulfill this promise. He trusted in God, and that was his faith. And so the Christian trusts in God, who raised up from the dead Jesus Christ, our Lord; and this is the substance of his faith. "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth Jesus as Lord, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved" (Rom. 10: 9). The contents of this faith are that Jesus Christ was delivered up on account of our trespasses, and was raised from the dead on account of our justification. To accept the truth that Christ died for our sins, and that God in His death sets forth His reconciling, pardoning love, that is the essence of Christian faith, according to St. Paul. Such faith is not helped by any theory or theories of the atonement. The essence of the atonement may be a transcendental process which is above the reach both of our experience and of our reflection; but the fact is a truth for our faith, which is attended by the most blessed results. For he who accepts this truth is pardoned—his sins are forgiven, in the sense that in his conscience he is absolved from the feeling of condemnation and guilt. He is assured that God is not angry with him, but loves him; and that, not having spared His own Son, but having delivered Him up for us all, He will also with Him freely give us all things. It is generally said that faith is the *condition* of justification, or the *condition* of the appropriation of the saving grace of God in Christ. If, however, by condition we understand something *different* from the appropriating act, then this distinction cannot be regarded as valid. Faith *is* the appropriation of saving grace, as eating is the appropriation of life-supporting food. When we eat, we do not merely fulfill a condition of appropriating food, but we do in the very act appropriate it. So when we believe in Jesus that He was set forth in His blood as a propitiation, and that He was delivered up on account of our trespasses and raised again on account of our justification, we do not merely fulfill a condition in conse-

quence of which God may pardon us, or in consequence of which we may be justified; but we are justified in the act of believing, and in this act we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. Faith is the very act in which the absolution of the conscience and the realization of peace are brought to pass. The man who believes not the grace of God exhibited in the blood of Christ remains an enemy of God—he is not reconciled, the atonement is not a reality for him, and he bears in his conscience the sense of condemnation. On the contrary, he who believes, “his faith is reckoned unto him for righteousness,” which we may now understand to mean that the believer’s faith itself is the realization of the sense of pardon and peace in his conscience. In his faith the believer realizes that his sins are forgiven and that he stands before God as righteous; and this, as we understand it, is justification by faith in the distinct Pauline sense of the word.

But is, then, the exercise of justifying faith merely a subjective activity, like a dream, for example, which has no objective reality? In a dream one may enjoy the delights of a banquet without swallowing a particle of food. Is it so also with faith? Faith is the sense or feeling of reconciliation and peace with God. Is this merely a subjective persuasion without any objective reality corresponding to it? Some, perhaps, would say that this is an irrelevant question. The adherents of the school of Ritschl, who would confine all theology to the study of phenomena, would tell us that we have no business to go back beyond the experience of justification which is given in the act of faith itself. We believe, however, that the question is a legitimate one. We may rightly ask whether our experience of justifying or pardoning grace has any corresponding reality in the activity of the divine mind. To suppose that it has not, would be to suppose that man is really his own saviour—that it is not God who forgives sins, but that man really forgives his own sins. We must, therefore, suppose that to our sense of pardon there corresponds a divine judgment absolving us from the guilt of our sins. But God’s judgments must be according to truth. In pronouncing one righteous He cannot violate the inherent *rightness* of His own being. If, then, in the

justification of the sinner through faith there is an expression of divine judgment, the question arises, how can God be true and yet justify the ungodly? How can God pronounce a sinner to be righteous who is not yet such in fact?

We believe that the answer which may be given to this question from the standpoint of St. Paul is two-fold. It may be said that God can pronounce the believing sinner righteous because He is able to view him, first, not as he is in himself, but as he is in Christ, and secondly, not as he is now, but as he is going to become in consequence of the principle of faith which is in him. According to Paul the condition or occasion of justification is faith in Jesus Christ. God is the justifier of him that has faith in Jesus (Rom. 4: 25). But evidently the ground or reason of the justifying act on the part of God is not in *faith*, but in *Christ*. We are justified *because of Christ*—justified in His blood (Rom. 5: 9). Being justified by faith we have peace with God *through our Lord Jesus Christ*, through whom also we were brought into this state of grace in which we now stand. We may say that it is Christ in the believer that constitutes the ground of divine judgment upon him. In a certain sense we may say even that the believer is justified, or regarded and treated as righteous in the forum of the divine judgment, for the *sake of Christ*, or on account of Christ's *merits*. These terms are not Scriptural, and they have been abused in the service of a false theory of salvation, which has brought Christianity into reproach with earnest ethical minds. When it is said that sinners are justified for the sake of Christ, or on account of Christ's merits, this has usually been understood to mean that Christ's righteousness is set to the account of sinners in an external, legal way. In this sense the words have entered into hymns and prayers. We pray that God may forgive us our sins and treat us as righteous for the sake of Christ's merits; never reflecting that if this were understood in the sense in which it is so frequently taken, there would be no use in praying for it. For if the merits of Christ consisted in His having paid the penalty of our sins, and having acquired a treasure of righteousness sufficient to make us



all rich, then God would be bound in His own justice to let us have the benefit of this arrangement. Such a conception would make Christianity wholly unethical and unreal, and, according to our conviction, finds no support in the writings of St. Paul, or of any other apostle.

And yet the expressions in question may be used in such sense as to convey the truth which the New Testament undoubtedly contains. Certainly there must be some consideration or motive on the ground of which God forgives sins ; otherwise sin would not be an evil for God, and forgiveness would be no reality. This consideration can not be the payment by the Redeemer of a legal equivalent in the way of punitive suffering, for in that case forgiveness would not be forgiveness ; it would not be gratuitous, δωρεάν, as St. Paul declares it to be. The consideration which forms the ground of the divine forgiveness, then, must be *Christ Himself*, who was perfected as the captain of our salvation through suffering, and having been glorified has become a life-giving Spirit, a principle of divine virtue, and therefore of salvation, in humanity. This salvation, however, is not a magical transformation. On the contrary, it can be appropriated only progressively in the moral way of faith. Hence no sinner can be ethically righteous the moment that he has begun to believe. The *saints* of Paul's Epistles are by no means free from all moral imperfections. But a *forgiven* sinner, a *justified* sinner, the believer must be supposed to be from the moment he believes. Such at least was the experience of St. Paul, who exclaimed, "There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 8 : 1). It is, then, for Christ's sake that God can account the believing sinner as righteous. It can not be for the sake of what the sinner is in himself at the moment that he is accounted righteous, but for the sake of what Christ is. Christ's merit, Christ's *worth* forms the ground on which the sinner is freed from condemnation and declared righteous in God's sight. That, we think, is Paul's teaching. But in this divine judgment Christ and the sinner must be supposed to be looked at as one. Christ was identified first with the sinner by



bearing the world's whole sinful lot, and now the sinner is identified with Christ in His exalted state of perfection; and it is because of this union that the sinner can be justified for Christ's sake.

The union between Christ and men is first a transcendental union, that is, a union outside of and beyond any form of experience. It is an essential union, like that subsisting between men and the first Adam, and forms the ground of all divine influences and tendencies in humanity. The life which is in the Logos incarnate in Christ is the light of men. But the union between Christ and believers is also a moral union, which begins in the principle of faith and grows into a complete personal oneness. Through faith Christ dwells in men's hearts in love (Eph. 3: 17), and this involves a gradual moral assimilation of them to Himself. And here, then, we have a second ground for the divine judgment pronounced in justification: it is the consideration, not of what the believer now is, but of what he is capable of becoming in Christ. It is not a false judgment when the young oak tree that has never yet produced acorns, is pronounced an oak. It has the nature of an oak tree, and if it shall ever bear any fruit at all, it will be acorns. So the believer has in himself potentially the nature of a Christian, that is, the nature of Christ; and this Christian nature may in course of time be expected to develop its peculiar characteristics and to bear its proper fruit. And it is in anticipation of this development that God, who views all temporal processes *sub specie eternitatis*, is able to declare the believer righteous, although his character of righteousness is yet to be formed. The promise of a Christian character, which is involved in faith, is a condition of the judgment of justification. Augustine has said somewhere that in order to justification it is not sufficient that man believe in God; God also must believe in man. That is doubtless true. The divine judgment of justification must take for granted that the promise of fruit contained in the blossom of faith will be fulfilled. What if this expectation should fail to be realized? Would the judgment of justification then stand? No, certainly not. The unmerciful servant in the

parable, whose debt of ten thousand talents had been forgiven, was afterwards delivered to the tormentors until he should pay all, because he himself was not willing to forgive his fellow-servant. The divine judgment is capable of being reversed, if the conditions on which it depends fail to be realized. Should it be said that this conception imports an element of time into the operations of the divine mind, we would reply that it is our Lord who so represents the matter, and that if God could create a temporal world, He must also be supposed to be able to adjust Himself to its conditions. But, as we have already seen, the presupposition of justification is sanctification. Where sanctification, that is, the development of a Christ-like character in the believer, does not ensue, there justification ceases to be a reality, and the man is still under condemnation. The act of justification in the declarative sense, then, presupposes the process of justification in the causative sense. Or justification and sanctification are reciprocal elements and stages in one divine process of salvation; and the former cannot be realized without the realization of the latter. "Whom He justified, them He also glorified."

It is as thus conditioned that St. Paul continually presents the subject of salvation in the Epistle to the Romans and elsewhere. There is in the believing Christian the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, which has freed him from the law of sin and death; and this new law of life has in it the tendency to produce a corresponding walk in the spirit (Rom. 8: 2). If this tendency should fail of its effect, then there would be no salvation. The apostle Paul nowhere in all his writings uses the term regeneration, or new birth, *παλιγγενεσία*, except in Tit. 3: 5, if indeed that epistle be from his hands. But in the Epistle to the Romans and elsewhere he sets forth the idea, not that the Christian has been born again, but that *he has died and risen with Christ*, and is for this reason now able and bound to walk in newness of life. There is a new life in him, which is the consequence of a spiritual resurrection with Christ. The essence of this new life consists in a new adjustment of the relations of flesh and spirit; the latter having, in consequence of union with the crucified and risen Christ,

obtained the ascendancy over the former. And this new life now is the source and principle of sanctification. There were those who slandered the apostle's doctrine by representing it as immoral, or at least as having an immoral tendency. They said, if it be true that we do not need the works of the law in order to justification, then it is immaterial what kind of life we lead; we may sin; and the more we sin, the more will grace be magnified in the remission of our sins. To this misrepresentation of his doctrine the apostle furnishes an answer in Rom. 6: 1-11. Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? By no means. The very conception is impossible. Christians who are justified by faith in Christ, have died with Christ unto sin, and are risen with Him unto newness of life. "I am crucified with Christ," exclaims the apostle (Gal. 2: 20), "yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." The carnal self has been put to death, and the spiritual self, which is created anew after Christ has been quickened into active life. Our old man, the carnal nature, has been in principle crucified with Christ, that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin.

This moral transformation, this change which has begun to take place in our moral nature, is *what is signified in our baptism*. Commentators are generally agreed that this reference to baptism implies an allusion to immersion. The plunging of the body under the waves, they say, signifies death and burial with Christ; and the coming up again from under the water signifies the rising of the soul unto newness of life. This may be admitted, provided we do not thereby turn immersion into a law, and so make of baptism merely a legal institution, like those of the Old Testament, which receives its significance wholly from its form. The apostle's reference is only an illustration, not the laying down of a law. It doubtless recognizes immersion as a mode of baptism; but it does not imply that this is the only mode that is permissible. There may be other elements in the spiritual transaction signified by baptism, which may be better represented by some other mode than immersion. If the apostle had been asked whether immersion is the only valid mode of baptism, and whether persons who

have not been immersed may not be regarded as Christians who have spiritually died with Christ and risen with Him, he would probably have answered with his impassioned *μή γένοιτο, perish the thought*. The apostle was not a legalist, or formalist, and would have scouted the idea of the origination of the Christian life in the soul being bound to any one external ceremony. If in what he says he refers to immersion at all, which is by no means absolutely certain, he refers to it only as a symbol of what takes place in the soul at the moment when the Christian life comes to its birth therein. But this revolution in the life of the soul, which is signified by the terms *dying* and *rising* again, and which, being itself essentially a transcendental process, is once for all certified to the Christian subject by the sensible act of baptism—this revolution has given to the life of the soul a new moral tone and tendency, which is wholly inconsistent with sin, and will act as a powerful influence or impulse, “law of the spirit,” towards the fulfilling of the law of righteousness. This law of the spirit, however, is not regarded by the apostle as an irresistible force, but as a moral influence; so that the exhortation is still in order: “Even so reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus.”

In consequence of the new creation, or new birth, which is signified in Christian baptism, the opposite elements of human nature are brought into right relation to each other. The flesh has become subordinate to the spirit. Its impulses and passions are no longer the controlling forces in human life. The spirit has been instated in its place of rightful dominion by a new accession of power from the Spirit of God. “Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if at least the Spirit of God dwelleth in you,” says the apostle (Rom. 8:9). But this dominion of the spirit over the flesh, in consequence of the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, is not of such sort that the flesh no longer retains something of its nature and tendency, and that the spiritual life goes on with mere involuntary spontaneity. Indeed the spiritual life differs from the carnal just in this, that the spiritual is entirely rational, voluntary and free. In the spiritual life there

is nothing compulsory. The natural, the carnal, on the other hand, is irrational and unfree—mere darkness and passion. It is, therefore, not impossible for the spiritual, in the very exercise of its power of freedom, to abdicate its dominion, and again to become unfree. The renewed soul *may* live after the flesh. There is no irresistible grace preventing such a result. And then, in case it does so, the consequence is death. "If ye live according to the flesh, ye shall die; but if by the spirit ye do mortify the practices of the body, ye shall live." The Epistle to the Romans is a barren soil for proof-texts in favor of the doctrine of irresistible grace. Whatever may be the ultimate issue of grace—whether it result in the salvation of few, or many, or all—grace itself is never an irresistible force, and the human will is always free over against its operations. The Spirit of Christ which dwells in the believer, is not a Spirit of bondage, but of freedom. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). It is the operation of this Spirit in the believer that sets him free from the power and bondage of sin. But this liberation from the bondage of sin does not involve the annihilation of the self-determining power of the will; for that would be the destruction, not the salvation of human nature. The will in its Christian state is entirely free to direct itself. It may be *led* by the Spirit of God; it is never driven or forced.

And this normal relation of the human spirit or personality to its psychico-physical organism, brought to pass by the operation of the Spirit of Christ in the soul, is what, according to St. Paul, constitutes *divine sonship*. He says (Rom. 8:14), "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are *the sons of God*." This state of divine sonship is not the result of a natural birth-right, but of *adoption*, *υἱοθεσία*. An adopted son, *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, is one who is not a son by nature, but one who has been by a legal act put into the place of a son and invested with the rights of sonship. A slave might be thus raised from the condition of bondage and put into the position of a son. The master then becomes to him a father, whom he now honors and obeys, not from motives of fear, but of love. So the Christian believer has

been instated in the position of son of God. He has come to realize that God is in truth his Father; and he now honors and obeys Him, not from considerations of law, but from motives of filial love. It is by reflections of this sort that St. Paul comes to his conception of *adoption*. It has often been observed, especially in more recent times, that St. Paul's conception of adoption and of divine sonship does not agree exactly with the teaching of our Lord concerning the divine fatherhood. According to the teaching of our Lord all men are children of God. In the mouth of our Lord the proper and most distinctive title for God is that of *Father*. The force of this fact is sometimes sought to be broken by the assertion that, when Jesus calls God Father, He does so always in relation either to Himself or to His disciples who have come to stand in a peculiar ethical relation to God. We do not believe that there is any ground for this distinction. Jesus uses this expression, *Father*, not with reference to the character of men, but with reference to the character of God. He has looked into the inmost nature and heart of God, and has apprehended Him in His profoundest relations to His personal offspring, and He expresses His conception by the tender term of Father. In this view God's fatherhood is universal, embracing all rational beings as His offspring. Indeed, Paul himself also accepts this view, when, in his speech at Athens, he adopts the sentiment of the Greek poets, Aratus and Cleanthes, that men are the offspring of God. In the teaching of our Lord, the parable of the Prodigal Son represents most clearly the relation which men in their natural condition are supposed to sustain to God. The prodigal, though lost and erring, and wandering far from home, is still a son, with the essential instincts and feelings of a son. And the father has not ceased to be a father, and to entertain towards his erring son the feelings of a father. Though grieved and sorrowing on account of his undutiful conduct, the father loves the lost son with an undying love. And this is a parable. The true Father, He of whose fatherhood every earthly fatherhood is but a dim reflection, is the Father in Heaven, who loves His human offspring with an infinite love, and whose mercy



endureth forever. And men have some sense, too, of this relationship. In their deepest degradation they can never entirely lose the consciousness of their divine descent—of their heavenly origin and destiny—of their being the offspring of God. And this persistence of the divine fatherhood, on the one hand, and of the human feeling of divine sonship, on the other, forms the ground of the possibility of conversion. The prodigal can say, I will arise and go unto my father, because he still believes in the reality of fatherhood. And so the sinner can call upon his Father in Heaven, because of his conviction of the unchanging reality of the divine fatherhood, and because of the indestructible sense of his own sonship. He does not become anything essentially different from what he was before, when he recognizes God as his Father, and himself as a dutiful child of God. He does not need to go out of his humanity in order to become truly a son of God and reverence and obey Him as a Father. On the contrary, his humanity is from the beginning constitutionally disposed and adapted to this end. Consequently he does not first begin *to be* a son of God when he begins to love and obey God; but, on the contrary, he loves and obeys God because he *is* a son, and only when he does this is he true to his own essential nature. This we believe to be the teaching of our Lord on this subject.

St. Paul, as we have already intimated, came to his conception of adoption by a different process of reflection. His principle was not theological, but anthropological. He started from the notion of the *legal status* which must form a stage of development in the life of all men. There is first a stage in the moral life of each man, as there was once in the life of the race collectively, when men are *without law*. It is the stage of infancy, before the law has become an object of consciousness. "I was myself living without law once," says the apostle (Rom. 7: 9); and that is true of all men. Then, after the stage when men are without law, there comes a stage when they are *under the law*. It is the period of the commencement of the moral life in its seriousness. The consciousness of the law has been awakened. Its imperative has been heard, either in sounds from Sinai or



some other sacred mount, or in tones from the interior of conscience. The law now becomes the regulator of life. Men live by rules. They do *this*, because the law says, *thou shalt*; and they forbear to do *that*, because the law says, *thou shalt not*. This is the spirit of legalism, or the spirit of Phariseeism, seeking to be justified by the works of the law. It is anxious, scrupulous, uneasy, unfree. It is the spirit of the slave, not the spirit of the son, except through that early period, when the son himself, being under guardians and stewards, differeth nothing from a bondservant or slave (Gal. 4: 1). The slave obeys the master, because he fears his lash; the son, at least after the true spirit of sonship has arisen in him, obeys the father because he loves him and is sure that his commandments are right. And this is the difference between the Jew and the Christian. The piety of the Jew is legalistic, anxious, servile; that of the Christian is free, loving, joyful. But the Christian, too, has once, for a longer or shorter time, occupied the position of the Jew. He passed through the stage of the law, when he served God as a slave, and when he cried out, "O, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" Every one's experience of this legal bondage may not have been as painful as that of St. Paul; but every Christian will have felt it, and will know what it is. But this is a condition from which the mature Christian has been delivered. The stage of the law has been passed, and he has entered into the condition of evangelical liberty. He obeys now, not in the spirit of the slave, but in the spirit of the Son. And this change—this transition from the stage of the law to the stage of filial liberty and love, the apostle designates by the term *adoption*. By the operation of redeeming grace the slave has been adopted and made a son, whose principle of moral conduct is no longer the law, but the emotion of filial love. Such evidently is Paul's reasoning. In Gal. 4: 3-7 he says: "When we were children, we also were held in bondage under the rudiments of the world (*rudiments, στοιχεῖα, elements*, legal institutions of Judaism and heathenism); but when the fulness of the time came, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under

the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. So that thou art no longer a bond-servant, *δούλος*, *slave*, but a son; and if a son, then an heir through God." And it is in the same sense that He speaks in our present epistle (8:14-17): "For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God. For ye received not the Spirit of bondage again unto fear; but ye received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are children of God; and if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs of Christ."

Two consequences follow from this conception of divine sonship. The first is stated in the passage last quoted: "If children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ." An heir is one who receives his allotted possession by right of sonship either real or constructive. An inheritance is something that comes to one, not in consequence of work or merit, but in consequence of a personal relationship. Now the blessing of salvation, the good which Christianity promises, is an inheritance—a free gift which the Heavenly Father bestows upon His children, not a purchase for which they are bound to pay by means of their works, and which will be measured out to them in proportion to their merits. Salvation is a moral good. It is the soul's state of perfection and the blessedness which is in the consciousness of that perfection. It is not an external possession, and can, therefore, not be purchased by outward legal performances. As a state of soul and character it is the result of a moral process which has its principle in the divine righteousness working through faith as a sanctifying power. In this process works, when they are of a really ethical quality, and not merely ritual performances, have their proper place and value; and St. Paul would never have approved of the proposition, which some theologians have imagined they derived from his system of teaching, that good works are dangerous to salvation. Good works are not dangerous to salvation, but on the contrary they are themselves moments or elements in the process by which salvation is

accomplished. But, then, they are not in the nature of a service rendered to God as a price in consideration of which He puts us in possession of salvation. They are rather divinely provided occasions which God, Who has created us in Christ Jesus for good works, afore prepared that we should walk in them (Eph. 2: 10), and by walking in them perfect the character of our souls. They have their value in relation to the formation of Christian character; and hence St. Paul, in the conclusion of one of the profoundest and most genial passages in all his writings, exhorts his readers always to abound in the *work* of the Lord, knowing that their labor is not in vain in the Lord (1 Cor. 15: 58). A really good work, though not the price of salvation in a commercial sense, is never without its value in the moral process of salvation; and the true Christian will be thankful for every opportunity of performing such work. An act of charity, for instance, like that of the good Samaritan, blesses the actor more than the object, for it stamps itself into his character, and makes him the more capable of the enjoyment of the love and bliss of heaven. Hence also, in the Apocalypse (19: 8), the fine linen in which the bride of the Lamb is arrayed, is said to be the *righteous acts* of the saints, *δικαιώματα τῶν ἁγίων*; implying that their works have grown into characters which may be compared to pure and shining garments. But in all this there is nothing like the Pharisaic idea against which Paul contended with so much vigor, that good works are the price of salvation, and that salvation is a matter of law rather than a matter of grace. Salvation is still an inheritance, not a purchase.

But a second consequence following from the conception of divine sonship, as understood by St. Paul, is the regulation of the moral life, not by the commandments of the law, but by the impulse of love. "Ye are not under the law, but under grace," writes the apostle. If any one, however, should suppose that, because he is not under the law, but under grace, the Christian may violate the ethical principles of the law, he would be greatly mistaken. The law is not evil, but good. "The law is holy," writes the apostle, "and the commandment holy, and righteous, and

good." Formally Paul never distinguishes between what has in theology been called the *moral* and the *ceremonial* law. What he means by the law is the law of the Old Testament, in which moral, ceremonial and civil precepts are mixed up in motley confusion. But in his own mind Paul, nevertheless, clearly distinguishes between the several elements which are contained in the law, and when he speaks of the law as something good and holy, he doubtless has in mind especially its moral precepts, which are identical with the immutable moral principles of right. From the observance of these there can be no dispensation. The ceremonial ordinances of the law have passed away. They were local, accidental and temporary. They may in times past have had their value as shadows of good things to come, but they have now no longer any significance for the Christian conscience. But it is different with the ethical principles of the law. These are principles of the universe; and they are principles of the divine nature itself. Hence they can never be abrogated. They must ever continue to rule the moral life of men. But in the manner in which they exercise this rule there may be an important difference. The rule may be external, or it may be internal. For the Jew, and for the man occupying the legal standpoint, it is external; for the Christian, or for the man occupying the spiritual standpoint of grace, it is internal. The Jew obeyed the law because it was *law*, and said to him *thou shalt*, or *thou shalt not*, and when he thought that he could in a *legal way* escape its precepts and yet get credit for obedience, he would not scruple to take advantage of the situation. The Christian, on the contrary, obeys the law because it is *right*, and because he *loves* the right. "Love," says the apostle, "is the fulfillment of the law" (Rom. 13:10). Love does not abrogate, it does not violate the law, but it fulfills it. It fulfills it, however, not because it threatens punishment to the transgressor, but because it is in its own nature good and right. This is the difference between the obedience of the Jew and the obedience of the Christian, or between that of the slave and of the son. And here we have the foundation, too, for the distinction between general and Christian ethics. A slave

and a son may obey the same person. The matter of obedience also may be the same, but nevertheless the quality of obedience may be wholly different. The one obeys from fear, the other from love; to the one obedience is a task without joy, to the other it is a pleasure. Now the Christian is a son. He is not under the law, but under grace. But he may not for that reason sin. He is not above the law, that he may trample it under foot. His right relation is to be one with it, or to be in it, *ἐννομος*, and to let it determine his conduct as an inward vital principle.

This is Paul's ideal of a Christian man, who has been justified by faith, and in whom faith is working as an active principle of sanctification. And no Christian character is complete without the realization of this ideal. Nor, indeed, is the process of justification itself, as Paul conceived it, complete until it has actualized itself in the sanctification of the believer, or in his being actually made righteous. Hence, as we said at the beginning of this paper, justification and sanctification may be regarded as opposite sides—negative and positive—or as successive stages of one process of salvation; and they are so connected that each presupposes the other. Justification, in the declarative sense, anticipates sanctification, and sanctification rests upon justification. It is a matter worthy of remark that St. Paul, while he insists upon justification by faith without works, always, when he comes to speak of the final judgment in which a man's eternal destiny is fixed, makes that depend upon works. God, he says, will render to every man according to his works, in the day when He shall judge the secrets of men, according to His Gospel, by Jesus Christ (Rom. 2:6-16). And this judgment will apply to all men alike, Christians as well as those who are not Christians, for in 1 Cor. 5:10, he says "that we must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of Christ; that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad." This is in accordance with Christ's own description of the last judgment; but, of course, it can not mean that, in the judgment, works will come into consideration as meritorious performances by the weighing of which men's weal

or woe will be determined, but it must rather be supposed to mean that men will be judged according to the character which they have formed in consequence of their works. In the judgment the great question will be what a man is as the result of the saving grace of God; and no one will enter into the eternal kingdom of God without having formed a character corresponding to the life and love of that kingdom. Thus the righteousness of God revealed in the Gospel, while at first it declares the sinner righteous for the sake of Christ, will and must at last make him righteous by the appropriation of Christ's character. What bearing this view will have upon the nature of the life in the intermediate state, we can not here discuss. But if the process of sanctification is not complete at death, and if it must be complete in the judgment, then the inference will be that existence in the intermediate state must be subject to moral conditions, under which moral development and progress in sanctification may still be possible.

There remains but one question more to which only a few passing remarks can be devoted in conclusion, and that refers to the relation between the objective work of redemption and the subjective work of salvation. Ritschl and his school are in the habit of placing redemption last in the order in which sinners are delivered and brought into their true estate of children of God. Instead of the order of *redemption, justification and sanctification*, they speak of *justification, sanctification and redemption*. So also Paul says (1 Cor. 1: 30): "But of Him (God) are ye in Christ Jesus, who was made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." But in the Epistle to the Romans, redemption is regarded as the objective divine foundation of the process of salvation, rather than as its culmination or conclusion. There may, however, be this reason for putting it last, that it is not in itself an absolutely finished act without regard to its results in humanity. In itself redemption is the act of Christ accomplished in His atoning sacrifice. Now, if this were an act of expiation literally covering the penalty of all the sins of all men, then it would be in itself a complete act



of deliverance, without regard to its results among men. But that, we do not think, was Paul's idea. According to Paul, the act of redemption is redemption really only when it issues in actual salvation for men. Christ's sacrifice becomes an actual propitiation only through faith. It is not a legal act, accomplished in the sinner's stead, but a dynamic and ethical act, looking to faith and sanctification in the sinner as the completion of its own meaning. Though first in time, and in the logic of reality, as the divine foundation of the process, its full meaning is only realized in the end of sanctification and glorification; and for this reason it may not be altogether wrong to treat of it last in a systematic representation of human salvation. But, what is of more importance than this merely logical question, is that the divine act of redemption necessarily presupposes the human process of salvation. It has been said that the divine idea of redemption would be satisfied even if not a single human soul were saved except that of Jesus. We believe, on the contrary, that it must be said rather that the full meaning of redemption can only be realized in the actual salvation of all those for whom Christ died.



## VII.

### THE IMPENDING CRISIS.

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That the present course of history is moving on toward a consummation is universally admitted. It is the only conclusion consistent with a rational view of human life. It is likewise the teaching of revelation. God "hath appointed a day, in the which He will judge the world in righteousness." However much confusion there may seem to be in the movements of history now, however much unrighteousness may seem now to prevail, it will not always be thus. There is both law and reason in the onward march of events, which in their own good time will bring the present course of history to a consummation and cause righteousness to triumph.

Can we form any sort of rational conception of what the character of that consummation will be? By what kind of powers and forces will it be brought to pass? What will be its relation to preceding history? What will be the nature of the crisis which it will involve?

One thing is made unmistakably clear by the prophecies of the New Testament Scriptures. That consummation will involve a final and decisive separation between the opposing forces which are now contending for the mastery in human life. That is the thought in the picture of the judgment, which we find in the latter part of the 25th chapter of St. Matthew, "But when the Son of man shall come in His glory, and all the holy angels with Him, then shall He sit on the throne of His glory; and before Him shall be gathered all nations; and He shall separate them one from another, as the shepherd separateth the sheep from the goats; and He shall set the sheep on His right hand, but the goats on His left." And from what follows, it is not at all difficult to

see what kind of a separation it will be. There will be two classes, and only two. The righteous will be welcomed to the right hand, which means favor and honor and blessedness; while the wicked will be driven to the left, which is the symbol of condemnation and misery and death. The same representation is found elsewhere, especially in the parable of the wheat and the tares. Both grow together until the harvest; but "in the time of the harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather up first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them; but gather the wheat into my barn."

This may be taken as the essential characteristic of that consummation which is involved in the final judgment. There will be a ripening of both wheat and tares; the kingdoms of light and of darkness will both reach their full-grown development; and then, when each has reached its perfect growth, the two will be fully and forever sundered. This, however, will necessarily involve several other things. Before such a complete and absolute separation can take place, there must be an unerring judicial determination of the character of each and all, so that every one may find his proper place. That likewise is represented as part of the consummation. St. Paul speaks of "the day when God shall judge the secrets of men, according to my gospel, by Jesus Christ." Hence he says, in another place: "Wherefore judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make manifest the counsels of the hearts." How this shall be accomplished, we shall not now inquire further than to say that it will of necessity come with the full development of all life, which that day will involve. If the wheat and the tares will then be both fully grown, there will no longer be any possibility of mistaking their character. So long as both are in the blade it is impossible to tell them apart; but in the harvest there remains no difficulty in distinguishing between them.

The separation will likewise bring with it as a necessary consequence a rewarding of each, such as is involved in all the descriptions of the New Testament. For the righteous to be finally and

forever separated from sinners and from every form of evil will be their full salvation; it will be their full and complete union with the good and with God; and that will be happiness and bliss forever. While for the wicked to be finally and forever separated from the society of the good and from all that is good, will be the fulness of condemnation. It will mean to be ruined and wretched forever.

By what kind of powers and forces will this separation, with all that it will involve, be brought to pass? Will they be powers from above and beyond our present human life? Or will they be forces which are now resident and working in the bosom of human society? Or will it be both? And, if so, how will they be related?

There is much in the New Testament which would at first seem to imply that the powers which will bring to pass the great separation will be from above and beyond our present human life. Thus in the picture of the judgment, from which I have already quoted, it is the Son of man, who, by His appearing, "shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd separateth the sheep from the goats." At the close of the parable of the wheat and the tares, the Saviour says, "The Son of man shall send forth His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom all things that cause stumbling and them that do iniquity, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire." So St. Paul says that it will be the Lord, who at His coming, "will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make manifest the counsels of the heart." In each case it is the Lord, with His holy angels, who is represented as the direct and active agent in bringing to pass what will be involved in the great day.

Doubtless we can not emphasize this thought too strongly. If good men were left alone in the great and final crisis, they would be utterly defeated. Satan never for one moment leaves his hosts without his supervision and help, and we may well suppose that he will put forth his utmost exertion in the final onset. Even now "our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of

this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places;" how much more may we not expect those superhuman powers of evil to be at hand in that day? As we need to put on the whole armor of God, now, that we may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil, so we will need to look to the hills from whence cometh our help in that day. As it will be the day of "the appearance of the glory of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ," so it will be the day in which He will manifest the greatness of His power and might. That and that alone is the blessed hope for which we can look amid the darkness of our present life, and especially in connection with the crisis of that day.

But we should make a very serious mistake, if we should conceive of His help in that day as something totally different from the help which He is giving us now. He is present with His Church even now; and our only hope in the struggles in which we are now or at any time in history engaged, is in the help which we derive from Him. Even now His holy angels are present with their ministries of help. "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation?" Though there has been no visible manifestation of their presence or ministry since the close of the Apostolic age, no one who accepts the fact of their existence, as ministering spirits, can for a moment question that they have been present continually in the history of the Church and participated in her conflicts and victories. Even the glorious appearing of our Lord will not be totally different from His presence in the Church now. When He stood in the presence of Caiaphas on the morning of His crucifixion, He said, "Henceforth ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming on the clouds of heaven." Undoubtedly, His "coming on the clouds of heaven" is the same fact as that described in St. Matthew, 25:31, where it is said, "But when the Son of man shall come in His glory, and all the holy angels with Him, then shall He sit on the throne of His glory." But it is just as clearly identified with His "sitting at the right hand of power," which began immediately

after His apparent defeat through His crucifixion and death. Both expressions are joined with "henceforth," which means that from that day on His "sitting at the right hand of power," and His "coming on the clouds of heaven" would be a fact of which His enemies would become sensible. So that even His glorious appearing is a historic fact, which is powerfully influencing history all the while, not a fact to be sundered from the rest of history going before, but a fact which by its power is even now directing the struggles of the kingdom of light and bringing to pass its great victories.

The parable of the wheat and the tares very clearly connects the separation of the great day with preceding history. That which will then be gathered out of the kingdom is simply the tares of the field now come to full maturity. The wicked in that day will simply be the tares gathered together in bundles for the burning. But we remember the origin of the tares. While men slept an "enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat and went his way." The tares sprang up with the wheat, grew side by side with it and have come to maturity at the same time. When the servants at the beginning proposed to gather up the tares they were forbidden lest they should root up the wheat also. Both were allowed, and purposely allowed, to grow together until the harvest. Between the separation at the end and the sowing at the beginning there is a vital connection. They are vitally joined by the growth which comes between. They are simply the beginning and the end of the same process which has gone on without interruption.

That, however, is simply a picture of the relation between the separation at the end of the present course of history and what goes before. Here the good and the evil have existed side by side, have each of them had their own growth, and come to maturity at the same time. The end and the beginning are likewise related to the growth which comes between. But this growth has been characterized by conflicts and struggles all the way through history. The kingdoms of light and darkness have not existed side by side in the world in the same peaceful way as

the wheat and tares in the same field. Their difference has all along implied antagonism, in which they have at every step divided the men of the world between them. And that division has essentially been the same as the separation at the end, except that in each case it has been a partial separation only, involving of necessity a partial victory only. But the separation, as far as it went at any time, was of the same kind as the final separation, and brought about by the same forces. On the one side was the good under the King of righteousness, on the other was the evil under the direction of the prince of darkness. Each has exerted the power which is inherent in its own kingdom, and the separation in each case was brought to pass by the victory of the one over the other. This will become clearer if we examine somewhat more fully the parallel growth between the kingdoms of light and darkness in the world.

Is the world growing better? Or is it growing worse? It is an old question, which has been variously answered according to the standpoint of the person replying. Some say unhesitatingly, yes, it is growing better. They point us to many evidences about us to show how the material and moral conditions of men are better than formerly, how works of charity abound as never before, how the Church is being extended into heathen lands, how Christian ideas are everywhere leavening society, how heathen superstitions are everywhere crumbling before the advance of civilization and Christianity, and how the standards of intercourse between men and nations are continually rising higher and higher. There are others who take just the opposite view. They are just as certain that the world is growing worse. They point us just as confidently to the evidences of increasing wickedness, to a decay of faith and piety in the Church itself, to the fact that, with advancing civilization, vices are being carried to the heathen of which they would never have known but for the advances of the commerce of our Christian nations, to the fact of political corruption in high places and low, and to vices which are honeycombing our so-called Christian society in ways which remind us of the declining days of the Roman empire.



Which is the correct view? I have no hesitancy in saying that neither is correct. Both are partially true, but neither is wholly true. Each sees one side of the truth; neither sees the whole truth. So far as the world is in the kingdom of light it is growing better—steadily and rapidly growing better. In as far as it is in the kingdom of darkness it is growing worse—just as steadily and rapidly growing worse. Part of the world has accepted the Gospel, and is being grandly and gloriously saved. There can be no question as to whether that side of the world's life is growing better or worse. There is more devotion to Christ and His Church to-day than at any time in the history of the world. There is a larger and better apprehension of the truth than ever before. The Church knows more of Christ and of His revelation to-day than at any time during her history. So it is with regard to the practical response to the truth as it is in Jesus. There is a larger and fuller response to the demands of Christian love than at any time. To affirm the contrary would be not simply to fly in the face of the plainest facts of history; it would be to deny the clear implications of God's word. If the wheat grows, as the time of harvest approaches, how can it be otherwise but that the kingdom which it represents must grow likewise?

But that is only half the truth. A large part of the world is not in the kingdom of light. It is still in the kingdom of darkness; and it is there not because the Gospel has not been presented to it. A large part of the human race is on the outside of the kingdom of light, because that is its deliberate choice. Granting that many millions are in heathen darkness, because the Gospel has never yet been preached to them; and granting that many, many thousands are on the outside in Christian lands, because of mistaken methods of the Church in presenting the truth; the fact still remains that many are on the outside, because they love darkness rather than light. It is simply an untruth to say that they are where they are, because the Church has not made the proper efforts to reach them. They are in the kingdom of darkness, because their deeds are evil, and because that kingdom corresponds to the condition of their inner life. In them the



kingdom of darkness has its living embodiment in the world; and what is more, it has its growth as well as the kingdom of light. It would be a serious misconception of history as well as of Scripture, to suppose that the kingdom of light has grown for more than eighteen centuries, and the kingdom of darkness not. According to the very structure of the parable, to which I have referred, the tares must grow as the wheat grows. Both grow together until the harvest. But that at once implies that there are aspects of the world's life which are growing worse. The mystery of inquiry is being manifested continually more and more. There are forms of wickedness in the world to-day which are blacker and more diabolical than any which the world has ever seen.

But if this be true, what must be the result? Evidently things can not go on in this way forever. Abraham Lincoln once affirmed with regard to the United States that they could not exist half slave and half free. The fact of slavery constituted an irrepressible conflict, which made it necessary that the whole country should become the one or the other. So we may say of the world. It can not exist forever half bad and half good, half in the kingdom of darkness and half in the kingdom of light. As surely as light is opposed to darkness, as surely as righteousness is opposed to sin, so surely must this condition of the world's life lead to a crisis, in which the one or the other will gain the victory. A crisis must come, in and through which the world will become either all light or else all darkness.

Have we any means of determining what will be the nature of that crisis? Will it be a peaceful crisis, in which the light will gradually dispel the darkness, as the day dispels the night? Or will it be a crisis, involving bloodshed and war, in which the two kingdoms will be arrayed against each other in deadly conflict?

The world has seen some crises which were, at least, comparatively free from violence. Great questions have been settled by peaceful methods, truth gradually triumphing over error, and the right taking the place of the wrong so quietly yet persistently that great revolutions have been accomplished without either

bloodshed or war. Thus we are sometimes pointed to the contrast between the English and French Revolutions, as furnishing illustrations of two totally different methods for solving the great problems of history and for passing its serious crises. And there can be no question about the fact that the English Revolution accomplished practically the same things that were attained in the French, yet with comparatively little violence. And the question may be fairly raised, Does it not indicate the way in which the final crisis between the two kingdoms of light and darkness will be solved? It is the hope of many; and there are undoubtedly indications which look in that direction. The tendency among nations is to substitute arbitration in the place of war for the settlement of international disputes. It is both the more rational and far the more economical method. As civilization advances, we may undoubtedly look for a more general application of the principle. Even Japan, which is just waking up out of its semi-barbarous condition, seems ready to submit its differences with another power to an impartial tribunal. May we not expect all the nations to attain to such a degree of sanity, that they will not learn war any more?

Even our most hopeful advocates of arbitration admit that there are difficulties in the way which seem insuperable. There are some problems which, they confess, it can not solve. Can a nation, for example, submit a question of national existence, or even of national honor, to a tribunal for arbitration? Should a nation feel itself so wronged by an adverse decision that it should feel its very life to be involved, can we expect it simply to yield without a struggle? Not certainly so long as the present order prevails. To admit it would imply that all the nations would first accept the Gospel and become consciously incorporated in the kingdom of light. But on the supposition that the kingdom of darkness will continue to exist alongside of the kingdom of light to the end, that it has a history with a development and growth of its own, that conclusion is impossible.

To say the least, that is not the way in which the great crises of history have been solved. Take the crisis in our own history,

in and through which it was decided that this nation should exist all free, instead of all slave. Compromise after compromise was passed by our Congress; the energies of our best statesmen were given to finding a peaceful solution; and more than once it was thought that the end had been reached. As we now look back, we can see how it would have been both cheaper and better for the nation to have emancipated the slave by giving the slaveholder an ample compensation; and now that the question has been decided by the bloody arbitrament of the sword, all of us, even the slaveholder, would prefer to have had that form of solution. But that was impossible before the clash of arms had come. Sin and passion and prejudice had so beclouded men's minds that such a solution could neither be offered by the one side nor accepted by the other. Will it be different with the final crisis? May not men become so enlightened that they will no longer be subject to such blindness and prejudice? If sin continues what it is, we must answer most emphatically in the negative. Not only will the mystery of iniquity manifest greater malignity; but those, who are willingly led captive by sin, will be more and more blinded by its power. Does any one suppose that Satan will lie down like a lamb, and allow himself to be bound, without a struggle, for the awful prison house into which he knows that he shall be hurled? Or does anyone suppose that the wicked, who will finally have made evil their deliberate choice, will give up the earth with its sinful pleasures for hell with its awful horrors, simply because it has been so decided by a tribunal of arbitration? The only basis on which we can suppose that such a tribunal of arbitration could enforce its final decision against the evil is on the supposition that both Satan and all wicked men would be converted; and for that there seems to be no hope. Even the advocates of "the larger hope" have to look to the ages beyond this present order for the realization of such a consummation. In this present order, in this age, at least, no such a thing can be expected.

There seems, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the crisis through which this age will reach its consummation will be

one of intense struggle and of supreme antagonism. There are many things, both in contemporary history and in Scripture, which point in that direction. What is the meaning of the immense preparations for war which are going on on all sides? Armaments are being prepared such as previous ages could never have conceived. It is a singular fact that, while nations are talking of arbitration and submitting their minor differences to settlement in that way, they are straining every nerve to get ready for war. It is true, we are told that our modern armaments are a deterrent against war; that, owing to the enormous expense and the fearful destruction which the next war will involve, nations will be afraid to go to war; and that, consequently, these very preparations are a harbinger of universal peace. Doubtless, there is a measure of truth in the assertion. Nations will hesitate far longer before they make an appeal to the sword. But simple fear can not avert the resort to the dread arbitration. It may, so long as the issue is greatly in doubt, or so long as the end to be attained does not seem to greatly overbalance the increased risk and expense. But let conditions arise in which the balance of power shall become greatly disturbed, and in which the end to be gained will greatly overbalance the risk to be run by the stronger power, and simple fear will not prevent war. The very existence of these fearful engines of destruction will only increase the temptation for the stronger power to go to war and to crush out the weaker. And does not the fact that "the whole world lieth in the evil one" indicate that there is a strong presumption that such conditions will by and by arise? The Saviour's discourse on the end of this age, at least, bears out this conclusion: "And there shall be signs in the sun and moon and stars, and upon the earth distress of nations, in perplexity for the roaring of the sea and the billows; men fainting for fear, and for expectation of the things which are coming on the world; for the powers of heaven shall be shaken. And then they shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud with power and great glory."

The final issue of the crisis can, of course, not be in doubt; for righteousness will triumph. But the form in which the tri-

umph will come no one can foretell. The power by which the victory will be gained will be the Lord's, as the victory will be His. And the manifestation of that power will bring the final manifestation of His glory. It will be His glorious appearing. But what that will be it is as yet idle for us to inquire. How He will come, how He will rescue His saints out of the hands of their enemies, how He will cause the right to triumph, we cannot tell. To quote the statement of the angel at the Ascension, "This Jesus, which was received up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye beheld Him going into heaven," as some do, to show that the return will be an outward visible return to this present order, is to miss the point of the declaration. For though the Ascension was visible to the disciples, who stood there gazing into heaven, it was not visible to ordinary sense or sight. The disciples did not see the risen Lord until the inner eye of their faith had been opened. He never appeared to any one who did not have this power of an inner vision; and His appearance at the Ascension was not an appearance which was visible to ordinary sight any more than any that had preceded. Hence His coming "in like manner" can not mean His coming back into this present order in such a way as to be visible by the ordinary sight of men. And so the help or the deliverance which He will then bring to His saints will not be of a carnal or material kind, as if He had come back to take up then the arms of flesh and blood, which He refused to use during the days of His humiliation. Those chiliastic conceptions, which look for that sort of deliverance, are likely as far wrong as the Messianic expectations of the Jews at His first coming. But, while we cannot tell the form of the deliverance, we have the assurance of the glorious fact. In some way, and we may be sure a way far more glorious than any carnal interference could be, Jesus will bring victory to His saints in the last dread affray. Hence He tells us, "When these things begin to come to pass, look up and lift up your heads; because your redemption draweth nigh."

As we cannot tell the form of the victory, so we cannot tell the time when the crisis will come upon us. One thing only we

can be sure of. As the crisis will grow out of the conditions which are now prevailing in the world, as it will be precipitated by the antagonism which is now going forward between the kingdoms of light and darkness, it is constantly impending. As was the destruction of Jerusalem, so are all the crises of history types and premonitions of the final crisis. Each of them carries in itself the conflict which will issue in the final onset; and so each of them is, in a sense, a preliminary struggle, admonishing us that the final one is impending. That may come sooner or later, according to the conditions which prevail. We know not how soon. The long-dreaded European war, if ever it comes, may be the beginning of the end. We cannot tell. But we know that the crisis is impending, and that each crisis in the world's unfolding life is hastening its coming. God speed the day, and grant, for the elect's sake, that the days of the awful struggle may be shortened!

## VIII.

### PHILOSOPHY AS A FACTOR IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE REFORMED CHURCH.

BY REV. JOHN S. STAHR, D.D.

The injunction of our Lord to Peter: "Feed my lambs," may be regarded as a charge to the Christian Church of all ages. This charge means more than the indoctrination of the young in the elements of Christian truth; it includes education in the widest sense under the fostering care and in the catholic spirit of Christianity itself in such a way as to realize, in the acquisition of knowledge, in intellectual and moral culture, in genuine human development, the ideal of normal manhood as exemplified in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. It presupposes during the period of elementary education, if this education is carried forward in the public schools, a training in the family and by the Church in such form and to such an extent that the spirit of it will form the background and the setting of the knowledge acquired and discipline received in the school sufficiently to give tone and character to the whole process in the interest of Christian nurture. Furthermore, it implies at the other end a sufficient body of Christian truth and principle to insure a safe progress through the mazes of higher learning, and to keep the soul sure and steadfast by the anchor of faith as it grapples with the problems of thought and life in pushing human inquiry to its farthest limits. As the waters of the Mississippi in the lower part of its course flow on by the velocity previously acquired, so the mind imbued with Christian truth and enlightened by the vision of things in their relation to Him "in whom all things consist" in the earlier stages of its growth, will continue to



move in its true orbit in the pursuit of knowledge in all departments of art and science.

Elementary education is thus safeguarded by oversight, and university training is made safe by the previous steadying of character. Does this cover everything that is included in the term education in the widest sense? A little consideration will show that this is not the case. Between these two extremes of the process of education lies an intermediate stage which is of the most profound significance. On the border land between youth and manhood, when parental oversight can no longer cover the whole range of interest, and the budding possibilities of a large, free life are manifest on every side; when the individual feels that he is thrown on his own resources in thought and action; when independent opinions are expected, and controlling principles of conduct take shape from within; when the acquisition of knowledge and acquaintance with the life of the world widen the horizon, and conflicting claims press for recognition on every side: there is more need, than ever before, of a religious environment and the warm, inspiring breath of Christian truth and love. This stage is covered by the American college, a unique institution with a unique mission and office, made so, especially, by the fact that neither the high school nor the university can be substituted for it without serious loss—loss which cannot but prove permanent from the standpoint of sound culture as well as from that of religion. It is sometimes said that facts are facts irrespective of religion or politics, and that it makes no difference by whom or under what auspices they are taught. This is a great error. There are no isolated facts. All facts have their relations, and what they signify to the human mind—to use a phrase now very common among psychologists—depends upon their apperceptive adjustment, that is to say, upon the relation in which they come to stand as ideas to other ideas by which they are modified or raised to a higher significance. Here is a powerful argument in favor of the American college as a distinctive institution under the care of some religious body, specifically charged with the training of men in such a way as to realize the

ideal of true manhood. This requires discipline and knowledge, principle and character. Discipline and knowledge are universally recognized as desirable, and every system of education worthy of the name is expected to furnish them; but it is not so universally understood that principle and character are not their necessary concomitants. A well-disciplined mind, trained to observe and investigate, and enriched with stores of knowledge, is by no means always, or even generally, an indication that its possessor is a man of sound principle and good character. Now, while virtue cannot be imparted like knowledge, nor character formed by a process of drill, it is, nevertheless, true that until the unfolding life has received a definite cast or form by self-determination, under influences which kindle, stimulate and give direction to the virtuous principle, moral and religious culture are as legitimately the province of an institution of learning, as physical and intellectual development.

The college, accordingly, stands for thorough and well-rounded culture. Its province is, first of all, to furnish training in all the general spheres of knowledge which belong to the culture of the age in which the student lives, together with such a training of the faculties in definite lines of investigation that he will be able to enter upon special study or practical life with broad sympathies, keen insight, and mature strength. Going hand in hand with this, there must be a moral culture which leads to the formation of manly character and a religious development broad and catholic and in full sympathy with the reigning life of his religious profession. And, finally, the college is at least to begin a culture which will afford the student *the right view of things*, a point of view (*Weltanschauung*) which will open up every avenue of thought and life, and serves as a coign of vantage in every phase of his subsequent career.

The writer has set forth his educational creed to this extent, not with a view to a full discussion of the significance of the college in education, but rather for the purpose of raising the question whether Philosophy as such is a college discipline, and of determining how and why it has been, in the estimation of all,

whether for good or for evil, so potent a factor in the educational development of the Reformed Church in the United States. In order that this purpose may be, in a measure, at least, realized, it is necessary to turn to the early history of our literary and theological institutions, to trace very briefly the origin and progress of the system of thought for which they soon became noted and to sketch in outline the fundamental principles which produced so fruitful a growth in subsequent years.

It is, of course, not intended to claim a place in the college curriculum for Philosophy in the widest sense as a separate discipline taking up Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics in the same way that the student takes up Algebra, Geometry and Analytics. The student is not prepared for that, nor has he the time for it. Neither is it intended to advocate a partial devotion to metaphysical studies so that the ability to talk philosophical jargon may hide a mass of ignorance in other branches of study. No amount of philosophical study can, in a system of modern education, take the place of Mathematics and Natural Science on the one hand, nor of Languages, Literature and History on the other. And yet two points may be unhesitatingly affirmed. First, a sound system of philosophy must underlie the whole course of study, and in the light of it the different departments of instruction must be administered. Secondly, room must be made for a course of instruction in which the fundamental principles of the system come to view, as in History, Psychology, Logic, *Æsthetics*, Ethics, Social Science, etc. Failing in this, a course of instruction lacks unity, and, in the end, proves woefully defective. No student can claim to be even measurably well-informed who does not have some knowledge of philosophical principles and of their application to the different departments of knowledge; and in such branches of study as Psychology and Ethics, which are acknowledged to be of prime importance, no matter how much stress may be laid upon empirical observation and the inductive method, there is always underlying them a system of philosophy expressed or implied.

Now and then one still hears the silly objection to such study

that Philosophy is dangerous and tends to lead men astray. So also is manhood dangerous, because it brings with it responsibilities of which the child is in blissful ignorance! The naïve view of things, which is the peculiar characteristic of childish knowledge, cannot continue through life; the unfolding reason will inquire into the nature of things, and a mature mind must have some kind of philosophy; it is only a question as to what kind. It is true, there are many people, no doubt, who, in the simplicity of their hearts, take things to be entirely as they appear on the surface. But the moment a doubt is raised as to the adequacy of their explanation of the common phenomena of sense, they are at sea; their philosophy is at fault, and they are "like reeds shaken with the wind." In such conditions it is that Bacon's maxim is verified: "A little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion." He who has not learned to think of these things is likely to find himself rudely awakened some day, in the same way that Germany was aroused out of its dogmatic slumber by the critical philosophy of Kant. And then comes the question, What kind of philosophy will the mind espouse? Will it be materialistic or spiritual, atheistic or Christian?

It was the good fortune of the Reformed Church and of its representative literary and theological institutions to have their educational system directed and molded by men who were thorough scholars and profound thinkers, men trained and thoroughly versed in the philosophy of Germany, who were in sympathy with American life and thought, and who were, at the same time, devout Christians and humble believers in revealed religion. These men were competent to speak with authority as scholars, as teachers, as leaders of Christian thought and qualified by their attainments and character to elaborate a course of study in the different departments of knowledge and to formulate a system of thought, the fructifying influence of which is felt to-day like the warm breath of spring upon the snows of April. The foundations of this system were laid at a time when American institutions of learning paid little attention to philosophic thought, and

when the old dogmatic systems or the sensational philosophy of Locke furnished the basis on which rested the mental and moral science of the day, as far as there was any; and as for Logic, it was dry and formal with little apprehension of the fact that thought itself might be studied to greater advantage and with better results than the mere categories of judgment or the forms of the syllogism. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that when a vigorous effort was made to introduce into the study of Psychology, *Æsthetics* and Ethics the results of the most advanced thought and the best scholarship of Europe, and when the waves of influence thus generated spread over the whole course of study and made themselves felt in theology and kindred branches, a profound impression was made not only in Marshall College at Mercersburg, but also in the larger centres of learning in this country, and even among scholars and theologians of the Old World. It argues much in favor of the ability of the teachers and the merits of their system that there was brought about an intellectual activity, a ferment of thought, a stimulus to study and investigation, and a radiation of influence such as can only be produced in the educational history of the world by the conjunction of master minds with earnest students, upon congenial soil, and under favorable conditions of growth. The enthusiasm and activity of those affected by the movement were unbounded. They read philosophy, they talked philosophy and some of them even dreamed philosophy. It must be confessed that they did this sometimes to little purpose, and at other times to their injury. So, too, it must be confessed, that the philosophical principles taught were often misunderstood, sometimes misrepresented, and occasionally perverted so as to lead to wrong conclusions and produce unfortunate results. But, for all this neither the system taught nor its authors can be held responsible. The best things may be abused. Even such prime necessities of life as food and raiment may, instead of ministering to the body, become harmful when wrongly used. And the early ages of the Church afford abundant proof that the teachings of our Lord Himself and the apostles were misconstrued and perverted. But that the influence of the

philosophical principles which gave tone and character to the life of our literary and theological institutions was most salutary, is demonstrated by the fact that they have preserved their vitality and proved their power to make thinkers and workers, in the professor's chair or in the pulpit, at the bar or in business. Moreover, these very principles, at first ridiculed and rejected by many who stood outside of the movement, have now become the common possession of all the great centres of thought and learning in the country. There is not a university in the land where philosophy is taught that would not be ashamed to-day to advance the objections and criticisms which these teachings at first had to encounter.

It was not the avowed purpose of those who may be considered the authors of what we have called a system of thought to formulate a complete system of philosophy. They were earnest, practical men, bent upon the thorough education of the young men who placed themselves under their care in the institutions of the Church; and they knew very well that a formal system of philosophy was not what these young men needed. But their teaching throughout, the course of study which they inaugurated, the scientific and ethical principles which they inculcated, the faith which they professed, and the theory which they taught formed a harmonious whole in which their philosophy is manifest, and from which the fundamental truths of their philosophical creed may be inferred. It is not easy, at least not to one who was not in the movement from the beginning, to determine precisely how much is due to one or to the other of the master minds to whom all, by common consent, turn as the leaders in this process of educational development. Frederick Augustus Rauch, John Williamson Nevin and Philip Schaff were *facile principes* among those to whom we may fairly look as the teachers at whose feet so many have received their initiation into the profound truths of science, philosophy and theology; while among those who were at first the students of these great leaders, and afterwards became the efficient exponents of their teachings, Harbaugh and Higbee have gone to their reward, while others still abide among us rich



in labors and honor, and the respect and gratitude of those who have in turn come under their influence. Drs. Rauch and Nevin may, however, be regarded as responsible for the philosophy of the movement, whilst the so-called "Mercersburg Theology" (with which we are at this time only incidentally concerned) may be attributed to the conjoint labors of Drs. Nevin and Schaff. Dr. Rauch undoubtedly introduced into the college at Mercersburg the system of thought under consideration and gave it definite shape in his *Psychology* and in his lectures on *Æsthetics* \* and *Ethics*. The former at once became exceedingly popular, and it is even at the present day a valuable book. The latter were never published, but the lectures on *Ethics* were almost ready for the press when the lamented author died. It is but fair to assume that they, as well as the lectures on *Æsthetics*, became the nucleus of the lectures on these subjects which have become classic in the history of our institutions. It would, however, be unjust to Dr. Nevin to suppose that he only continued or enlarged and improved what he received from the hands of Dr. Rauch. Dr. Nevin, perhaps the profoundest philosopher yet produced on American soil, in full sympathy with Dr. Rauch and entering into his labors from the same point of view, himself went to the original sources and mastered the whole field of German philosophy. He enlarged and perfected what Dr. Rauch had only begun, and he introduced the richest treasures of German thought into the system which was developing from within under the guidance of his masterly hand. We should expect, therefore, to find that while no doubt the earlier lectures on *Æsthetics* and *Ethics* were based on those of Dr. Rauch, the later ones were not only more elaborate but also reconstructed in form and method so as to constitute a new development of the subject. The later lectures on *Ethics* have perhaps more in common with J. H. Fichte, and those on *Æsthetics* with F. Theodor Vischer than with those which Dr. Rauch had delivered. And yet the whole movement is substantially the legitimate development of

\* See "What is Poetry?" by Dr. Theodore Appel, *Mercersburg Review*, Vol. XI.



the system founded by Dr. Rauch during the short span of years in which he was permitted to labor as the first president of Marshall College. Drs. Rauch and Nevin were not merely imitators of any previous author or thinker. Both of them, on the basis of thorough study and complete mastery of the whole field, freely constructed their system and exercised their undoubted right to cut loose from their masters whenever, in their judgment, they pressed their views too far, or became one-sided in their development.

Dr. Rauch, after a full course of study in the University of Marburg, spent a year at Giessen, and afterwards went to Heidelberg, where he was the favorite student of Dr. Karl Daub, a master in Philosophy and a sincere, orthodox Christian. He thoroughly mastered the whole course of philosophic thought from Kant to Hegel and Herbart and, like his master, he maintained the integrity of his faith without falling into the pitfalls of rationalism on the one hand, or of pantheism on the other. In the main features of his system he was, no doubt, a disciple of Hegel; but, as we shall presently see, he distinctly avoided the pantheism with which Hegel has been charged. Moreover, when he came to America he became a patient student of American life and thought. As he had also studied Reid and Dugald Stewart, it is at once apparent that he was especially qualified for the task which he had undertaken, which was to adapt the best fruits of German culture to American soil and thus to meet the educational needs of his adopted country.

It is proposed at the present time only to inquire what the salient features and fundamental principles of this system are, and to point out some of their obvious consequences and applications. It might be both interesting and profitable to discuss these features in detail, but that would require more time and space than our present limits will permit.

The standpoint from which the movement proceeded is that of the critical and dialectic method pursued by the great leaders of the philosophical movement in Germany. Kant, the Königsberg philosopher accomplished two things, once for all, however unsat-

isfactory his results may have been in other respects: he put an end to the dogmatism which had weighed like an incubus upon the thought of his age, and he proved conclusively that the sensationalism of Locke was wholly inadequate to explain knowledge and the operations of the mind in the apprehension of universal and necessary truth. After the merciless dissection to which Kant subjected the old dogmatic systems and his profound inquiry into the conditions of knowledge, the days of the dogmatic philosophy were ended. Henceforth no system could expect to gain or hold the confidence of students that was not able to give an account of itself and to bear the test of the keenest criticism. It may be true that the human reason is not the source of all truth, yea that there is truth which transcends the power of the reason fully to fathom; but all truth, whether of human or divine origin, must authenticate itself to the reason and conform to its innate laws.

The sensationalists taught that all knowledge has its origin in the senses. "*Nihil est in intellectu, quod non antea fuerit in sensu.*" Locke says: "Whence hath mind all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external, sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two (that is sensation and reflection) are the fountains of knowledge whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."\* Kant, on the other hand, maintains that every act of cognition involves two elements; 1st, that which is furnished by the senses; and, 2d, an element not given by sensation, but derived solely from the intellect. The senses can give us impressions of light, heat, sound, weight, etc.; but when we conceive of bodies as having extension, or of events as following in succession, or as dependent upon one another, the ideas of space and time and causation are not derived from the senses, but they

\* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book 2, Chap. I., Sec. 2.

are derived from the intellect itself, which adds them as the necessary form which all knowledge must take; they are means of knowledge rather than objects of knowledge. "Hence, if sensibility, in consequence of an instinctive and inevitable habit, shows us things in time and space, it does not show them as they are in themselves, but as they appear to it through its spectacles, one of whose glasses is called time, the other, space. As they appear to it! which means that sensibility gives us appearances, or *φανόμενα*, and that it is incapable of giving us the *thing-in-itself*, the *νοούμενον*. And, since the understanding obtains the materials which it needs exclusively from the senses, since there is no other channel through which the materials can come, it is evident that it always and necessarily operates upon phenomena, and that the mystery concealed beneath the phenomenon forever baffles it, as it forever baffles the senses."\* Kant thus, while he admitted the existence of an external world or non-ego as the condition of sensation, made all knowledge, in the proper sense of the word, subjective, and placed the thing-in-itself, whether material or immaterial or by whatever name we may call it, beyond the reach of the thinking ego, and, therefore, outside of the pale of knowledge. From this position it was easy to pass over into an entire negation of the purely objective world, as was actually done by the Post-Kantians, so as to land in subjective idealism. "If the thing-in-itself cannot be conceived either as a quantity, or as a cause, or as a *reality*, it cannot be considered as *anything*; it is nothing, or rather it exists only in the thinking subject; like space, time and the categories, it is *identical* with the subject which conceives it. The *matter* of our ideas, the transcendent substratum of the phenomena of sense, is the same as the substratum of the inner phenomena, the soul, or ego, or reason giving to itself not only the *form*, but also the *matter* of its ideas."† Kant himself was able to reach the certainty of an external world, of immortality, and of God, only through his doctrine of the *primacy of the practical reason* or the *WILL* which postulates

\* Weber's History of Philosophy, Eng. tr., p. 444.

† Weber's Hist. Philos., p. 477.

freedom and, therefore, the moral order and the *noumenon*. The Post-Kantians, however, did not, as is so frequently supposed, deny the existence of an external world; they denied its independent or separate existence and attributed its origin to the ego itself—not, indeed, to the individual ego, but to the absolute ego. "The objective world is not, as 'common sense' and empiricism claim, an obstacle which the ego *encounters*; it is a limitation which the ego *gives* to itself. The limitation of the ego, the objective world, exists, but it owes its existence to the activity of the subject. *Suppress the EGO and you suppress the world*. Creation is reason limiting itself; it is the will or pure thought, limiting, determining or making a person of itself.\* There is thus an earnest effort to reduce the whole world to a unity, to do away with the dualism of subject and object; and this movement finds its highest development in the *absolute idealism* of Hegel.

According to Hegel the common source of the ego and of nature is immanent in the reality of things as they exist in the order of the world's development. The whole world is a movement of *becoming* (*ein Werden*), a movement in which the fundamental idea of *being* unfolds itself in a process, and this process itself is the absolute. According to Schelling the absolute transcends both subject and object, and things as they exist proceed from it. For Hegel, however, the absolute is not outside of things, but in them, ever active, ever living, leading on to the manifold variety of the world until the process culminates in man, in self-consciousness and freedom. The absolute is like Goethe's *Erdegeist* :

"In Lebensfluthen, im Thatensturm  
Wall' ich auf und ab,  
Webe hin and her!  
Geburt and Grab,  
Eine ewiges Meer,  
Ein wechselnd Weben,  
Ein glühend Leben,  
So schaff' ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,  
Und schaffe der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid."

\*Fichte's Complete Works, I., pp. 83, ff.

But this movement is according to law, and it tends towards a definite goal, both of which are immanent in the movement throughout its whole extent. The law both of human thought and of unconscious nature is *reason*; the goal towards which all things tend is, likewise, reason, but self-conscious reason. Hence the terms *absolute* and *reason* are synonymous. Reason is thus the law according to which being is produced, constituted or unfolded. It is a subjective faculty and an objective reality; it is the essence and norm of thought, and it is the essence and law of the evolution of things.\* It is thus involved in the whole process of becoming through which the world is brought to pass—a process which means simply differentiation, that is to say, the resolution in ever higher unities of the differences and contradictions which inhere in every stage of existence from the simple idea of being up to the culmination and summing up of the whole movement in man.

The system of Hegel is an attempt to solve the problems of thought and being on the basis of a thorough-going monism. It is no doubt one of the profoundest systems to which the human mind has ever given birth in the field of speculative philosophy; and it is no wonder, therefore, that it should have been variously interpreted. On the one hand, it has been pronounced atheistic or pantheistic; on the other hand, it has been claimed that it is open to a theistic interpretation. James Hutchinson Stirling, a profound student of Hegel, the translator of Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, is convinced that Hegel believed in the existence of God as the Creator of the universe, as a God of absolute power, holiness, goodness and justice, and quotes Hegel himself as exclaiming: "I am a Lutheran, and will remain one." It is, however, difficult to see what room there is in the system for a transcendent, personal God. God is the absolute, or rather the absolute is God, and this is the rational process immanent in the world movement struggling to its full realization in the human consciousness. Here the pantheistic idea seems to be in the foreground, and there is no real act of creation by which the universe is constituted.

\* Weber, p. 499.

But if there is room for doubt with respect to the system of Hegel, there is no room for such doubt with respect to Dr. Rauch and the system of thought taught at Mercersburg and at Lancaster. Rauch's Psychology and the whole series of lectures on the Philosophy of History, *Æsthetics* and Ethics are not only capable of a theistic interpretation, but they presuppose and explicitly assert an act of creation, the existence of a transcendent, personal God, the divinity of Christ, and the truth of divine revelation.

We may, accordingly, enumerate the following as the chief features of the system taught at Mercersburg and Lancaster:

1. The first characteristic is that as over against materialism or sensationalism it professes *idealism*; not indeed the subjective idealism of Fichte nor the absolute idealism of Hegel in its wholeness, but rather a moderate idealism which teaches that the phenomena of the universe can be explained in terms of mind rather than in terms of matter. Human experience has to do with two classes of phenomena, the *thing* series and the *thought* series, both of which, on the testimony of consciousness, are to be regarded as equally real. But the deeper, the more fundamental reality is to be found in the thought series, that is on the side of spirit rather than of that of matter. "The relation of our thought to cosmic being involves a dualism and a parallelism. A dualism, for our thought, though able to grasp objects only through conception, is not able to view its conceptions as real, but only as valid for reality. It likewise involves a parallelism, as otherwise thought would not grasp reality. And, finally, the representation of the thing series in the thought series is possible only through a highly complex activity within the latter. But while this is the case for finite thought, it is impossible to view it as expressing the ultimate relation of thought and being in fundamental existence. We have frequently complained of the idealist for overlooking the dualism of our knowing in the interests of a metaphysical monism. It is now in order to complain of our traditional philosophers that they generalize the dualism of our knowing into a necessity of all knowing. Our thoughts are not things,



but are valid for things ; nevertheless, we must at last come down to a thinker whose thoughts are things ; that is, to a thinker whose objects are only his realized thoughts."\* That is to say, that while our thinking is confronted with an external, material world, an objective order which we can neither make nor unmake, this objective order is nevertheless the result or product of thought in the divine mind in the act of creation. The thoughts of God come to their expression, or are realized, in the very act of thinking in the facts of creation. "He spake and it was done; He commanded and it stood fast."† Nature and the whole objective order, therefore, has everywhere underneath and behind it the divine energy that called it into existence ; yea, it exists only as the same divine energy upholds and preserves it by the unceasing activity of the Creator.‡ From this point of view the perplexity of Faust in trying to translate *Εν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος* vanishes ; for whether we say word, thought, energy or deed, it comes very much to the same thing. The world originated out of the thought of God, inasmuch as the divine thought and the divine will go together towards their actualization in time, and we, as Kepler said, simply think God's thoughts after Him. It is, therefore, not only true that thoughts or ideas govern the world, but it is also true that thoughts or ideas underlie and in fact constitute the world.

Does this view of the world, then, do away with the antagonism between matter and spirit ? Certainly not, as far as our experience goes. The thing series and the thought series still confront each other ; but they converge as you trace them to their origin and the contradiction is solved in the idea of force or energy which constitutes the soul of each. And all through the development of the natural world, the more we study it, the more we get a scientific knowledge of its phenomena, the more we shall see that "things are not what they seem." We look out upon the

\*Bowne's *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, p. 310. (Bowne uses the word reality here to denote external or corporeal reality. S.)

† Ps. 33: 9.

‡ Heid. Cat., Q. 27.



world and are delighted by the green fields and the majestic mountains. But the green is not in the fields. All that we get from that source is force transmitted in vibrations of a certain rapidity with a definite wave length, and green as a sensation is the mind's interpretation of the effect which this force has upon the sensorium. So again the majesty of the mountains is not the impression made by immediate vision, but it is the result of the mind's own working in the perception of distance and magnitude and relations which are cognized by the working up of the original data of sense into the higher form of real knowledge—that is, the discernment by subjective reason of objective reason as the latter lies before the mind in the order of nature for the uses of the former.

2. If the spiritual underlies the material it is easy to see why, in the system to which reference is had, so much stress should be laid on the *idea*. This word is used with a great deal of latitude and often very vaguely. Looking closely into its meaning we can find at least five different significations: (1) It signifies a mental image or a thought, not a presentation, but a representation; (2) an immediate or intuitive truth; (3) in the Kantian sense, a conception of the reason which transcends all possible experience, as the idea of God, of immortality; (4) in the Platonic philosophy, the archetypes or patterns of things as they are supposed to have preëxisted from all eternity; and (5) the essential nature or absolute truth of every form of existence. The idea of a tree, for instance, does not exist independently of a tree, but it is in every tree as its type, or as the divine thought which in the existence of the thing comes to its expression. In the last sense the word is of frequent occurrence in the system, and it is not possible to understand its conception of the beautiful, the true or the good without it.

3. The idea, in the sense in which it has just been explained, comes to signify the same thing as the *universal* or *concept*, although the latter is reached by approach from a different point of view. The former comes intuitively, the latter by a process of thinking; but, in the nature of the case, if they signify the

same thing, they must be equally real. Accordingly, we have to do here with *realism* as over against *nominalism*.<sup>\*</sup> That is to say, concepts or universals are not merely names which the mind gives to the results reached by a process of abstraction, but they stand for something real which, as apprehended by the mind, has its objective counterpart, not as an independent existence before the thing, but as concretely embodied in the thing. The classification of natural objects depends on real resemblances, that is on features which as a substratum are contained equally in the objects compared. They are in these objects because they represent that which is due to the immanent forces by which the objects have come to be what they are. The mind, in the construction of science, accordingly, does not make resemblances and differences; it only finds what is in nature objectively, and its species and genera represent real entities. Dr. Rauch, who is generally very clear in his definitions and statements, here seems to grope to some extent in the dark in his chapter on pure thinking where he identifies the contents of thinking or the object with the thought itself, justice with the thought of justice, and the concept man, with the thought of humanity. This is analogous to his definition of the body, that it is not the external frame but the life and power which connects the elements that is the body, instead of saying that the materials as such do not constitute the body, but that the body consists of the materials as they are held in their living relation by the power of organization. The thought is real because it has its object or counterpart in the sphere of being, just as the body is real in so far as the organizing power of the soul holds *something* in its grasp and uses it as its organ. The concept man, therefore, comes to be the same as the idea of humanity, coextensive with the race, and realized in every individual.

4. The world, or the universe, constitutes a grand organism, developing from its beginning by a process of differentiation and

<sup>\*</sup> It is important to remember that the word realism may be used in two entirely different senses, according as it is the opposite of idealism on the one hand, or nominalism on the other.

growth until its underlying idea is fully realized. In every stage of the process all the parts are related, and the meaning of the movement and the significance of every part become clear only in the light of the *organic idea*. This is true of nature and of history, of the intellectual and moral development of the individual man and of society. This principle, it may be confidently asserted, colors the whole system of thought, and it has proved to be the most fruitful impulse in the intellectual and moral development of the century which is now drawing to a close. *The doctrine of historical development*, according to law, as the expression of the will of God immanent in the whole movement, anticipated Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection and kindred theories, and proved as stimulating and helpful in history and theology as the others did in the field of natural science. In fact, it is the theory of evolution apprehended from the theistic standpoint and applied with a larger sense of its scope and significance.

It is in place, in this connection, to emphasize two peculiarities of our system, with respect to which current thought is disposed to take issue. The first is the conception of law. The empiricists, such as Mill, for instance, define law as *the constant occurrence of events in the same order*. This definition is inadequate, although it is very generally accepted. No empirical observation of the uniform occurrence of two or more facts or events in the same order can establish a causal connection between them or make their occurrence in that order necessary. And yet this is precisely what the case requires. There must be a connection between the facts or events, so that one determines the other. Law is the force or nexus that operates to bring about the dependence and establish the relation of cause and effect. That is to say, law is not an external uniformity of sequence, but an internal relation of necessity which issues in outward conformity. This conception of law changes for us the whole aspect, both of nature and of history. As physical law is immanent in the former, so moral law, grounded in the constitution of man, is immanent in the latter; and, although the two

orders are different, the same fundamental principle is striving in both towards its full realization.

The other point concerns the mode in which the mind operates in the thought process or in the formation of concepts and ideals. It is quite usual to say that in the building up of a concept the mind abstracts the common qualities or attributes of a number of objects and combines them into a unity ; or that in creating a new image, the imagination constructs it out of old elements, getting one feature here, another there, and then combining all these into a whole, as a mosaic is made up of many independent parts. This view makes imagination and thought mechanical processes. It may be seriously doubted whether the mind ever lays hold of a quality or attribute as a pure abstraction. The constructive processes of the mind, at all events, we have reason to believe, are organic and not mechanical. The mind does not take dead parts and put them together, and then breathe into them the breath of life. As a living organism, it assimilates one element to another and constructs plastically new and higher combinations—each a whole, although at first imperfect and of low organization, until the product has received its full development and the thought or image, instinct with life, is complete. The artist in creating his ideal, let us say of a Madonna, does not take the brow of one face, the eyes of another, the nose and lips of a third, the cheeks and chin of a fourth and put them together as so many separate parts. Granting that he receives suggestions and materials from so many different sources, the ideal is developed from within, each part being assimilated in the living whole as it develops by an organic process. This whole, in its totality and in its individual features, embodies the artist's idea of perfection—the highest degree of excellence, which, at the time, is for him possible. The same is true of the moral or religious ideal. The product of the constructive imagination in the form of an ideal not only embodies the best of all past experience, but it also transcends experience by an intuitive apprehension of the idea of the perfect to the plane of which it must rise in its creative act. It is quite true that ideals vary in different men and in the same men at dif-

ferent times. But this only proves that, as light is modified by the medium that receives and reflects it, *the inspiration of the ideal* is conditioned and modified by the subject which it affects.

5. The cosmos culminates in man. *If, therefore, the cosmos is a grand organism, man holds the central place in it, and the significance of the whole comes to view in the nature and constitution of man.* It is admitted on all sides that nature reaches its highest development in man, and that to the latter, because of his physical, intellectual and moral superiority, is accorded the place of honor and dignity in the whole order. But this is only one side of the truth. Man is superior to nature; but he is also related to nature. He stands at the head, not because of an accident, not as the result of an unconscious striving, of a blind upward growth the unforeseen and, therefore, unexpected end of which is a creature of such wonderful beauty, power and dignity. Nature would be as little complete without man, as a vertebrate animal without a head; and as the growth of the embryo presupposes and involves the growth of the spinal cord and brain, so the development of nature presupposes and involves the coming of man. The *man-idea* lies in nature from the beginning, and, therefore, in the complete system all the parts are related to man, and, by virtue of that relation, to each other. Science, on the one hand, and art, on the other, are the fruit of this correspondence and interrelation, for each of them, in its own way, only shows how man finds himself, the depths of his own soul revealed in nature, and nature made clear in the light of his own consciousness.\*

There is only one way of accounting for this wonderful fact. Man is made in the image of God, and nature is the process by which the divine idea unfolds itself until it appears unveiled in man, and this is accomplished by the ever fuller impartation of the divine in proportion, as nature becomes its commensurate organ. Again, we have the upward movement in man met by a corresponding downward movement of the divine until we get

\*See Dr. Nevin's "The Wonderful Nature of Man," in the *Mercersburg Review*, Vol. XI., p. 317.

the full union of God and man by means of the incarnation in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. *The constitution of nature and the position of man in the cosmos, accordingly, are intelligible only in the light of the Christ idea, and Christology is of fundamental significance in the interpretation of nature and the study of the historical development of the human race.*

6. The old *Mercersburg Review* used to bear on the title-page the motto of Anselm: "*Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.*" This motto emphasizes the intellectual and moral standpoint of the system of thought which we have been discussing, viz., the principle *that faith is in order to knowledge*. This does not mean faith in propositions or doctrinal statements, but faith in verities or fundamental facts. The primary data of consciousness cannot be questioned. The *ego*, the world and God authenticate themselves to consciousness, and all higher forms of knowledge presuppose them. Without such positing of a beginning, progress in knowledge is not possible. All science begins with that which is accepted by a primary act of the mind, an act of faith. This gives a place where to stand, and that being gained, the whole realm of nature and history, of things human and divine is open for investigation. It is in this way that we advance from stage to stage of knowledge. For this reason the profession of faith in Christianity begins with the Apostles' Creed, not with a system of doctrine like the Augsburg or Westminster Confession. The Creed moves in the line of fundamental facts; the confessions embody the results of investigation and study, truths which flow out of the unfolding life of Christianity, the subjective explanation or apprehension of that which is involved in the fundamental facts. The objects of faith are ever the same, but knowledge is continually deepening and widening under the guidance of the spirit that leads into all truth.

From this brief, and, it is to be feared, inadequate statement of philosophical principles, we may perhaps be enabled to draw an inference as to the advantages which have accrued from the



teaching of such a system in the institutions of the Church. It has opened a new field of vision to all earnest inquirers on the road to knowledge, and given both zeal and direction to their efforts. It has introduced order and unity into the intellectual, moral and religious development of the Church, and emphasized a development of thought and life which has proved highly beneficial to those engaged in secular pursuits, but especially so to those who, in turn, have become the teachers of others or the leaders of educational thought. Above all, while it has held fast to the old, fundamental facts of science and religion, it has insisted upon the great law of progress as applicable to every department of life and thought, saying with Tennyson :

" Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs,  
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns."



## IX.

### EDITORIAL NOTES.

#### HARNACK'S CHRONOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Some months ago, when vague reports began to circulate as to the contents of Professor Adolf Harnack's recent book, *The History of Primitive Christian Literature*, there was a general expression of satisfaction in conservative theological quarters, because of the support which it was believed to lend to the traditional views of the origin and character of the books of the New Testament. Harnack is one of the most celebrated professors in the most celebrated university of modern Europe, namely, that of Berlin. He occupies the chair once occupied by the venerated Neander. He is a man of prodigious learning and of marvelous industry, whose productive activity in the sphere of historical theology seems to be without limitation. Manifestly, such a man's opinions on subjects connected with his chosen line of investigation, can not but be of great weight, when deliberately and formally expressed. Until recently, however, Professor Harnack's views were not regarded with much favor by many English and American theologians. He was generally looked upon as a Ritschlian in theology, and as being tainted with the peculiarities of that school; and he was regarded as being altogether too free in his methods of investigation to deserve much confidence. He was believed to lean too much to the side of the Higher Criticism to be safe and trustworthy in his views as to the history and contents of the Bible.

But according to the first reports of the character of the most recent of his publications, referred to above, he seemed suddenly to have taken a long step backward, in the direction of conservative and traditional views; and, of course, his "conversion" was hailed with no small degree of delight. It was said that he had

completely overturned the views of the rationalistic critics from Baur to Reuss, that he had confirmed, upon the whole, the long established traditional theory of the origin of the various Biblical books, and that it would not be long now until the present critical craze would be completely ended. The books of the Bible were all written by the persons and at the time represented by the long received tradition, even the critical doubts of Eusebius and his talk about *antilegomena* being groundless; and the post-biblical literature of the early Christian centuries was in general composed just as tradition had always affirmed. Great, after all, is tradition! One of the greatest scholars of the age has spoken, it was said, and his testimony is in favor of traditionalism; and it is a testimony that must be regarded as the more valuable as it comes from a sort of unwilling witness—one whose inclinations have always been in favor of radicalism. Verily, the cause of traditionalism must be supposed to be strong, when a man of such tendencies is forced thus to come out on its side. And so Harnack was for a time regarded by some as a very Daniel come to judgment; before whose face the critical hosts would be put to flight, as the mists are before the face of the morning sun.

But now, as more correct information comes to be received concerning Professor Harnack's real views, it is found that these expectations must be greatly modified, if they are not to be entirely disappointed. It is true, indeed, that Professor Harnack has reached conclusions and published views which are favorable to the general conception of Christianity that has always been current in the Church; and for this he deserves the thanks of all who are interested in the prosperity of religion, certainly. But, of course, no less than this was to be expected of him. He is himself a Christian theologian who believes in Christianity, and whose scientific interest in theology is sustained by his Christian faith. Christianity for him is a reality capable of scientific study and treatment; and the Biblical literature, to his mind, contains true and trustworthy information concerning the origin and nature of Christianity. Harnack has no favor for the extravagant critical theories of the new Tübingen school,

which brought down the origin of most of the New Testament books to the time of the second or third century, and supposed them to have been written in the interest of divergent theological tendencies then prevailing in the Church. These theories, if indeed they still made any stir in the world, Harnack may be supposed to have finally put to rest. So far his work may be said to be a reaction in favor of traditional views, and will, doubtless, be gratifying to all earnest theologians, even the majority of the higher critics themselves included. And in this respect Harnack himself speaks of his work as involving a *retrograde movement*." "I do not hesitate," he says, "to use the word retrograde, for one should call things by their right names, and in the criticism of the sources of early Christianity we are undeniably on a retrograde movement towards tradition. The time will come, and even now is on the way, when we shall trouble ourselves very little about the untangling of the literary-historical problems of early Christianity, since the chief matter to be established by such investigation will be universally accepted, to wit, the substantial correctness of tradition save for a few noteworthy exceptions."

We have taken this quotation from a notice of Professor Harnack's book in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*; and we have given it in full because it seems to represent quite accurately Harnack's position. A close scrutiny of this quotation will show that Professor Harnack's "retrograde movement" is, after all, not exactly in the direction of English and American traditionalism. What he claims is that the traditional view of the origin of the literature of the New Testament, and, indeed, of early Christian literature generally, is *substantially* correct, but that even to this there are some *notable exceptions*. What these exceptions are will appear from a brief review of the chronology of the New Testament, which our Berlin Professor adopts. For the purpose of such review we shall make use of an article by Francis A. Christie in the *New World* for September, 1897. The origin of the Pauline literature, with the exception of the Pastoral Epistles, is supposed to be in the main rightly repre-

sented by the received tradition. Indeed, Harnack dates all the genuine epistles of St. Paul some four or five years earlier than has generally been the case, as also he supposes Paul's conversion to have taken place a few years earlier than others have supposed; and he receives all the writings which go under Paul's name as genuine, with the exception of the Pastoral Epistles. These he does not believe to be from the hands of Paul. They are accretions or compilations, which may have had a Pauline basis, but which received their present form sometime in the years 90-110 A. D., and to which additions were made as late as 150. The Epistle of James, which some suppose to be the very earliest portion of the New Testament, is, according to Harnack, not genuine. It is a compilation of material from widely different sources, made by some Christian teacher not earlier than A. D. 120, and edited by some one else still later. The Epistle to the Hebrews, the traditional date of which is about A. D. 62, is by Harnack supposed to have been written sometime between 65-100 A. D., probably by Barnabas, as Luther suspected long ago. The first Epistle of Peter was never intended for a composition of the Apostle Peter, and was written probably between 83-93 A. D., long after Peter's death. Second Peter is a clear case of forgery, dating from about the year 175. It plunders material from the Epistle of Jude, which itself is not genuine, and dates from the first third of the second century. Of the Synoptical Gospels, the earliest one, upon which the others are more or less dependent, is that of Mark, dating from 65-70 A. D.; while Matthew must have been written very soon after 70, as it bears evidence, especially in the eschatological discourse, of the agitations of that year of judgment; but it contains also later additions. The date of the Gospel of Luke is fixed between A. D. 80-93, which is also the latest limit for the date of the Acts of the Apostles, in which, it is said, there are obvious mistakes about the relations of things in Apostolic times, which would prevent us from dating it earlier. The so-called Johannine writings, including the Apocalypse, were composed, according to Harnack, by one author, but that author was not the *Apostle* John, but John, the *Presbyter*

of Ephesus, who flourished during the reign of Trajan, A. D. 80-110. This Presbyter John, mentioned by Papias as quoted by Eusebius, was doubtless a disciple of the Apostle John, with whom ecclesiastical tradition afterward confounded him. It will thus be observed that none of our Gospels are supposed to have been written earlier than from thirty-five to forty years after our Lord's death, nor later than eighty years after that event. But this is early enough to vouch for their substantial historical accuracy.

From all this it will appear that Harnack's retrograde movement is, after all, not of a very thorough-going character, and that he has not gone back on the critics as much as was by some supposed. This retrograde movement will hardly satisfy those conservative theologians whose religion is the Bible, according to the phrase of Chillingworth, and whose faith in Christianity would be seriously disturbed by the supposition that any of the books of the Bible were not written by the persons by whom they have always believed them to have been written. Of course, these views of the Bible Harnack does not share. For him the Bible is not religion. *Substantial correctness* is all that he cares to claim for the traditional view of its origin and contents; just as the same quality might be claimed for Herodotus or Thucydides. But that is something very far from the claim of infallibility either for the canon of the Bible or for its contents; and those who had been led to believe that Harnack had demolished not merely the critics of the Tübingen school, but Graf, Wellhausen and Driver as well, will be greatly disappointed when they come to know his real position. What Harnack holds, and thinks he has proved, is that most of the books of the New Testament—for those of the Old Testament do not come within the sphere of his investigation—were probably written within the apostolic period, or shortly thereafter, and may be accepted as trustworthy sources for the knowledge of primitive Christianity. But he does not regard these books as having been produced by divine dictation and as possessing the quality of infallibility or inerrancy. He views them, not from the dogmatic

standpoint of inspiration, but from the critical standpoint of history.

Is there anything in this, now, that should alarm us as to the security of our Christian faith? Does this view make the foundations of Christianity any less sure than the traditional view does? Is it harder for us to believe in Christianity, if we doubt that Paul wrote the Pastoral Epistles, or that John wrote the Gospel which goes by his name, than it would be if we had no such doubts? The answer to these questions must depend upon our general view of the nature of Christianity. What is Christianity? If Christianity be supposed to be a system of doctrinal propositions directly revealed from heaven, whose accuracy and infallibility are guaranteed by certain external credentials attached to the instruments of the revelation, then the question, *What think ye of the Bible*, becomes the most important question with which religious thought can be concerned—more important, even, than the question, *What think ye of Christ*? Our conviction of the truthfulness of Christianity must then depend upon a logical examination of the credentials of the Bible, or rather of the credentials of its various authors, and our faith will be the result of a logical operation. The process of conversion will then become essentially an intellectual and judicial process. The authors of the Bible must be called up, and their claims and credentials must be examined, much as witnesses are examined in court; and we are Christians or not Christians, according to the issue of such examination. Such a process Bishop Sherlock once conducted, against the deists of his time, in his famous treatise entitled *Trial of the Witnesses*, in which he brought the apostles into court and made them give their testimony in regard to the facts of the Gospel. And such a process every soul must, in effect, conduct before it can come to have Christian faith; and the degree of faith must be in proportion to the thoroughness and ability of the examination and to the satisfactoriness of the result. What now, if in such trial the witnesses should be found to be entirely different persons from what they have been believed to be, and from what the accepted theory requires them to be? If,



for instance, the author of the Gospel of John, when brought upon the witness stand, should prove to be a different person from the Apostle John, must not he and his testimony be at once ruled out of court as being entirely unworthy of credence? Such a supposition will at once show how this theory, instead of favoring and facilitating belief in Christianity, must, in fact, constantly imperil it. If this theory of Christianity were correct, then the only way to security and calmness of faith would be never to question the witnesses at all, but simply to accept their testimony blindly, or on the authority of tradition. What one does not know, that one can believe; but any questioning would be certain to lead to uncertainty and doubt. And in no case could Christian faith, in this view, amount to more than *probability*. Any truth that depends wholly upon external historical testimony can not, in any proper sense of the term, be *demonstrated*, and *absolute certainty* in regard to it must be out of the question.

But this is not the theory of Christianity which the Bible itself teaches; and we are sure that it is not the theory which commends itself to the best and profoundest Christian reflection. Christianity is life, not logic. What Christian is there who, when reflecting upon his Christian experience, is not convinced that his faith rests upon a more immediate and therefore a surer foundation than that afforded by any chain of historical investigation and reasoning? If there be such a Christian, his faith must always be exposed to the uncertainty arising from the consciousness of the liability to error accompanying any intellectual process. *Humanum est errare*; and any faith that rests merely upon an operation of the human intellect, no matter what its premises may be, must always be open to the suspicion of error. Suppose a person of common intelligence and common honesty were to propose, as a condition of believing in Christianity, to prove to himself the genuineness, veracity and authenticity of the Bible. That would be an undertaking of vast proportions and of vast difficulty. Few men, indeed, would ever get through with it. The majority, feeling the imperative need of



having religion, would be content in the end to fall back upon the conclusions of others. But suppose one should have accomplished the task proposed, and what then? Would there be no room for him to doubt his conclusion? Might there not be a chance of his having mistaken the facts in the case, or of having misunderstood the witnesses? Might there not be some fallacy lurking in his process of reasoning, that would vitiate the results arrived at? May not even the great and learned Harnack be wrong in some, at least, of his positions? Clearly, then, if Christian faith were the result merely of a logical process, there could be no such certainty, no such assurance and trust, as the soul demands in matters of religion, and as the Christian feels that he possesses in his experience.

The Christian believer is immediately and infallibly certain of the truth which he believes. Of course, this can not be said of any secondary or derivative propositions of doctrine, but only of the substantive truth of faith. That truth authenticates itself immediately to the believer's heart and conscience. It does not derive its authority from some other and extraneous source, but from itself; and details of Christian doctrine may participate in this self-authenticating power in proportion to their nearness to the heart of faith. The Christian does not say, I will believe in Christ, provided I can demonstrate the reality of His miracles, or prove the correctness of His genealogy, or, provided, I can put my fingers into the print of the nails or thrust my hand into His side; nor does he say, I will believe in the truth of the Bible, provided I can be made sure by whom and at what time each particular book was written. The Christian believes in Christ because Christ is a present divine reality to his soul, answering to its deepest wants and yearnings. In the exercise of faith he apprehends the Christ at once as his Lord and his God, and, like Thomas, he needs no further argument. And so the Christian believes the Bible, not because he knows precisely by whom each book was written, and has been assured of its inerrancy by some infallible authority, but because its religious substance or teaching corresponds to his idea of divine truth

and satisfies his spiritual hunger ; although, of course, he never thinks of extending this quality to matters which are not religious, such as statements in history or science. As the ideal embodied in a work of art, by virtue of which it inspires and thrills the soul of the beholder, does not at all depend upon the question as to who made it ; so the inspiration and quickening energy of Sacred Scripture does not depend upon the question of authorship, but solely upon its spiritual nature and quality. Is not that in accordance with the test which Christ Himself proposes in order to prove the divinity of His own teaching ? " If any man be willing to do His will, he shall know concerning the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." The Bible contains a collection of sayings and doings of Christ, and of other godly men who are more or less closely connected with Him ; and these sayings and doings are presented as historical facts, just as historical facts are presented in other writings. The Bible does not claim to be essentially different from other books, or to be absolutely free from error. It simply claims to be substantially correct in what it presents ; and this claim is generally admitted by critics as well as by traditionalists. How, now, shall we know that the matter thus presented is divine truth capable of enlightening the mind and quickening the soul ? We answer, *by experiencing this very effect*. Let this truth be accepted and taken up into the soul and see whether it has life and power in itself or not. Countless numbers of sincere Christians, in all ages, who had not the slightest idea of apologetics, have thus tested it and found it to be the power of God unto salvation. How would one test the vitality of a grain of corn which he may be holding in his hand ? Not, certainly, by any mechanical or chemical process. One could not by cutting it up, or dissolving it, find the life which it contains. But put it into the warm bosom of the earth, and it will show whether it has life or not. And so it must be with the Word of God. That Word is spirit and life ; but this quality cannot be proven by any process of historical or antiquarian research, however important and profitable such processes may be in many re-

spects, but only by receiving it into the heart and letting it produce its proper effect there. Christ is the way, the truth, and the life; and His words are spirit and life; and all this He proves to be in the life of His believing people. Here is a firm foundation for Christian faith to rest upon, far above the storms of criticism that may rage around the question of the literary composition of the Bible, and far above the debates of doctrinal theology. This foundation Harnack's conclusions in Biblical chronology have not shaken; nor would they have strengthened it, if they had been more in harmony with the expectations and wishes of the traditionalists.

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#### FUTURE PROBATION OR ELSE ABSOLUTE PREDESTINATION.

The idea of an extension of the possibility of probation and of salvation into the spirit world after death is accepted by a large number of leading theologians at the present time. This idea is not the notion of a second probation, after death, for those who have deliberately rejected the offer of divine grace and salvation in the present life; but it is the idea of one Christian probation for all men. One decisive and sufficient trial for eternal life every man must have. And as without Christ and faith in Christ there can be no salvation, it follows that somewhere and somehow Christ must be presented to every soul in such way as to make possible a free and conscious choice in relation to Him. Such presentation of Christ, wherever it may take place, will involve an element of probation, or trial, for the result can not be regarded as fixed by the previous moral development of the subject; since, in that case, the great majority of mankind would, after all, have no real chance of salvation, as their lives are passed in circumstances most unfavorable to right moral development.

That, now, is the idea of future probation in its most essential form; and in that form it is held by a large and growing number of influential theologians. It was held, for example, by such men as Martensen, Dorner Nitsch, Julius Müller, Lange and Ebrard, of the past generation, among the Germans. Some of

our readers who studied Ebrard's *Dogmatics*, at Mercersburg, from thirty to forty years ago, will remember the startling effect with which they read, in vol. 2, page 743, of said work, that Sheol, or Hades, "though a sad and cheerless place, is still a place where prayer may be made in the name of Jesus, where sins that remained unforgiven here may still be forgiven, save only that against the Holy Ghost, and where conversion is still possible." The same view is held in England by such able thinkers as Maurice, Farrar, Phumpton, Stanley, Alford and many others; and in this country by the large and ever-growing school of the "new theology," which is a revolt within the sphere of Calvinism against the decretal principle in the theological thought upon which Calvinism is built.

In the Lutheran Church in this country, which, we think, can easily claim to be the Gibraltar of ancient Protestant orthodoxy, the theory of future probation, the very exponent of anti-Calvinism within Calvinism, seems, curiously enough, thus far to have received little, if any, favor. Professor R. F. Weidner, of the Lutheran Theological Seminary of Chicago, in a popular commentary on the General Epistles, noticed in the October issue of this *REVIEW*, speaking of this theory, page 189, says: "It is contrary to Scripture and opposed to the unanimous teachings of the Church in all ages. The principle of interpretation employed (in the establishment of this theory), and the rationalistic tendencies displayed are subversive of the most important evangelical doctrines. If this theory were true, the whole of Christian doctrine as taught in the Bible and believed by the Church would have to be reconstructed. This erroneous theory has its origin in a false sentimentality, and in a one-sided knowledge of the scheme of redemption, and in a false and strained exegesis." Thus speaks a Lutheran, who is not afraid of making assertions, who is sure that he is a Lutheran, and certain that Lutheranism is now and always right.

There are, however, Lutherans, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, who do not agree with Professor Weidner at all on this subject. They think that they understand the Bible, and that

they have a fair knowledge of the scheme of redemption ; and yet they hold this theory of future probation just as positively as Professor Weidner rejects it. One of these is Bishop Dahle, a Norwegian Lutheran, whose position in the Church of his native land attests his ability as a theologian, and invests his opinions with more than common importance and interest. Indeed, as a bishop, he may be supposed to be in some sense speaking for the Church to which he belongs ; at least it is not likely that he differs very radically with the doctrinal position of his Church. Now Bishop Dahle has just written a book, entitled "Life after death, and the Future of the Kingdom of God," which has been translated into English and published by the Clarks, of Edinburgh, and which may be had of Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. In this work Bishop Dahle strongly advocates this theory of future probation. He admits, indeed, that there is no direct and positive statement of Scripture in favor of it, but thinks that it is implied in the whole scheme of Christianity as taught in the Bible and apprehended especially in the Lutheran Church.

We have not ourselves seen this book of Bishop Dahle's, but are dependent for our knowledge of it upon a review by Dr. Benjamin B. Warfield in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for October of the present year. But this is of little consequence, as our motive for writing the present note is not derived from anything contained in this book, but, rather, from what Dr. Warfield has to say in relation to it. For Dr. Warfield insists that this very theory of future probation, which Professor Weidner pronounces altogether "unbiblical" and "rationalistic," is the necessary logical outcome of the presuppositions of the Lutheran scheme of salvation. "The Scriptures certainly teach," says Dr. Warfield, "that there is no salvation in any other name than that of Jesus ; and if it is also true that God desires that all should be saved, and, indeed, His very innate sense of justice forbids Him to discriminate between men in the offer of that salvation by which alone they can be saved, it follows very stringently that all must some time have the offer made to them." That is to say, if the doctrine of an absolute double decree of predestination be

rejected, and if it be believed that God loves all men with an equal and impartial love, and that He sincerely desires the salvation of all, then it becomes necessary to go farther and hold that, in order to be consistent, God must also secure the *possibility* and *means* of salvation to all men, either in this or in a future life; for we cannot think of God as willing the end without also willing the means by which it may be reached. Now the Lutheran Church has rejected the doctrine of a double predestination. In Article XI. of the *Formula of Concord*, after some considerable juggling with the subject, it is at last affirmed, in Section IX., that "the true opinion concerning predestination" is that "God has concluded all under unbelief that He might have mercy upon all," and that "God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should be converted and believe in Christ;" and further on, in Section XIV., it is declared to be an error to say that "God is unwilling that all men should repent and believe the Gospel," or to say that "when He calls us He does not earnestly wish that all men should come unto Him," or to say that "God is not willing that all men should be saved, but that some men are destined to destruction, not on account of their sins, but by the mere counsel, purpose and will of God, so that they cannot in any wise attain to salvation." It is true that in a preceding part of the article the salvation of "the good and beloved children of God" is ascribed to God's eternal election as its only ground, and it may be difficult to reconcile that with what is said in regard to the universality of God's saving grace; but there is no doubt that the Lutheran Church has distinctly rejected the doctrine of divine decree of reprobation.

Now, says Dr. Warfield, that being the doctrine of the Lutheran Church, no consistent Lutheran can do otherwise than accept the theory of future probation. For, if God has not predestinated any soul unto perdition, if He really desires the salvation of all, and if salvation is possible only in Christ, then it follows with logical necessity that somewhere and sometime Christ must be offered to all; and as He is manifestly not offered to all in this life, He must be offered after this life; and thus



the doctrine of future probation is established. The old Lutheran claim that Christ is really offered to all men in this world is very properly pronounced "absurd" both by Bishop Dahle and by his reviewer. With our present knowledge of geography it is no longer possible to accept the story, once told with a naïve conviction of the supremacy of dogmatics over history, that the Gospel was once preached by the apostles on the banks of the Missouri and of the Amazon. To use the language of Dr. Warfield, "it just has not been done." But even if it had been done, that would not prove that the Gospel has been preached to every creature in this world. To say that the Gospel has been preached to a people when a few missionary stations have been planted in its territory, either in ancient or in modern times, and that this may be considered a sufficient Christian probation for the individuals belonging to it, is, to put it mildly, the height of nonsense. The Gospel has not been preached to the Hindoo people because Thomas once labored in India—if indeed there be any truth in that story. Nor could it be said that the light of reason and conscience—the essential Christ immanent in all men—is sufficient to afford the conditions of Christian probation; for, if it were, it would have to be sufficient also to salvation, and the Gospel would be superfluous; which is a proposition that few would be willing to affirm. It is plain, then, that in this world Christ is not presented to all men in such way as to make their salvation possible; hence we are bound to conclude that He will be offered to them after this life. For to hold that God wills the salvation of all men, but that He is either unwilling or unable to afford them the means of salvation, would involve a contradiction of the very idea of the Godhead. Hence we must either accept the theory of future probation, or we must adopt the doctrine of absolute predestination, and hold that God does not seriously will the salvation of all men, but rather has foreordained some to perdition for the manifestation of His glory. Thus argues Dr. Warfield, and holds, accordingly, that Lutheranism, which rejects the latter doctrine, must of necessity adopt the former.

This contention of Dr. Warfield's, we think, is correct: we



are bound to believe either that a Christian chance of salvation must be assured to every soul, or that God does not will the salvation of every soul. This opinion is confirmed by an authority which, we are sure, will be respected by the majority of our readers. Dr. Schaff, in his *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. I., p. 451, after saying that all the Reformers, "under a controlling sense of human depravity and saving grace, and in extreme antagonism to Palagianism and self-righteousness, came to the same doctrine of a double predestination which decides the eternal destiny of all men," then continues to write as follows: "Nor is it possible to evade this conclusion on the two acknowledged premises of Protestant orthodoxy—namely, the wholesale condemnation of men in Adam, and the limitation of saving grace to the present world. If the Lutheran theology, after the Formula of Concord (1577) rejected Synergism and Calvinism alike, and yet continued to teach the total depravity of all men and the unconditional election of some, it could only be done at the expense of logical consistency." To the same effect Dr. Schaff then quotes Alexander Schweizer, who says that the harshness of the dualistic particularism which characterizes the Reformed Confessions belongs in fact to all the confessions of the Reformation age, and "follows necessarily from the idea that men's eternal destiny is fixed in this world when they die, and that only those are saved who become Christians here, while all others remain damned."

It will be seen from these quotations that, on this subject, Dr. Schaff is of the same opinion as Dr. Warfield, only his way of presenting the matter is the converse of Dr. Warfield's. Dr. Warfield says, in effect, if you deny the dualistic particularism and partiality which the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination implies, then you are bound to assume that for those who have not the chance of being saved in this life there must be a chance hereafter; and thus you have the doctrine of future probation, with all which that implies. "It will not do to take refuge in generalities," says Dr. Warfield, further "and to affirm that it is all a mystery;" that is to say, you are bound to accept the con-

elusion involved in your own premises, and may not seek to escape from it by averring that the subject is too deep for your understanding. Dr. Schaff, on the other hand, says, if you accept the doctrine of total depravity and of the sole efficiency of the divine grace in the work of conversion, and if you suppose the possibility of conversion and salvation to be limited to the present life, then, seeing that the majority of men have no chance of being saved here and must therefore be doomed to perish everlastingly, you are bound to assume the doctrine of predestination and reprobation, with all which that implies. Either the doctrine of future probation, or the doctrine of eternal divine reprobation: that is the dilemma to which, according to Schaff, theological thought on this subject is reduced. It will be observed that Dr. Schaff does not state on which side of the dilemma he supposes the stronger arguments to be; nor do we propose to do so, as that is a point which each one will want to decide for himself. Dr. Schaff merely says that those who hold the orthodox Protestant doctrines of total depravity and of the decisiveness of the present life in the determination of eternal destiny, have no right to abuse the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, as has been so much the fashion in the past, for this doctrine really follows with logical necessity from their own premises. A Calvinist who believes in reprobation and rejects the doctrine of future probation, is consistent; but a Lutheran who believes that the love of God is universal, and yet holds that the majority of mankind will never have a real chance of salvation, is not consistent. So say Drs. Schaff and Warfield, and so say we.

The world's history must in the end correspond to the eternal plan of the world, for it is impossible to suppose that the eternal purpose of the Creator can be eternally defeated. If, therefore, we are sure that this history involves as its result an eternal dualism, then we must assume that this dualism was in the plan from the beginning, and supra-lapsarian predestinarianism must be the principle of our theology. We can not reject this principle, and admit the conditions which necessarily involve it. It will thus appear with what propriety the doctrine of future proba-

tion could be set up as the exponent of the revolt against Calvinism within the ranks of Calvinism. There has been surprise expressed at times that the new theology men, especially in New England, should have fastened upon this "unpopular and dangerous doctrine" as the most prominent point of their contention. But, from what has now been said, it will appear that their method was, after all, not unnatural, and that they were led by a truer logic than perhaps their critics are; for future probation and absolute predestination are, in fact, logical alternatives, of which the affirmation of the one implies the negation of the other. Which of these alternative theories now ought one to choose? Of the former it is usually said that it is a dangerous doctrine, that it may be *abused*, and that it may lead to procrastination and to the postponement of conversion to a future life; while of the latter it may be said that for a God of infinite love it gives us an infinite *Diabolos*, who hates the majority of the beings He has made, and is bound to damn them for His glory. Which is the better theory to adopt?

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#### OUR BOOK NOTICES.

We take the liberty of calling the reader's attention to the book notices contained in this issue of the REVIEW. And we want to say in this connection that it is our aim to make the notices of new books a really valuable feature of this publication—valuable, we mean, to the readers of the REVIEW, not merely to the publishers of books. With few exceptions, the books noticed are purchased in the ordinary way, leaving the reviewer entirely free in the expression of his judgment. No book is to be noticed *without being read*; and the notice, instead of being merely a colorless announcement of title and table of contents, will always aim to convey some positive information in regard to the contents and character of a book. The reader will then be in a position to make up his mind intelligently whether he will want to buy the book or not, and, in any case, the notice will be a matter of value to him. To this end we solicit the interest and coöperation of our readers.

# X.

## NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE. By G. T. Ladd, Professor in Yale University. Chas. Scribner's Sons. Pages, 607. 1897. Price, \$4.00.

A work distinctly metaphysical, and written by a well-known philosophical author who is neither afraid nor ashamed to avow himself a thorough believer in revealed religion, will be welcomed by many. For genuine agnosticism, if there be such, will desire to know what the advocate of a living faith has to say, that he may either controvert the statements made in defence or modify his own position. The believer, who does not fear for the truth he professes, will be pleased to see a strong presentation of his views by one who is in hearty sympathy with them.

Professor Ladd occupies such a commanding position that he can compel a respectful hearing for all his well considered opinions; and there is a naïve confession by the author in his preface that he thinks this the best of all the works he has published. Though an author is not always a proper judge of the comparative value of his own work, yet we are inclined to think that Professor Ladd's estimation is correct.

This book is an examination of the foundations of all knowledge, dealing with the first principles which are common to every department of thought, whether physical, mathematical, historical, religious or speculative. This is a large undertaking, one which demands a wide acquaintance with the facts of universal culture, and the methods by which these facts are systematized into sciences. The amount and diversity of the author's reading gives him abundant material. The patience and logical acumen which he displays throughout shows him capable of grappling with this formidable task. He sees clearly what he wishes to do and how to effect his purpose both by an analysis of principles and a synthesis of facts in the elaboration of new and original views. The thought is preferable to the style. The latter is often careless, and sometimes obscure; there are little infelicities which occur so often that they seem to be pets, *e. g.*, "work-a-day," "feeling-full," etc. But these do not obscure the meaning, and are only trifling blemishes. Again, there are long and unbalanced sentences, which form what the French critics call *construction louche*, *vide*, page 226, the sentence beginning, "Thus a course," etc.; page 431, "Shall we then," etc. In truth, the general style of this book is difficult. And the fact that so many works on philosophy, especially those written in modern times, have been expressed in obscure, involved sentences and barbarous nomen-

clature, has done much to bring the study into disrepute. "The Children of the Mist," as Whately so aptly called the German metaphysicians, are forbidding, at least in their external garb, to most clear-headed men, who cannot help questioning whether they understand themselves, when they are so difficult for any one else. For the dictum of Aristotle: "The test of knowledge is the ability to teach," will be applied. Perhaps it is impossible to express recondite principles in obvious language; but we do not believe it. Schopenhauer is clearness itself, though he grappled with all the problems which occupied the attention of Kant and Hegel. There is no difficulty in understanding Hume except where we attempt to grasp his meaning through Green's elucidations. Hamilton is never obscure, though it may be said he is neither original nor profound. The perfection of style is found in Plato, who started, or at least gave definite forms to, all the questions in philosophy over which thinkers have since labored, and if in any place there is obscurity it is only such as arises from the abstract nature of the subject treated. But though the shell of the book is sometimes difficult to break, the kernel concealed will always repay the labor of reaching it.

While the aim of Professor Ladd is a severely scientific search for the universally accepted principles of all knowledge, this naturally brings him in conflict with those who deny, *in theory*, that there are any such that can be certified and who therefore render a controversial style necessary. The challenge thrown down by doubters or agnostics is readily accepted, and fools are answered according to their folly and out of their own mouths! For their inconsistencies are mercilessly exposed, and if the author were not known to be an amiable man, we would be forced to conclude that he takes a malicious pleasure in the torture of his victims. For he shows at every turn that the fundamental principles of all knowledge, while denied to those who have a living and working faith, are tacitly assumed by these very doubters in the constructing of their systems of agnosticism. We can see the author, as he draws his vivid picture of the doubter deliberately engaged in cutting off the limb on which he unconsciously rests while wielding his destructive criticism. What can be more exquisite than the following bit of sarcasm, p. 390: "Moreover, there is assumed a positive and conclusive knowledge that the common mental representation of the reality of the world of things is *not* indeed what it claims to be, namely, cognition; it is mere sensation, mere ideation, mere abstract thinking and cannot be the truth in the sense which men usually attach to that word. But who does not see that so much nescience as this involves a vast amount of the most positive and comprehensive propositions, which, instead of confessing a skeptical attitude of mind toward truth and reality, the rather manifest an attitude of extreme dogmatism concealed under agnostic guise." Or the following, page 389: "Now, this 'I-do-not-know' may mean also

'You do not know' and even 'Nobody knows or ever will know, or ever can know.' This is nescience venturing into the field of epistemological philosophy and laying down a universal proposition. But it requires no critical insight or work of analysis in order to show that such nescience is the most confident and comprehensive kind of knowledge, if only it be regarded from a perfectly unprejudiced point of view." It will not do for the materialist, the doubter, the agnostic—the rose by any of these names emits the same odor—to lay down this book of Professor Ladd with contempt, or pooh pooh its method of dealing with them. The mirror is held up to nature, and if they turn their backs and refuse, like the crook in the rogues' gallery, to have their photograph taken, other people will behold their true likeness and recognize the inconsistencies of their work. And the readers who honestly believe something in the sciences of Nature will gladly accept the contribution to Philosophy which tends to show that there is both Design and a Designer, both in and above Nature.

JACOB COOPER.

**THE OLD TESTAMENT UNDER FIRE.** By A. J. F. Behrends, D.D., S.T.D. Pastor of the Central Congregational Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. Published by Funk & Wagnalls Company, N. Y.

This is a book of 246 pages. Its contents are divided into seven chapters as follows: *Our Lord's use of the Old Testament; Christ and the Old Testament; Criticism and the Old Testament; Criticism and Common Sense; The Historic Faith; The Integrity of the New Testament;* to which is added a note on Professor Adolph Harnack's last work. The papers were originally prepared for public audiences, and afterwards, yielding to the pressure of friends, the author has had them published. They do not, however, appear in the form of dissertations. They constitute a book. The several chapters are written in a clear, somewhat conversational style. The reader has no difficulty in understanding the author's meaning. The work is intended for "intelligent and thoughtful men" rather than for learned specialists, and hence is free of technical terms and phrases.

The aim of the book is to defend the traditional view of the Old Testament over against the Higher Criticism. For the most part, the work is an arraignment of the positions and arguments of Old Testament critics. As a consequence, it is negative rather than positive, setting forth more fully what the author does not believe than what he does believe. It is in fact itself a criticism on the views of the critics. Of course, his own opinions and views are given too throughout the book. He belongs to the conservative school of theology and yet there are indications and intimations here and there that he does not hold strictly to all traditional conceptions, as for example, the little importance he attaches to the inspiration of the Scriptures and the following



statements: "The traditional views of the origin of the present pentateuch may require modification;" and "It may be assumed that the biblical history must be complete and absolutely inerrant in every slightest detail. But the assumption is contradicted by the facts. There are incomplete and variant accounts, and thus far the differences have refused to melt together in the critical crucible. General credibility is all that we can claim." The author insists that in treating the various questions that may be raised in regard to the Scriptures a great deal of "downright common sense" ought to be brought into exercise, and he must be given credit for expressing many common sense views in this book.

Dr Behrends's contention is that the criticism on the Old Testament is largely conjectural; that the problems raised are insoluble; that unwarrantable assumptions are made by destructive criticism; that the charges of literary forgery are monstrous and intolerable; that literary criticism must be subordinated to the historical; that "the crucial question is whether the Old Testament is substantially correct in the account it gives of the rise and development of the true religion;" that the real difficulties are connected with the minor details and the fragmentary character of the Old Testament Scriptures; that all that can be claimed for them is general credibility. He lays great stress on the Lord's use of the Scriptures. Jesus referred to the Scriptures, based His teaching largely on them, quoted from them and appealed to them as witnessing to Him as the Messiah. And the Scriptures in His day and for several hundred years before were the Old Testament as we have it to-day. This is established by the Septuagint and the writings of Josephus. And all that we can do and the least we can do is to accept the Old Testament and use it as our Lord did without raising the questions of date, authorship and the like.

Our author further holds that the field opened by Higher Criticism is a fruitless and hopeless one; that no definite results can be reached; that the processes are too full of assumptions and suppositions; that different conclusions are consequently reached by different writers; that if our current literature were subjected to the same kind of treatment hopeless confusion would be created. All the foregoing and many other topics are enlarged upon by the author. He gives examples of analyses made of Genesis with the view of showing the unreliability and worthlessness of such procedures. He does not object to the researches of the critics, but he does protest against the promulgation of doubtful propositions as fixed and authoritative. "The intolerance of Ewald and Graf are as offensive and unbearable as the tyranny of Hildebrand and Boniface."

Dr. Behrends is an earnest writer; his words are born of his own experience; he believes what he says; and, hence, is very readable. But it seems to us that in many of his arguments he is

unfair in this, that he sets forth the opposite view in its worst light. It is a book that can be read with profit especially by those who are inclined to the radical way of thinking on the subjects treated.

We wish to call attention yet to the author's note at the end of the book in which he exults in the fact, as he thinks, that Professor Harnack in his last work, which has just appeared, has sounded the death-knell for radicalism. According to this "foremost scholar of Europe" there must be a return to conservatism, for "tradition speaks with authority." Dr. Behrends thinks that Wellhausen is about ready for burial.

But the New York *Independent* of August 26, 1897, in reviewing Professor Harnack's book seriously questions our author's representations. It says that in this work "not simply the accuracy of tradition at this or that point, but also its incorrectness at other points is demonstrated far more conclusively than ever before. It is certainly right in many, possibly in the majority of cases, but it does not speak with authority" (Harnack would be the last man to utter such a sentiment) and that it is frequently wrong \* \* \* is being shown ever more plainly."

The weakness in many of Dr. Behrends's positions is that he invariably assails the extreme views of Higher Criticism and gives no place to moderate positions. In fact, he does not believe that there can be any intermediate stopping place; logically, the critics must all arrive eventually at the conclusions of the extremists. Here to our mind he is in error. We can much more readily accept the position of the writer in the *Independent* when he says: "The change that has taken place does not mean the approaching rehabilitation of tradition, it means rather the approaching rehabilitation of the truth, which lies, as in so many cases, between the two extremes."

A. E. T.

**THE THEOLOGY OF LUTHER**, in Its Historical Development and Inner Harmony. Dr. Julius Köstlin, Professor and Consistorialrath at Halle. Translated from the Second German Edition, by Rev. Charles E. Hays, A.M. Complete in two volumes. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. 1897. Price of two volumes, \$4.50, net.

Luther was undoubtedly the greatest of the reformers of the sixteenth century. Though there were others of his time who possessed greater learning and excelled him in certain special gifts, yet there was none who equalled him in "rugged sterling sense and strength," in intensity and force of character, and as a spiritual leader. Carlyle not unaptly designates him, "a right spiritual hero and prophet, a true son of nature and fact, for whom these centuries, and many that are to come, will be thankful to heaven." The theology of Luther, therefore, is something of more than denominational interest and requires to be studied

by all those who would thoroughly acquaint themselves with, and understand rightly, the progress of the world's religious thought.

In the two volumes before us the theology of Luther is presented to us in a very complete and satisfactory manner. The author of them, Dr. Köstlin, is generally acknowledged to be the foremost Lutheran scholar of our times, which, in itself, is a guarantee of their superior value.

The work itself is divided into four parts or books. Of these the *first* treats of the inner life and the doctrine of Luther before the indulgence controversy; the *second*, of the great reformatory testimony of Luther from the promulgation of the ninety-five theses until the Diet of Worms: A. D., 1517 to A. D., 1521; the *third*, of the principal points in which an advance is manifest in the doctrine of Luther after his retirement at the Wartburg, developed in opposition not only to Catholicism, but particularly to tendencies which appeared upon the territory of the Reformation itself; and the *fourth*, of the doctrinal views of Luther presented in systematic order. The treatment throughout is masterly and, also, highly interesting and instructive. The author does not merely give us his own opinions, but illustrates his assertions by abundant quotations from the entire range of the reformer's writings.

The translation of the work into English has, also, been admirably done. If it were not stated in the title page that it is a translation, one might naturally suppose that the work was originally written in English, so clear and smooth is the style of the translation. One cannot but wish that all translations from the German were equally meritorious.

The work deserves a wide circulation not only in the Lutheran church, but among Christians of all denominations. The careful reader of it cannot fail to gain much valuable information from it and to be spiritually benefited.

J. M. T.

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY. By Leonard Woolsey Bacon. New York: The Christian Literature Company. Pages, x and 429. Price, \$2.00. 1897.

This is the last volume of the series of American Church History, which has been published by the Christian Literature Company. It is, however, sold also separately. The mechanical execution of the work is all that could be desired. The paper and printing make it a real luxury to the eye, as its contents are a delight to the mind. The author is a son of Dr. Leonard Bacon, of New Haven, Conn., and from such a source one would only expect a work of the highest order of merit, which expectation is not disappointed in the case before us. Dr. Bacon seems to be well qualified for historical composition. His style is accurate and stately, his grasp of historical material clear and strong and

his judgment well balanced and cultivated, and they made no mistake, accordingly, who imposed upon him the task of writing this history of American Christianity.

The task thus imposed, however, was not an easy one. It was not to write a history of the American Church, for as yet there is no American Church, and it is doubtful if there will ever be one. Christianity exists in America in a number of independent *denominations* or *churches*—their total at present being 143, including Mormons and Spiritualists—the leading ones of which are of European origin, and present striking differences of national and religious character. Still, there is a fundamental unity of religion in all of them. And here in America, moreover, in consequence of the mutual attrition and influence upon each other of the various denominations, something of a common religious life has been formed, which, together with its expression in the way of practical and intellectual activity, may not unfitly be called American Christianity. And to present a living picture of this American Christianity, involving only so much of the history of the various Christian denominations as serves to give body and color to the general outlines of the picture, was the task proposed to the author of this volume. It can easily be seen how the very abundance of the material presenting itself and the diversity of its nature and character must have combined to make that task a difficult one. Nevertheless, the result is a volume of exceedingly interesting historical writing, whose general accuracy and fairness, we presume, will hardly be questioned by the adherents of any one of the denominations.

In chaste and stately language, befitting a work of the historic muse, the author briefly relates the story of the discovery and early colonization of America by Spaniards and Frenchmen, and then shows how North America was irretrievably lost to the Spanish and French Churches, and how it fell to the possession of various branches of the great Teutonic stock of peoples, who had lately thrown off the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and adopted a form of Christianity more in harmony with their national taste and genius. The various chapters recounting the settlement of various European colonists, with their diverse ecclesiastical establishments, in different parts of the North American continent, will be read with intense interest. The German immigration into Pennsylvania, the work of Schlatter, and the foundation of the Reformed Church are here described with sufficient fulness of details to make it inexcusable hereafter for intelligent people to be ignorant of the existence of such a Church as the Reformed; and in answer to the question, What is the Reformed Church, it will be enough hereafter to refer to this volume of Dr. Bacon's. The origin of other Churches, of course, receives equally satisfactory notice. And then we have an account of the leading events in the history of American Christianity. The great awakening in the time of Edwards, of Wesley and of

Whitfield; the decline of all church life and religion during the war of the Revolution, and afterwards; the restoration of the Churches subsequently, and the foundation of colleges, theological schools, missionary societies, Sunday-schools and similar institutions, during the early part of the present century; the divisive movements within the Churches, and the tendency to sectism during the first half of the century; the conflict of the Churches with public wrongs, such as dueling, negro slavery and intemperance—all these themes are eloquently discussed in the volume before us.

One of the most interesting chapters of this interesting volume is on "The Church in Theology and Literature," in which a rapid review is given of the most important theological movements and controversies that have taken place in the American Churches up to the present time. We quote entire the following paragraph on "The Mercersburg Theology," in which we are sure our readers will be interested. After speaking of the controversy occasioned by the writings of Dr. Horace Bushnell, the author continues: "Another wholesome and edifying debate was occasioned by the publications that went forth from the College and Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Church situated at Mercersburg in Pennsylvania. At this institution was effected a fruitful union of American and German theology; the result was to commend to the general attention aspects of truth, philosophical, theological, and historical, not previously current among American Protestants. The book of Dr. John Williamson Nevin, entitled 'The Mystical Presence: A Vindication of the Reformed or Calvinistic Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist,' revealed to the vast multitude of churches and ministers that gloried in the name of Calvinist the fact that on the most distinctive article of Calvinism, they were not Calvinists at all, but Zwinglians. The enunciation of the standard doctrine of the various Presbyterian Churches excited among themselves a clamor of 'Heresy!' and the doctrine of Calvin was put upon trial before the Calvinists. The outcome of a discussion that extended itself far beyond the boundaries of the comparatively small and uninfluential German Reformed Church was to elevate the point of view and broaden the horizon of American students of the constitution and history of the Church. Later generations of students owe no light obligation to the fidelity and courage of Dr. Nevin, as well as to the erudition and immense productive diligence of his associate, Dr. Philip Schaff," p. 377.

The quotation of the above paragraph will at once serve the double purpose of enabling us "to see ourselves as others see us," and of affording us a fair sample of our author's style of writing. With a view to the latter end we shall quote one more paragraph. After having given a brief account of the origin of the higher criticism, and of the agitations and troubles which it has occasioned, the author continues as follows: "The undeniably grave

theological difficulties occasioned by the results of critical study have given rise to a novel dogma concerning the Scriptures, which, if it may justly be claimed as a product of the Princeton Seminary, would seem to discredit the modest boast of the venerated Dr. Charles Hodge, that 'Princeton has never originated a new idea.' It consists in the hypothesis of an 'original autograph' of the Scriptures, the precise contents of which are now undiscoverable, but which differed from any existing text in being absolutely free from error of any kind. The hypothesis has no small advantage in this, that if it is not susceptible of proof, it is equally secure from refutation. If not practically useful, it is at least novel, and on this ground entitled to mention in recounting the contributions of the American Church to theology at a really perilous point in the progress of Biblical study." Pages 380-1. We should like to quote what our author says on the liturgical literature of the American Churches, and on the advancement of public worship, but our space forbids. Besides, we have said enough to give our readers a fair idea of what the work before us is like. We cordially commend this work to all who are interested in Church history, and who want a single volume for the purpose of *Orientation* in the history of American Christianity.

THE GERMAN EXODUS TO ENGLAND IN 1709. Prepared at the request of the Pennsylvania German Society by Frank Ried Diffenderffer, member of the Pennsylvania German Society, etc. Lancaster, Pa. Pages, 156. 1897.

The main portion of this elegant volume consists of a paper read before the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania German Society, in Philadelphia, 1896. There are, however, numerous appendices, consisting of letters and documents never before published and serving to throw light upon the subject with which they are connected. The volume is also profusely illustrated by portraits of noted men and women of the period with which it has to do and by views of famous places. A fine portrait of the genial and gifted author fronts the title-page, which will serve greatly to enhance the value of the book to his friends.

The event treated in this volume forms one of the strangest episodes in all history. It was nothing less than a *Massenauswanderung der Pfälzer*—a migration *en masse* of Palatines, into England, in the year 1709, for the sake of physical subsistence and religious security and peace. The movement began in the spring of the year, and before the autumn there were more than 14,000 (some put the figures much higher) Germans from the Palatinate of the Rhine, mostly members of the Reformed Church, encamped in and about London; and still they were coming. What was the cause of this strange movement? Mr. Diffenderffer shows that a variety of causes coöperated. The country of the Palatinate, naturally one of the fairest and richest provinces of



Europe, had been devastated by many years of war. The inhabitants had been plundered and impoverished. Their cities had been burned and their homes desolated. Then came the cold winter of 1708-9, whose severity was unexampled in all previous as well as subsequent time. During that winter thousands of men, women and children died of hunger and cold. The Government, which was then in the hands of a Catholic Elector, John William of Newburg, cared not for the sufferings of Protestants. The Elector claimed that he was not persecuting his Protestant subjects. The fact was, however, that these subjects felt safer in England than they did on their own native soil, and to England they fled as fast as provision could be made for their transportation. In England, whose throne was then occupied by Queen Anne, there was much sympathy felt for the suffering Palatines, and their migration was encouraged in various ways by the Queen herself and by men high in authority. These men were influenced by the highest motives. There were, however, others encouraging the movement whose motives were not so pure. They were men interested in American colonization schemes. Among these was William Penn himself. And there is reason to believe that many of the migrating Palatines themselves had their eyes set upon America as the ultimate goal of their wandering. They pressed into England only because from England they expected to get to America, where no French swords, no starvation and no religious oppression would await them. But the movement thus at first encouraged by English statesmen, philanthropists and speculators grew to such proportions that, ere long, it became alarming. The Palatines came faster than they could be cared for, and it became a serious problem what to do with them. It is said that 3,800 were sent to Ireland, 650 to North Carolina and 3,200 to New York. Many of the latter, after much suffering, finally made their way into Pennsylvania, and their descendants are now among the most substantial citizens of this noble commonwealth. Of those who were sent to Ireland, many afterwards returned to England, and about 2,000 of the wanderers were subsequently returned to Germany, while the balance died in England. This German migration cost the English government £135,775, which would be equivalent now to nearly three-fourths of a million dollars.

The above is but a brief synopsis of the story so well told by Mr. Diffenderffer in the eloquent pages of this volume. It is a story of the trials and sufferings of the ancestors of that German race which now constitutes so large and influential a part of the population of certain portions of the union. Mr. Diffenderffer's volume shows how much labor it cost to establish this race here on American soil. We quote in this connection the following paragraph from his conclusion: "The silver-tipped tongue of the orator, the pencil of the artist and the lyre of the poet can not adequately tell the tale, and while the divine hand of Clio shall

guide the eloquent pen of history, she will find no theme more worthy of her mission than this story of our ancestors, staking their all upon an uncertain venture into the new world. Bearing aloft that grand motto of their race, *ohne hast, ohne rast*, they pressed onward toward the goal of their hopes with the same energy, determination and unflinching courage with which their ancestors seventeen centuries before had defied the power of Rome and hurled back the legions of Cæsar."

OUTLINES OF SPECIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT : with an Introductory Statement upon Old Testament Philology. By J. G. Lansing, D.D., Gardner A. Sage, Professor of Old Testament Languages and Exegesis in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. Publisher, J. Heidingsfeld, New Brunswick, N. J. Pages, 238. 1897.

No other theological discipline has suffered so many changes within the present generation as that of Old Testament Introduction. Within this time the traditional view of the origin of the books of the Old Testament, inherited by the Christian Church from the Synagogue, has been thoroughly shaken and in many respects discredited. Without any loss of faith in the Old Testament as a record of divine revelation, such scholars as Davidson, Cheyne, Driver, Briggs and many others have studied the books of the Old Testament from a literary point of view, and have come to the conclusion that in regard to the date and manner of their composition the received tradition must in many cases be given up. This literary study of the books of Scripture constitutes what has been called the *higher criticism* of the Bible.

To the conclusions of this higher criticism the attitude of the volume before us is entirely negative and hostile. The author, of course, knows this criticism, at least through the representations of its opponents, but he is determined that he will have none of it. In a single case only does he yield to the arguments of the critics, namely, in the case of the book of Ecclesiastes, which he admits was not written by Solomon, but by some unknown writer at a much later date. In all other respects the received tradition stands as it has always stood. The Pentateuch, as we now have it, is a *whole* which Moses wrote in the wilderness, although he may have had before him various written sources from which to draw his material. (How about the last chapter of Deuteronomy?) The books of Chronicles were not written after the time of Alexander, as the critics maintain on the basis of 1 Chron. 3 : 19-24, which brings down the genealogy of Zerubbabel to the *sixth* generation, but in the time of Ezra, and shortly after the proclamation of Cyrus. The book of Job is not a religious drama dating from the time after the Exile, but a veritable history *written most likely by Moses*, at any rate by some one who lived in the time of Moses; and its theme is not the question, *Why do the righteous suffer?*—but the proposition that *the righteous can suffer and still endure steadfast in their piety*. Of the Psalms,

some are erroneously ascribed to David, but the majority of those attributed to him are "unquestionably" his. This is true notably of Ps. 110, because it is referred to by Christ as a Psalm of David; which settles the question, although most of the critics maintain that this particular Psalm *must* date from the Maccabean age. It is a fixed canon for our author that any reference by Christ or the apostles to any book in the Old Testament by any particular title, settles the question of authorship. For this reason the book of Isaiah must be regarded from beginning to end as the work of the son of Amoz; for in the New Testament quotations are contained from what the critics now call the deutero-Isaianic part of the book, under the general name of Isaiah. For the same reason also the book of Jonah must be regarded as a book of real history. "Christ affixes the seal of His authority to the book," and that settles the question of its origin and character. "It is not fiction, allegory, myth, or legend, but an account of that which actually took place, genuine history, of deep prophetic-symbolic and typical significance."

But we have said enough to show that the author of this volume is one upon whom the waves of critical theory have beaten in vain. He stands as firmly against the anti-traditional theories as the rock of Gibraltar stands against the billows of the Atlantic. As for analysis and arrangement of contents of the various books of the Old Testament, the volume before us is most admirable. In brief compass the author gives an analysis of each book, and then a summary of its theology and of its Messianic teaching. In regard to the substance of these summaries, of course, many will differ with him; but the plan is certainly a most excellent one, and well calculated to meet the wants of theological professors and students. The clear and compact style of composition also fits it well for use in theological seminaries. In fact, it seems to us that institutions determined to fortify their students against all conclusions reached by the methods of the higher criticism, could do no better than to introduce this volume for class-room purposes. And even those of an opposite tendency might use it profitably as a guide by means of which to work out their own conclusions; for which its brevity and distinctness of plan fit it very well.

**A MANUAL OF ETHICS.** By John S. Mackenzie, M.A., Professor of Logic and Philosophy in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Third Edition. Revised, enlarged, and in part re-written. *University Tutorial Series.* Pages, 456. Price, \$1.50. 1897. University Correspondence College Press. London: W. B. Clive, 13 Booksellers' Row. New York: Hinds & Noble, 4 Cooper Institute.

The second edition of this work was noticed in this REVIEW a few years ago. The fact that a work of this kind goes through three editions inside of the space of five years, may be regarded as a sufficient guarantee of its general excellence and usefulness. The public knows a good thing of this kind, when it sees it, and

appreciates it. Besides the fact that in a comparatively short time the work has gone through three editions, reference may be made also to the fact that it has been introduced as a text-book into *forty-five* American colleges and universities, among which are Yale College, Brown University, Lafayette College, University of Virginia, Heidelberg College, etc. It has now been largely rewritten, increased in size by one hundred pages, and made still more worthy of the generous reception which has been accorded to it in the previous editions. In this revision the original spirit and tendency of the book have not been changed.

In a treatise on ethics very much depends upon the metaphysical standpoint that is adopted. It may be possible to produce a system of ethics without a formal discussion of metaphysical principles; but such principles will be present after all and will exercise a determinative influence upon ethical thought. In the work before us this truth is clearly recognized, and the author avows himself as belonging to the school of *Idealism*, i. e., the school founded by Kant and developed by Hegel, Green and others. The influence of Professor Green is especially recognizable throughout the volume, as it is in fact in all the ethical thought of the English race in modern times. And this fact is the more gratifying in view of the strongly materialistic tendency which has prevailed for some time, owing to the influence of the theory of evolution. Mr. Herbert Spencer, though not himself a consistent materialist, has written ethics on the assumption of pure materialism. Ethical ideas, on this theory, are merely transformed and transmitted sensations, and volition is only a transformation of physical energy. In view of such theories it is a relief to turn to a work like that of Professor Mackenzie's, in which the ideal element in human nature is so clearly recognized, without the faults, however, that have usually adhered to idealism. The special merit which belongs to this work, and, indeed, in some measure, to all English ethical writings influenced by the thinking of Professor Green, is that it recognizes both the spiritual or ideal and the natural elements in the constitution of human nature and in the determination of human conduct. A work on ethics thus comes to be very much more than a discussion of the principle of the moral law, the origin of conscience, and the question of freedom.

The work before us, after an introduction treating, in three chapters, of the scope of ethics, of the relation of ethics to other sciences and of the divisions of the subject, is divided into three books. The first book consists of prolegomena, chiefly psychological. Here we have discussions of such themes as *desire* and *will*, *motive* and *intention*, *character* and *conduct*, *evolution of conduct*, *growth of the moral judgment*, *significance of the moral judgment*. The second book discusses *theories of the moral standard*. Its subordinate topics are the *development of ethical thought*, the *types of ethical thought*, the *standard as law*, the *stan-*

*dard as happiness and the standard of perfection.* Self-perfection, or the harmonious adjustment of the various elements of our lives within an ideal unity, together with the feeling of happiness accompanying this adjustment, according to Professor Mackenzie, constitutes the highest good or the supreme end of moral action. The general subject of the last book is *the moral life*. This is discussed in seven chapters treating respectively of *the social unity, moral institutions, the duties, the virtues, the individual life, moral pathology and moral progress*. A concluding chapter treats on *ethics and metaphysics*. We do not hesitate to commend this volume to all who are interested in the most recent ethical thought. They may not agree with all the positions of the author, but the careful perusal of his work cannot fail to be profitable.

**KARMA: A Story of Early Buddhism.** By Paul Carus. Third edition. Illustrated and printed by T. Hasegawa, Tokyo, Japan, for the Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ills.

This brief story is intended to illustrate that a man's Karma—character and destiny combined—consists of all the deeds which he has done. "We are what we have done. Our Karma constitutes our nature." This story has been translated into Russian by Count Tolstoi, who commends it to his countrymen, and says that it sheds light on two fundamental truths of Christianity, namely, that life consists only in renunciation of self, and that the good of men is in union with God, and through Him with each other.

**OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION BASED ON PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY.** By August Sabatier. James Pott & Company, Fourth Avenue and 22d Street, New York. 1897. Pages 348.

The author of this work is a Frenchman and a Huguenot, who was formerly connected with the Protestant Faculty of Theology at Strasburg, and is now a Professor in the Faculty of Protestant Theology in Paris. He is in the fifty-ninth year of his age, and is a man of mature mind, as well as of thorough and accomplished scholarship, whose opinions in his particular sphere of thought must be received with respect. He has written a good deal on religious subjects; and his work on "The Apostle Paul," which also exists in an English dress, forms one of the most interesting treatises in the great mass of recent Pauline literature. And we are sure the work here brought to the attention of our readers will take equally high rank on the subject with which it is connected. The translation has been well done, and is clear and smooth. We have noticed a few infelicities of style, which must be set to the account of the translator, and which will doubtless be corrected in a future edition. For instance, in the middle of page 270 we have "on" for "concerning," and in the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 275, confusion is created



by the unnecessary insertion of the pronoun "it." But these are only trifles; and the reader has no difficulty in understanding the thought of the author in the English garb in which it is presented. We cannot help, however, expressing our regret at the omission from the translation of two sections of the original, acknowledged on page 122. It is said, indeed, that these "sections are non-essential;" but in a work of this kind we should prefer to have all that the author has written.

In order to write a philosophy of religion a man must himself be religious; just as a man would have to be an artist in order to produce a satisfactory theory of art; for religion is something subjective and personal, which only he can understand who has the experience of it in his own consciousness; and a philosophy of religion must largely be an analysis of the religious consciousness. M. Sabatier, according to his own declaration, fulfills this condition. He is a religious man; and this treatise on the philosophy of religion may be regarded as in some sense a confession of his religious faith. This, indeed, seems to be his own conception of it; for on page 222 he writes as follows: "In sketching the broad outlines of the religious history of humanity, I have had but one object; I have wished to show the men of my generation why I remain religious, Christian and Protestant. I am religious because I am a man and do not desire to be less than human, and because humanity, in me and in my race, commences and completes itself in religion and by religion. I am Christian because I cannot be religious in any other way, and because Christianity is the perfect and supreme form of religion in this world. Lastly, I am Protestant, not from any confessional zeal, nor from racial attachment to the family of Huguenots, although I thank God daily that I was born in that family, but because in Protestantism alone can I enjoy the heritage of Christ—that is to say, because in it I can be a Christian without placing my conscience under any external yoke, and because I can fortify myself in communion with and in adoration of an immanent Deity by consecrating to Him the activity of my intellect, the natural affections of my heart, and find in this moral consecration the free expansion and development of my whole being."

In addition to this confession of our author's faith, we quote a few sentences from the preface of this book, as showing the purpose of its preparation and publication: "It is of the young that I have thought, while preparing these pages, and it is to them that I dedicate them. To a generation that believed it could repose in Positivism in philosophy, utilitarianism in morals, and naturalism in art and poetry, has succeeded a generation that torments itself more than ever with the mystery of things, that is attracted by the ideal, that dreams of social fraternity, of self-renunciation, of devotion to the lowly, to the miserable, to the oppressed—devotion like the heroism of Christian love." For this young generation, then, with its idealistic and mystic ten-



dencies, and its generous impulses—a generation that *must be religious* although it cannot be such in the dogmatic fashion of an earlier time—this treatise on the philosophy of religion was composed; and we shall be surprised if the younger generation of thinking men and women in America do not give to it an equally hearty reception with that which it may receive in France.

The work before us is divided into three books, whose respective titles are *Religion*, *Christianity*, and *Dogma*. In the first book the author treats of *the psychological origin and nature of religion, of religion and revelation, of miracle and inspiration, and of the religious development of humanity*. Religion, our author holds, arises necessarily out of the conflict of self-consciousness and world-consciousness in the evolution of the life of humanity. Hence, all men are of necessity religious. Religion is the free and conscious intercourse of the soul with the Being upon whom it feels itself to be dependent. Religion, therefore, necessarily presupposes revelation. Religion and revelation are correlative; for to the religious act on the part of man must correspond an act of self-manifestation on the part of Deity; but both acts must take place within the consciousness of the human subject. Divine revelation, accordingly, belongs to all religions, and is supernatural as well as natural: supernatural because it proceeds from the impression of a being which is other than man, and natural because it is accomplished in the natural conditions of the human mind. This divine revelation does not consist in the communication of ready-made religious ideas, but in divine impressions, in the excitation of sentiments and feelings, that may be interpreted by the reason. This interpretation will be conditioned by the general state of intellectual culture; and so there come to be different religious systems in different times and among different races of men. In the religious development of humanity a "special vocation" belonged to the people of Israel. Their mission was to mediate the realization of the absolute religion, in which God becomes internal to the human consciousness, and manifests Himself as the principle of justification and salvation.

In the second book, under the general title of *Christianity*, we have, in three chapters, a discussion of *Hebraism, or the origins of the Gospel, of the essence of Christianity, and of the great historical forms of Christianity*. Christianity grew out of Judaism, though it has roots also in the general religious life of humanity, but especially in the soil of Greek culture. In the history of Israel it was *prophetism*, which served as the force by which Christianity was evolved. Christianity is an *evolution*, because there is an organic continuity between it and the religious life of the world that preceded it; but it is also a new moral creation transcending anything that existed before it—it is the crown of the religious evolution of humanity. Its perfection consists in the perfect realization of the oneness of God and man

first in the consciousness of Jesus and thence in the consciousness of His followers. This oneness of God and man, which, however, must not be understood in the sense of *identity*, is the essence of Christianity. And it is the distinction of Jesus Christ to have been the first man to realize this union in His consciousness. The experience of the consciousness of Christ has become a force in history that can never be lost. *This is Christianity.*

Of course, it is hardly necessary to say that this is not orthodox Christianity; at least it is not orthodox Christianity in its completeness. The author does not put it forward as such. He does not accept the traditional Christology, which, he says, makes Jesus "only a deity walking in the midst of His contemporaries hidden beneath a human figure." This Christology, he thinks, is incurably Docetic. "The traditional Christology," he says, "has been so incurably Docetic that it has been practically impossible, from this point of view, to write a serious life of Jesus without falling into the heresy, at once modern and semi-pagan, of *Kenosis*, the theory according to which the pre-existent and eternal deity commits suicide by incarnating Himself in order gradually to be re-born and find Himself God again at the end of His human life," p. 142. Jesus was a man; but He was without sin; and He was a perfect man, and, therefore, a perfect manifestation of Deity. M. Sabatier rejects Strauss's dictum that the finite cannot represent the infinite, if the idea of the infinite is taken, not in a quantitative, but in a synthetic or qualitative sense. But this conception of the character of Jesus does not remove the record of His life above the reach of criticism. It is in this way that M. Sabatier gets rid of the nimbus of miracles, which surrounds the life of Jesus, and which creates so much difficulty in modern religious thought. "If prodigy has penetrated into the life of Jesus at one or two points," he says, "the explanation is to be found in the mistakes, or in the legendary corruptions for which His biographers alone are responsible, and which criticism may eliminate without violence," page 73. Of course, this cannot be regarded as a satisfactory account of the character of Christ. Whatever difficulties there may be connected with the traditional Christology—and they are confessedly great—yet no theory of Christ's person can be accepted which robs Him of His Divinity, and takes Him from the Church as an object of worship. We do not think, then, that on this point M. Sabatier has solved the difficulty which he has so trenchantly uncovered; and here there is room for still further thought.

The last book of the work under notice treats of *Dogma*. Under this general heading the author discusses, in four chapters, the following subjects: *What is dogma? The life of dogmas and their historical evolution; The science of dogmas; and The critical theory of religious knowledge.* The author does not regard dogmas as something superfluous in the life of religion. The idea of dogma is inseparable from the idea of a Church, as the idea of a

Church is inseparable from the idea of a perfect religion. "A dogma is a doctrine of which the Church has made a law." This is all right. No religious community can exist without common doctrines; but common doctrines can only be maintained by authority, that is by their being made into *dogmas* or *legalized opinions*. Dogmas are not revealed from heaven. Nor are they fabricated out of ready-made ideas and propositions derived from some formal code of revelation. They are a necessary product of religious life and piety in the bosom of a community, just as sacred scriptures are; but they are no more immutable than is the community itself. Only a Church that claims to be infallible can issue immutable dogmas. Protestantism cannot do so because Protestantism is progressive; and for it to claim the right of setting forth dogmas binding upon the reason and conscience of all men in all times, would be to fall into a radical contradiction with its own principle. Immutable dogmas are dead dogmas; for only dead things never change. A dogma that shall be alive and worth anything, must be in a state of constant flux. It can easily be seen what havoc the acceptance of such a view would make of the science of dogmatics, which pretends to accurate knowledge on a great variety of unknowable things.

The most interesting and also the most difficult chapter in the book before us is that which treats of the *theory of religious knowledge*. Here we have first a discussion of the general principles of knowledge, the author adopting as his own theory a kind of modified Kantianism, which is then applied to the knowledge of religious truth. But we have no space for any further remarks; and we commend the book itself to the careful study of our readers, being sure that, though they will not adopt all its views, they will find in it much to make them think, and not a little which they will be glad to accept.